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 ABSTRACT 
 
 
Forced displacement of people is one of the most complex humanitarian problems facing 
the international community.  Long-term forced displacement generates a range of 
political, security and humanitarian concerns including regional instability, transnational 
crime and a regression in the quality of life for both refugees and their host communities. 
Grappling with this issue, scholars and practitioners have turned to the field of transitional 
justice as a possible source of solutions. Transitional justice refers to the set of 
mechanisms societies use to respond to a history of atrocities, including criminal trials, 
truth commissions and reparation programs. Scholars describe the potential for these 
mechanisms to respond to the justice needs of refugees, thereby improving prospects for 
their repatriation, and contributing to the success of their reintegration after return.  
 
To date, the interaction between transitional justice and refugees has had three main 
features. The first is an almost exclusive use of a legal framework of human rights to 
structure the interaction between refugees and transitional justice. This means that the 
law determines the understanding of the harm refugees suffer, as well as the methods by 
which that harm might be repaired. Second, the existing approach focuses on state-led 
mechanisms of transitional justice, with limited engagement with local or customary 
approaches to achieving justice for refugees, and little acknowledgment of refugee voices. 
And finally, scholars and practitioners describe the ultimate goal of the interaction 
between transitional justice and refugees as refugee return. 
 
There is little empirical work examining the standard approach to the interaction between 
transitional justice and refugees. My thesis addresses this gap, offering two case studies: 
Liberia and Afghanistan. Through these case studies, I scrutinise the claims of the existing 
scholarship, and compare those claims with the lived experience of refugees. Overall, my 
findings suggest that transitional justice as conventionally understood is often ill-
equipped to support the justice outcomes that refugees seek. In particular, I demonstrate 
how the dominance of law and the influence of the transitional state restricted the ways 
that Liberian and Afghan refugees were able to engage with transitional justice processes. 
Based on refugee perspectives of harm, accountability and reparations, I propose an 
alternate understanding of the objective of refugee engagement in transitional justice: that 
of rebuilding the state-citizen relationship. This understanding more closely aligns with 
the justice outcomes refugees in Liberia and Afghanistan hoped to achieve, and suggests 
that repair of displacement may take place in the absence of physical return, and in forums 
other than those of legal, institutionalised transitional justice.  
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CHAPTER 1: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND DISPLACEMENT 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
The idea for this thesis arose over the course of several years, when I was employed as a 
Protection Officer with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 
In a range of different contexts, refugees approached my colleagues and me, seeking to 
engage with justice initiatives taking place in their countries of origin. In Jordan, for 
example, Iraqi refugees asked how they could achieve restitution of their property through 
the Commission for the Resolution of Real Property Disputes, without being required to 
return to Iraq. Some explained that having access to housing was critical to their ability 
to consider repatriation. Others, who were unwilling to repatriate, explained that if they 
could reclaim their property then the proceeds of its sale could support their family to 
survive abroad. In Indonesia, to give a second example, Sri Lankan refugees asked how 
they could provide testimony to the Sri Lankan Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation 
Commission initiated following the end of Sri Lanka’s civil war. The motivation for some 
refugees was to obtain official recognition of their suffering, while others believed that 
by participating in the Commission’s activities they could contribute in a small way to a 
peaceful Sri Lanka.  
 
This type of experience brought to my attention the field of transitional justice. 
Transitional justice refers to the processes a society uses in an attempt to deal with past 
atrocities after the end of a conflict, or an authoritarian regime.1 It includes an array of 
responses, such as criminal trials, property restitution, truth commissions, and 
reparations. As a field, it has not typically been concerned with the justice claims of 
                                                        
1 Pablo de Greiff, ‘Theorizing Transitional Justice’ in Melissa Williams, Rosemary Nagy, and Jon Elster 
(eds), NOMOS LI: Transitional Justice (New York University Press, 2012) 31, 34. 
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refugees. However, in the late twentieth century, as both the number of refugees and their 
time in displacement grew substantially, scholars began to consider the ways that 
transitional justice might contribute towards achieving a solution for refugees. As such, 
the existing scholarship is largely concerned with the merits of engaging refugees in 
transitional justice processes. For example, scholars claim extending the reach of 
transitional justice to refugees might provide them with an opportunity to receive 
recognition of the wrongs they have suffered, and obtain redress for that harm. 2  In 
addition, mechanisms such as truth commissions might generate reconciliation between 
refugees and their non-displaced compatriots, while reparations could offer economic 
assistance to support refugees when they return.3  
 
This thesis undertakes an empirical study of the interaction between transitional justice 
and displacement, and the claims scholars make regarding that interaction. It focuses on 
two case studies: Liberia and Afghanistan. When I first began research for this thesis, I 
held many of the assumptions reflected in the existing scholarship: that transitional justice 
should result in positive justice outcomes for refugees, and that the primary question to 
be determined is the technical design of their engagement. However, once I started 
fieldwork, I quickly realised that refugee interactions with transitional justice were much 
more complex. This shifted the focus of my research from the technical design of 
transitional justice programs to understanding how and why the interests of refugees and 
states come into conflict, and how the existing practice of transitional justice responds to 
that conflict. Overall, my thesis findings suggest that the high expectations of transitional 
justice scholars and practitioners with regard to refugee engagement are not always met. 
Moreover, transitional justice as conventionally understood is often ill equipped to 
                                                        
2 Roger Duthie, ‘Introduction: Incorporating Transitional Justice into the Response to Displacement’ in 
Roger Duthie (ed), Transitional Justice and Displacement (Social Science Research Council, 2012) 11, 24.  
3 Ibid.  
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produce the justice outcomes refugees desire, mainly because refugees often conceive of 
harm, accountability and reparations in quite different ways to that of conventional 
transitional justice.   
 
This first chapter begins by reflecting on the refugee figure: who is a refugee, and why 
does it matter? It then turns to the history of transitional justice, its theoretical basis, and 
how it came to recognise the justice claims of refugees. The chapter discusses how the 
existing practice of transitional justice engages refugees, and the outcomes both scholars 
and practitioners anticipate will result from the interaction. I then explain the contribution 
my thesis aims to make, and conclude with an overview of the contents of the thesis. 
 
1.2 The Figure of the Refugee  
 
The primary subject of my thesis is the refugee. This categorisation – ‘refugee,’ as 
opposed to migrant, or victim, or citizen – is not a trivial matter. Rather, it is of discursive 
and practical significance, since the way in which people define themselves and how they 
are defined by others is critical to their ability to act as agents, and claim rights. 4 
Moreover, it determines what obligations – if any – a state owes towards persons who are 
displaced beyond their own borders.5 
 
The modern refugee occupies a distinct space and identity.6 Of course, there have been 
expulsions and displacements of peoples throughout history, and many examples of 
                                                        
4 Naila Kabeer, ‘Citizenship and the Boundaries of the Acknowledged Community: Identity, Affiliation 
and Exclusion (Working Paper No. 171, Institute of Development Studies, 2002) 32. 
5 Matthew Gibney, ‘Political Theory, Ethics and Forced Migration’ in Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al (eds), 
The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies (Oxford University Press, 2014) 51.  
6 Liisa Malkki, ‘Refugees and Exile: From Refugee Studies to the National Order of Things’ (1995) 24 
Annual Review of Anthropology 495, 497. See also: Peter Nyers, ‘Emergency or Emerging Identities? 
Refugees and Transformations in World Order’ (1999) 28 Millennium: Journal of International Studies 1, 
11. 
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individuals seeking sanctuary. However, prior to the twentieth century, the act of an 
individual seeking refugee abroad was romanticised as something heroic or noble,7 and 
exile carried with it ‘a touch of solitude and spirituality.’8 As the scale of forced migration 
increased exponentially in the twentieth century and individuals turned into destitute 
masses, all images of heroism were lost.9 More fundamentally, and of critical significance 
for the figure of the refugee, the twentieth century saw the nation-state system 
consolidated as the modern way to group, govern and identify people.  
 
The nation-state system established the idea of the sovereign state as the natural, and only, 
form of social and political organisation.10 In the twentieth century, structuring the world 
according to nation-state principles became so routinely assumed and banal that the 
construction process vanished from sight altogether.11 The effect was to entrench the idea 
that humans are supposed to be rooted to one place, 12  and to generate a vision of 
displacement as pathological.13 It also resulted in policy decisions such as the sealing of 
borders and the establishment of refugee camps and detention centres. 14  However, 
although the prevailing system of nation states is entrenched, it is in no way natural, 
normal, inevitable or uncontested. To the contrary, it is the result of a variety of 
historically contingent practices,15 primary amongst which are the concepts and practices 
of nationalism and sovereignty.16  
 
                                                        
7 Emma Haddad, The Refugee in International Society (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 67. 
8 Edward Said, Reflections on Exile and Other Essays (Harvard University Press, 2002) 181. 
9 Emma Haddad, above n 7, 68. 
10 Andreas Wimmer and Nina Schiller, ‘Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation-State Building, 
Migration and the Social Sciences’ (2002) 2(4) Global Networks 301, 302. 
11 Ibid, 304. 
12 Liisa Malkki, ‘National Geographic: The Rooting of Peoples and the Territorialisation of National 
Identity Among Scholars and Refugees’ (1992) 7(1) Cultural Anthropology 24, 24. 
13 Ibid, 34.  
14 Liisa Malkki, above n 6, 511-512.  
15 Peter Nyers, Rethinking Refugees: Beyond States of Emergency (Routledge, 2006) xi. See also: Nevzat 
Soguk, States and Strangers: Refugees and Displacements of Statecraft (University of Minnesota Press, 
1999) 38. 
16 Emma Haddad, above n 7, 65.  
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Nationalism concerns the way those who live within a nation-state conceive of 
themselves, and others. Benedict Anderson describes this as the process of creating an 
‘imagined community.’ Members of even the smallest nations will never know or meet 
all their fellow members, he explains, and ‘yet in the minds of each lives the image of 
their communion.’17 An essential element of nationalism is the understanding of nations 
as bordered, finite entities, since no nation considers itself coterminous with all of 
humanity.18 The crucial condition making modern politics possible is the ‘distinction 
between an inside and an outside, between the citizens, nations and communities within 
and the enemies, others and absences without.’ 19  Therefore, under the nation-state 
system, the citizen and the foreigner became mutually exclusive, exhaustive categories.20 
Those who do not belong, such as the refugee, form ‘a constitutive outside, a basis for 
identity formation against the identity or threat of something else.’21 They provide the 
‘others’ required for people to be able to invent for themselves a ‘we,’ as distinct from a 
‘they.’22  
 
The second practice underpinning the system of nation states is the concept of state 
sovereignty. Sovereignty comprises a set of norms concerning the legitimate organization 
of political authority, and was established with the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia.23 In its 
original conception, sovereignty was understood as the physical control a state exercised 
over its territory. States could point to their established border, and control of territory 
                                                        
17  Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 
(Verso, 1983) 15. 
18 Ibid, 16. 
19 RBJ Walker, ‘International Relations and the Concept of the Political,’ in Ken Booth and Steve Smith 
(eds), International Relations Theory Today (Polity Press, 1995) 306. 
20 William Rogers Brubaker, Citizen and Nationhood in France and Germany (Harvard University Press, 
1992) 46-47.  
21 Jennifer Hyndman, Managing Displacement: Refugees and the Politics of Humanitarianism (University 
of Minnesota Press, 2000) 1. 
22 Julia Kristeva, Strangers to Ourselves (Colombia University Press, 1991) 81. 
23 Christian Reus-Smit, ‘Human Rights and the Social Construction of Sovereignty’ (2001) 27(4) Review 
of International Studies 519, 526. 
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within, as evidence of their sovereignty. Within this conception, the treatment of citizens 
was considered a matter for each state, and a mutual respect for each state’s sovereignty 
constrained states from intervening in each other’s internal matters. However, after World 
War II, collective horror at the extent to which human rights had been disregarded led to 
the emergence of a new international legal regime and a transformed understanding of 
state sovereignty. In this new climate, sovereignty was no longer understood as a purely 
territorial matter, but also encompassed a state’s responsibility to ensure the human rights 
of all citizens living within its territory.24 A wide range of human rights instruments arose, 
which established obligations upon a state to take (or refrain from taking) certain actions, 
in order to protect the rights of its citizens.  
 
The new human rights regime was firmly grounded in the concept of the nation state. 
That meant that while states became responsible for protecting the rights of their citizens, 
there was no concurrent obligation to protect the rights of non-citizens. The implications 
of this state-centric system became acutely clear in the period after World War II when, 
across Europe, hundreds of thousands of people became displaced by conflict and 
persecution, and, simultaneously, a number of states chose to divest, or refused to 
recognise, the citizenship of groups of people previously included in their respective 
polities. Thousands of persons found themselves cast outside the state system, rendered 
‘nothing but human.’25 As a mere human, and not a citizen, refugees became deprived of 
a forum through which to claim rights protection.26 This meant that the loss of citizenship 
was politically tantamount to the loss of human rights altogether.27 
 
                                                        
24 Ibid, 528.  
25 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Harcourt, first published 1951, 1967 ed) 294, 300. 
26 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford University Press, 1998) 126, 
171.  
27 Seyla Benhabib, The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens (Cambridge University Press, 
2004) 50. Arendt, Hannah, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Harcourt, first published 1951, 1967 ed) 299. 
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The effect of the modern system of sovereign states is to deprive refugees not only of 
rights protection, but also of a forum in which to speak politically. It is the state that 
decides what qualifies as ‘normal’ political space, practice and identity, as well as which 
actions, or people, fall outside of it.28 From the perspective of the state, it is the citizen 
that is the ‘proper subject of political life: the principal agent of action, the source of all 
meaning of value.’29  Without citizenship, refugees are denied the capacity to speak 
politically and the expectation that they will be heard. 30  As Arendt explains, the 
fundamental deprivation of human rights is manifested ‘above all in the deprivation of a 
place in the world which makes opinions significant and actions effective…[Refugees] 
are deprived not of the right to freedom, but of the right to action; not of the right to think 
whatever they please, but of the right of opinion.’31 For Arendt, this lack of political 
significance was identical with a lack of life itself, since ‘life without speech and without 
action…is literally dead to the world; it has ceased to be a human life.’32 
 
Bearing this context in mind, who, then, is a refugee? The instrument primarily 
responsible for creating the legal identity of the refugee is the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
Article 1A specifies that a refugee is a person, who, ‘owing to a well-founded fear of 
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his [or her] nationality, and is 
unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that 
                                                        
28 Peter Nyers, above n 15, xii.   
29 Nevzat Soguk, States and Strangers: Refugees and Displacements of Statecraft (University of Minnesota 
Press, 1999) 9. 
30 Peter Nyers, above n 15, 17. 
31 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Harcourt, first published 1951, 1967 ed) 296.   
32 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (University of Chicago, 1958) 176.  
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country.’33 In general, scholars are critical of the 1951 Refugee Convention definition as 
too arbitrary or narrow to provide a plausible normative account of who is owed asylum.34 
 
One of the most influential critiques of the 1951 Refugee Convention originates with 
Shacknove. Shacknove identifies four implicit assumptions underlying the 1951 Refugee 
Convention definition: that a bond of trust, loyalty, protection and assistance between the 
citizen and the state constitutes the normal basis of society; that in the case of the refugee 
this bond has been severed; that persecution and alienage are always the physical 
manifestations of this severed bond; and that these manifestations are necessary and 
sufficient conditions for determining refugeehood.35 The limitation with this definition, 
he argues, is that persecution is a sufficient – but not necessary – condition for the 
severing of the bond between the state and the citizen. Rather, persecution is just one 
manifestation of a more fundamental absence of state protection.36 Therefore, Shacknove 
argues, a refugee should be understood as someone whose government fails to protect 
their basic needs, and who thereby has no remaining recourse other than to seek 
international restitution of these needs.37  
 
This understanding of the refugee highlights that states and citizens are bound by a 
minimal set of rights and duties. In exchange for their allegiance, citizens can minimally 
expect that their government will guarantee physical security, vital subsistence, and 
liberty of political participation and physical movement.38 When the state fails to respect 
citizens’ rights – or their ‘basic needs’ – the bond between the citizen and the state is 
                                                        
33 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 150 
(entered into force 22 April 1954).  
34 Matthew Gibney, ‘Political Theory, Ethics and Forced Migration’ in Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al (eds), 
The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies (Oxford University Press, 2014) 49. 
35 Andrew Shacknove, ‘Who is a Refugee?’ (1985) 95(2) Ethics 274, 275. 
36 Ibid, 277. 
37 Ibid, 284. 
38 Ibid, 281. 
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fractured. The refugee is thus created when norms of good governance within a state fail 
and she is forced to search for governmental protection in another state. Therefore, the 
fundamental criterion necessary for refugee status is a breakdown in the state-citizen 
relationship, and a refugee can be understood as someone who has been forced, in 
significant degree, outside the domestic political community indefinitely.39 
 
If refugeehood constitutes a breakdown in the state-citizen relationship, then repairing 
the harm associated with refugeehood must also address the state-citizen relationship. At 
the heart of this process is the concept of repatriation. Long argues that repatriation is far 
more than a simple act of return: it is a political commitment to the restoration (or in some 
cases construction) of political trust between refugee-nation and state. 40  It involves 
complex, long-term and gradual processes of reintegration and reconciliation.41 These 
processes involve ‘the remaking of citizenship and consequent re-accessing of rights 
through reavailment of national protection in the country of origin.’42 Repatriation, then, 
is fundamentally a political process.43  
 
Similarly, Bradley argues that the state is obligated to provide reparations for the forced 
severing of the state-citizen relationship. In her understanding, reparative action involves 
the state recognising the unacceptability of the abuses at the root of displacement, 
repositioning the refugee as a citizen empowered to make claims against the state, and 
deterring future violations of returnees’ rights. 44 Through reparations, the state of origin 
                                                        
39 Emma Haddad, above n 7, 42. 
40 Katy Long, ‘Statebuilding Through Refugee Repatriation’ (2012) 6(4) Journal of Intervention and State-
Building 369, 383.  
41 Katy Long, ‘Home Alone? A Review of the Relationship between Repatriation, Mobility and Durable 
Solutions for Refugees’ (UNHCR, Policy Development and Evaluation Service, March 2010) 6, 9. 
42 Ibid, 1, 3. 
43 Ibid; Lucy Hovil, ‘Hoping for Peace, Afraid of War: The Dilemmas of Repatriation and Belonging on 
the Borders of Uganda and South Sudan’ (UNHCR Research Paper No. 196, November 2010) 11.  
44 Megan Bradley, Refugee Repatriation: Justice, Responsibility and Redress (Cambridge University Press, 
2013) 62.  
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may affirm or re-establish its legitimacy by acknowledging and attempting to make good 
on the duties it abrogated by forcing its citizens into exile, as well as enabling returnees 
to rebuild their lives and their place in the political community.45 This understanding of 
repatriation shifts the focus from crossing a border, to the process of restructuring political 
relationships between states and citizens. 46  This means that it is the restoration of 
citizenship, rather than a return to physical territory, which is at the very heart of 
repatriation.47 
 
Citizenship, as understood in this context, is not just a matter of legal status, but 
encompasses a much broader sociological notion involving social membership and 
identity.48 At its most fundamental, it implies a legal and political status of belonging, 
imbuing large groups of people with a collective identity that makes sense of who they 
are both in relation to each other, and in relation to structures of power.49 What citizens 
share is membership in a rich cultural community constituted by common social practices, 
cultural traditions and shared ethical understandings.50 There are a number of different 
frameworks for understanding citizenship. While a comprehensive discussion of each of 
these frameworks is beyond the scope of this thesis, the following paragraphs set out two 
dominant conceptions of citizenship, and how they justify different courses of action in 
reconstructing the state-citizenship relationship between refugees and their state.  
 
                                                        
45 Ibid, 240. 
46 Ibid, 23.  
47 Katy Long, above n 41, 7.  
48 Bryan Turner, Citizenship and Social Theory (SAGE Publications, 1993) 2. 
49  Lucy Hovil, ‘Who Belongs Where? Conflict, Displacement, Land and Identity in North Kivu, 
Democratic Republic of Congo’ (Working Paper No. 3, International Refugee Rights Initiative, March 
2010) 7.  
50 Matthew Gibney, The Ethics and Politics of Asylum: Liberal Democracy and the Response to Refugees 
(Cambridge University Press, 2004) 26. 
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Two dominant ways of framing citizenship are the liberal model, and the civic republican 
model.51 The former casts citizenship as a status granted and secured through individual 
rights, while the latter casts it as a practice involving responsibilities to the wider 
society.52 The most influential exposition of liberal citizenship is Marshall’s Citizenship 
and Social Class. According to Marshall, citizenship is essentially a matter of ensuring 
that everyone is treated as a full and equal member of society. The way to ensure this 
sense of membership is through according people an increasing number of citizenship 
rights: civil, political, and social.53 This conception of citizenship places an emphasis on 
passive entitlements and the absence of any obligation to participate in public life: 
Participation is required only insofar as it is necessary to protect people’s basic rights and 
liberties. 54  Public and private spheres are kept distinct, and citizens are under no 
obligation to participate in the public arena if they have no inclination to do so. As Heater 
describes, ‘citizenship largely means the pursuit of one’s private life and interests more 
comfortably because the private life is insured by state-protected rights.’55 
 
The modern civic republican tradition, by contrast, is a form of participatory democracy 
that emphasises the intrinsic value of political participation for the participants 
themselves.56 According to civic republicans, individual are socially embedded, and a 
failure to participate in politics makes one a ‘radically incomplete and stunted being.’57 
Civic republicans focus on the development of shared values, social norms, history and 
culture with responsibilities and duties. The ideal citizen is active, and involved in civic 
                                                        
51 Engin Isin and Bryan Turner, ‘Citizenship Studies: An Introduction’ in Engin Isin and Bryan Turner 
(eds), Handbook of Citizenship Studies (SAGE Publications, 2002) 1, 3-4.  
52 Basak Ince, Citizenship and Identity in Turkey: From Ataturk’s Republic to the Present Day (I.B.Taurus, 
2012) 26. 
53 Thomas Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class (Cambridge University Press, 1949) 78. 
54 William Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, ‘Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship 
Theory’ (1994) 104(1) Ethics 352, 355.  
55 Derek Heater, What Is Citizenship (Polity Press, 1999) 6-7. 
56 William Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, above n 54, 362.  
57 Adrian Oldfield, ‘Citizenship: An Unnatural Practice?’ (1990) 61(1) Political Quarterly 177, 187.  
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activities in the local community, aware of the values, duties and responsibilities they 
share.58  
 
These two models each generate a different understanding of the role of the citizen vis-à-
vis their interaction within the polity, and with their state. The liberal approach to 
citizenship allows for active citizenship (through legal entitlements) but cannot directly 
bring it about. It locates the capacity of citizens in the power to retrieve their rights, and 
does not put any value on participation in governance for its own sake. The civic 
republican approach, by contrast, defines participation in self-rule as the essence of 
freedom, and part of what must be secured.59 Its emphasis on civic obligation leads to the 
idea of citizenship as a practice, rather than a set of rights.  
 
Scholars and practitioners advocate a number of strategies for rebuilding the relationship 
between refugees and their state, such that their citizenship may be remade. One such 
strategy is the involvement of refugees in transitional justice processes. The following 
sections seek to explain what transitional justice is, how it has engaged refugees, and how 
it might contribute to the remaking of citizenship.  
 
  
                                                        
58 Zoe Kohr, ‘Conceptualisations of National Citizenship and Naturalisation’ in Simon McMahon (ed), 
Developments in the Theory and Practice of Citizenship (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 111, 117.  
59 Charles Taylor, ‘The Liberal-Communitarian Debate’ in Nancy Rosenblum (ed), Liberalism and Modern 
Life (Harvard University Press, 1989) 178. 
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1.3 Transitional Justice  
 
Transitional justice encompasses a legal, political, and moral dilemma about how to deal 
with historic human rights violations in societies undergoing some form of political 
transition.60 A 2004 report by United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan provides the 
most common definition, stating that transitional justice comprises:  
 
the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts 
to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure 
accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. These may include both 
judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with differing levels of international 
involvement (or none at all) and individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-
seeking, institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, or a combination thereof.61  
 
The modern conception of transitional justice is usually traced back to the post Second 
World War Nuremberg trials. 62  The Nuremberg trials established the principle of 
individual criminal accountability for human rights violations perpetrated against 
civilians in wartime, and introduced the idea that certain crimes are so heinous that they 
violate the ‘law of nations’ and may be prosecuted anywhere. 63  Until this time, 
international law was not usually relied upon to provide a framework to address a state’s 
treatment of its own citizens, or to impose criminal sanctions against states for abusive 
treatment of their own citizens.64 During the period after the Second World War, the 
                                                        
60 Rosemary Nagy, ‘Transitional Justice as a Global Project: Critical Reflections’ (2008) 29 Third World 
Quarterly 275, 277-278. 
61 Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict 
Societies, UN Doc. S/2004/616 (24 August 2004) para 8. 
62 Ruti Teitel, ‘Transitional Justice Genealogy’ (2003) 16 Harvard Human Rights Journal 69, 70.   
63 Ruti Teitel,  ‘Transitional Justice: Postwar Legacies’ (2006) 27(4) Cardozo Law Review 1615, 1615.  
64 Neil Kritz, Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, Volume 1: 
General Considerations (USIP Press Books, 1995) 386.   
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demand for justice took on a retributive character. This was not tempered by any other 
value – and especially not with the values of peace or negotiation – largely because post-
war justice processes were imposed by the victorious party.65 
 
Retributive justice refers to the idea that justice requires perpetrators to suffer, 
characteristically via punishment. It posits that wrongful actions involve the violation of 
a moral standard for conduct, and when such violations result in wrongful harm to an 
individual, a retributive response is required.66 Based on this idea, in the post-World War 
II period many perpetrators of crimes against humanity were held responsible and 
severely punished.67 Proponents of retributive justice claim that prosecutions fulfill a duty 
owed to the victims, and serve as a partial remedy for their injuries, while also asserting 
democratic values.68 Opponents of retributive justice, on the other hand, often point to its 
incompatibility with reconciliation; Braithwaite, for instance, explains that ‘retribution is 
in the same category as greed or gluttony; biological they once helped us to flourish, but 
today they are corrosive of human health and relationships.’69 
 
The term ‘transitional justice’ only emerged after the Cold War, during the period of 
accelerated democratisation and political fragmentation that took place across Latin 
America and Eastern Europe.70 Scholars and practitioners used the expression to describe 
the ways in which countries in those regions were addressing a history of serious human 
rights violations, and transitioning to democracy. 71  As repressive regimes in Latin 
                                                        
65 Ruti Teitel, above n 62. 
66 Jean Hampton, ‘Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution’ (1992) 39 (1) 
UCLA Law Review 1659, 1666, 1679. 
67 Ruti Teitel, above n 62, 72-74. 
68  Paige Arthur, ‘How “Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional 
Justice’ (2009) 31(2) Human Rights Quarterly, 321, 355.  
69 John Braithwaite, ‘Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts’ (1999) 25 Crime 
and Justice 1, 7.  
70 Ruti Teitel, above n 62, 71.   
71 Roger Duthie, above n 2, 12.  
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America came to an end, the human rights movement began to recognise that undertaking 
criminal trials during a political transition could have undesired political implications, as 
well as an adverse effect upon human rights.72 As a result, leaders of the newly emerging 
Latin democracies moved away from criminal prosecutions, and aimed instead to present 
a formal accounting of the violence, crimes, and civil and human rights abuses that 
characterised their previous regimes. 73  This led to the creation of the truth and 
reconciliation commission, a temporary body mandated to investigate a history of human 
rights violations.74 
 
Truth commissions introduced the idea of restorative, rather than retributive, justice. 
Broadly defined, restorative justice is focused on ‘making things right, [and the] repair of 
social injury,’ 75  as well as reparations as an alternative to punishment. 76  Unlike 
retributive justice, restorative justice is victim-centred, and seeks to empower the 
victim.77 The focus on the victim demands a participatory approach that treats victims as 
‘stakeholders’ in the reparation process,78 space ‘to move beyond the rather masculine 
discourse of crime and punishment towards a notion of repairing relationships.’79 In light 
of these traits, the restorative justice of truth commissions is often viewed as a direct 
rejection of retributive criminal trials and their emphasis on inflicting ‘equal and just 
measure of pain’.80  
 
                                                        
72 José Zalaquett, ‘Confronting Human Rights Violations Committed by Former Governments: Principles 
Applicable and Political Constraints’ in Justice and Society Program of the Aspen Institute (ed), State 
Crimes: Punishment and Pardon (The Aspen Institute, 1989) 23, 24-25. 
73 Neil Kritz, above n 64, 386.   
74 Priscilla Hayner, ‘Fifteen Truth Commissions 1974 – 1994: A Comparative Study’ (1994) 16(4) Human 
Rights Quarterly 597, 598. 
75 Howard Zehr, Retributive Justice, Restorative Justice (Willan Publishing, 1985) 80-81. 
76 Declan Roche, Accountability in Restorative Justice (Oxford University Press, 2003) 27.  
77 John Braithwaite, above n 69, 7.  
78 John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2002) 11. 
79 Christine Bell and Catherine O’Rourke, ‘Does Feminism Need a Theory of Transitional Justice?’ (2007) 
1 International Journal of Transitional Justice 23, 40. 
80 Heather Strang and Lawrence Sherman, ‘Repairing the Harm: Victims and Restorative Justice’ (2003) 1 
Utah Law Review 15, 16.  
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The 1990s and, to a lesser extent, the 2000s were marked by fierce scholarly debate 
around the merits of trials versus truth commissions, framed in terms of ‘truth versus 
justice.’ 81  The purpose of transitional justice was often discussed in binary terms: 
punishment versus reconciliation, retributive versus restorative justice.82 However, by the 
twenty-first century, government, practitioners and scholars reached a more nuanced and 
comprehensive understanding of justice, and transitional governments usually implement 
both retributive and restorative approaches to justice in tandem. Typically, the transitional 
justice ‘package’ consists of some form of criminal accountability, truth-telling, and 
institutional reform. Such is the acceptance of these mechanisms that the question most 
frequently asked by transitional governments is not whether to conduct some form of 
transitional justice, but what the scope, modalities, and sequencing might be.83 
 
A third form of justice commonly engaged in transitional justice process, and sitting 
outside the retributive/restorative binary, is reparative justice. Reparative justice seeks to 
repair wrongs committed against the victim by returning what was taken from the victim, 
whether material or symbolic.84 It usually takes the form of restitution and apology.85 The 
overall aim of reparative justice is to restore to the victim their sense of dignity and moral 
worth, and eliminate the social disparagement and economic marginalization that 
accompanied their targeting. 86  In reparative justice, as with retributive justice, the 
primary responsibility for repairing harm remains on the perpetrator, since it is the 
responsibility of the perpetrator to follow through on promises for restitution or apology. 
                                                        
81 Pierre Hazan, ‘Measuring the Impact of Punishment and Forgiveness: A Framework for Evaluating 
Transitional Justice’ (2006) 88 International Review of the Red Cross 19, 20.  
82 Phil Clark and Nicola Palmer, ‘Challenging Transitional Justice’ in Nicola Palmer, Phil Clark and 
Danielle Granville (eds), Critical Perspectives in Transitional Justice (Intersentia, 2012) 1, 3. 
83 Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford University Press, 2000) 21.  
84 Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence 
(Beacon Press, 1998) 107. 
85 Joanna Quinn, ‘Transitional Justice’ in Michael Goodhart (ed), Human Rights: Politics and Practice 
(Oxford University Press, 2009) 355, 362-363. 
86 Ernesto Verdeja, ‘A Critical Theory of Reparative Justice’ (2008) 15(2) Constellations 208, 208.  
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This is in contrast to restorative justice, where both the perpetrator and the community 
hold active roles throughout the process. 
 
The final type of justice associated with transitional justice is what Laplante describes as 
‘civic justice.’ Whereas restorative justice refers to a vision of micro-reconciliation within 
communities, civic justice refers to a vision of macro-reconciliation that mends the 
relation between the government and the governed.87 Civic justice acknowledges that the 
abuses committed by a state, or permitted by its lack of protection, may lead victim-
survivors to feel they were treated as ‘second class citizens,’ and imagines a type of 
macro-level ‘civil reconciliation’ that seeks to mend the relationship between the State 
and its subjects while lending legitimacy to the new governing enterprise.88 This type of 
justice in particular demonstrates a range of commonalities with the concept of 
citizenship. Both are concerned with how a society can avoid violent social rupture by 
developing a sense of national solidarity, and a shared commitment to democratic 
principles and practices.89 In addition, they both conceive of justice being achieve by 
restoring, or possibly building afresh, the relationship between the state and its citizens.90 
This understanding of justice highlights the importance of mechanisms such as 
constitution-building, or enfranchisement as methods of repairing harm.  
 
The distinctive element of transitional justice is that these different theories of justice are 
underpinned by the normative aim of facilitating a transition to democracy. 91  Paige 
Arthur traces the conceptual history of transitional justice, and explains that a transition 
                                                        
87  Lisa Laplante, ‘The Plural Justice Aims of Reparations’ in Susanne Buckley-Zistel et al (eds), 
Transitional Justice Theories (Routledge, 2014) 66, 74. 
88 Pablo De Greiff, ‘Justice and Reparations’ in Pablo de Greiff (ed), The Handbook of Reparations, 
(Oxford University Press, 2006) 451, 460–462. 
89 Rosemary Nagy, ‘After the TRC: Citizenship, Memory and Reconciliation’ (2004) 38(3) Canadian 
Journal of African Studies 638, 639.  
90 Pablo de Greiff, above n 88, 460-462. See also: Megan Bradley, above n 44, 240. 
91  Paige Arthur, ‘How “Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional 
Justice’ (2009) 31(2) Human Rights Quarterly, 321, 358.  
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to democracy was the dominant normative lens through which political change was 
viewed when the field first emerged. Since the focus was on a transition to democracy, 
certain mechanisms – prosecutions, truth-telling, restitution, and reform of abusive state 
institutions – were favoured above others measures of justice, such as those associated 
with claims for distributive justice.92 Since those early days, a number of challenges have 
arisen concerning the nature of a transition, and the type of justice that a different 
transition might entail. In the case of South Africa, for example, there was a reactivation 
of distributive justice claims, associated more with a transition to socialism than a 
transition to democracy. Coupled with this, some critics argue that justice for the crimes 
of apartheid requires more than the standard legal-institutional reforms, and should 
include a redistribution of wealth that was unjustly accumulated through an inhuman 
political and economic system.93 
 
1.4 Transitional Justice and Displacement  
 
Displacement was a relatively late addition to the transitional justice landscape, emerging 
largely after the Cold War ended. There was some limited precedent for this connection. 
In 1923, the Turks and Greeks concluded the Treaty of Lausanne, one result of which was 
a large-scale population exchange that forced almost two million people to leave their 
homes.94 The Treaty of Lausanne established a Mixed Commission, which (theoretically) 
allowed forcibly displaced Turkish and Greek nationals to obtain compensation for their 
abandoned property.95  In another early example, after the Second World War Israel 
sought and received reparations from West Germany, in order to pay for the resettlement 
                                                        
92 Ibid, 325 – 326.  
93 Ibid, 321, 359.  
94 Onur Yildirim, ‘The 1923 Population Exchange, Refugees and National Historiographies in Greece and 
Turkey’ (2006) 40 (1) East European Quarterly 45, 45. 
95 Treaty of Peace With Turkey, Greece-Turkey, signed 24 July 1923, LNTS No 16 (entered into force 6 
August 1924) arts 10 and 11. 
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of Jewish refugees from Europe.96 At the same time, the displacement of some 750,000 
Palestinians from the newly recognised state of Israel triggered a number of precedent-
setting political statements that foreshadowed the right of refugees to reparations for their 
displacement.97  
 
The post-Cold War period saw more consistent engagement between transitional justice 
and refugees. The impetus for this inclusion was an international preoccupation with 
refugee return. During the Cold War, many states accommodated large numbers of 
refugees on their territories, and were growing increasingly resentful of their presence.98 
There were various reasons for this resentment: the global economic downturn post-1973; 
a shift towards higher numbers of global South refugees seeking asylum in the North (as 
opposed to the original political paradigm of East-West flows) which resulted in a decline 
in the ideological value of refugees; and increased suspicions by states concerning refugee 
motives for flight.99  As the immigration policies of refugee-hosting states hardened, 
UNHCR began to advocate voluntary repatriation as the ‘most desirable’ solution that 
should be promoted and facilitated whenever possible.100 Seeking to make refugee return 
more sustainable, UNHCR and host states focused their collective attention on the 
restitution of homes for returning refugees.101 As a result, in the 1990s property restitution 
rose to prominence as a remedy for forced displacement.102  
 
                                                        
96  Michael Bazyler ‘The Holocaust Restitution Movement in Comparative Perspective’ (2002) 20(1) 
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99 Ibid.  
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At first, the right to property restitution developed quite apart from the broader 
transitional justice framework. Scholars and practitioners believed that housing and 
property restitution was essential to the sustainable large-scale return of refugees, and 
concentrated their advocacy towards this issue with little regard for other avenues of 
reparation.103 The dominant medium of this pursuit was international law, and from the 
end of the Cold War until the mid-2000s, transitional justice scholars and human rights 
NGOs advocated through international forums for the adoption of international standards 
concerning property restitution for displaced persons.104  
 
The 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton 
Accords) presents the first example of successfully implemented mass restitution in the 
wake of full-blown conflict. The Dayton Accords established the right of return for all 
refugees and displaced persons, as well as their right to restitution of property lost during 
the war,105 and almost every peace agreement since that time has included provisions on 
the right of refugees to return to their homes, as well as the right to restitution or 
compensation for those who lost property.106 Annex 7 of the Dayton Accords stated that 
the imperative for restitution lay in the ‘rights of the displaced,’107 and asserted that all 
refugees were entitled to restitution of any property lost during the war.108 In addition, 
the Accords provided that refugees who did not wish to return to Bosnia and obtain 
                                                        
103 See, eg, Scott Leckie (ed), Returning Home: Housing and Property Restitution Rights of Refugees and 
Displaced Persons (Transnational Publishers, 2003); Megan Bradley, ‘FMO Research Guide: Reparations, 
Reconciliation and Forced Migration,’ Forced Migration Online (October 2006) 
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Refugee Return’ (2000) 19(3) Refuge 3-7.  
105 General Framework Agreement For Peace In Bosnia and Herzegovina, 35 I.L.M. 117 (14 December 
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restitution of their property could instead apply for financial compensation.109 As such, 
the Dayton Accords seemed to make a significant contribution towards achieving justice 
and a more sustainable return for refugees.  
 
However, despite the language of justice and rights, critical scholars argue that the Dayton 
Accords in fact undermined justice outcomes for refugees. The compensation fund 
proposed by the Accords never materialized, due to a concern that offering compensation 
for property would minimise the will of refugees to return. The international community 
and domestic political leaders were committed to the goal of reversing ethnic cleansing 
in Bosnia, and if refugees did not return home, it would undermine this goal.110 Property 
restitution formed a key element of the political aim of reconstituting Bosnia as a multi-
ethnic country, regardless of whether returning refugees were themselves interested in 
contributing towards such a goal.111 Within this context, the language of human rights 
was used to detract from the obvious political emphasis being placed on refugee return. 
By relying upon a rights-based framework, practitioners were able to replace the highly 
politicised emphasis upon refugee return with a more impartial ‘rule of law’ 
framework.112 
 
An important point to recognise in the interaction between transitional justice and 
refugees is that displaced populations often include large numbers of perpetrators, and 
not just victims. A primary example of the former is found in the case of Rwanda. 
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Between April and July 1994, Rwanda experienced a devastating genocide, which 
resulted in the death of nearly three-quarters of the total Tutsi population, while hundreds 
of thousands fled to neighbouring countries.113 After the genocide, an additional two 
million predominantly Hutu Rwandans fled into neighbouring countries, among them 
members of the former national army and Hutu paramilitary units.114 Transitional justice 
in Rwanda subsequently centred on the perpetrators of the genocide and Congo-based 
rebels. The government instituted a process of prosecuting genocide crimes through the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, a national court system, and the neo-
traditional gacaca courts (established in 2005). Alongside these criminal mechanisms the 
government also established a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration program. 
Of great significance to refugee perpetrators, the two processes operated in strict isolation, 
and any DRC-based combatants who chose to participate in demobilisation were excused 
from prosecution. The strict separation of these processes succeeded in encouraging the 
demobilization of tens of thousands of combatants, but also led to widespread criticism 
of rebels who completely avoided prosecution and therefore were never held accountable 
for genocide crimes.115 To date, the ICTR has not prosecuted cases of high-level genocide 
suspects based in the DRC, hampered by a lack of cooperation from either the UN 
peacekeeping mission or the Rwandan government, both of which favour a clear 
separation between DDR and transitional justice.116   
 
The 1990s also witnessed the development of a soft law framework around arbitrary 
displacement. From 1992 until 1998, the Representative of the UN Secretary-General for 
                                                        
113 Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (Colombia University Press, 1998).  
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IDPs, Francis Deng, worked with Walter Kaelin and a small number of supportive states 
to identify existing normative gaps in protection for IDPs. Having identified the gaps, 
they drew upon existing international human rights, humanitarian and refugee legal 
norms to create the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. 117  These were 
subsequently adopted by states as a non-binding framework for interpreting their 
obligations towards IDPs.118 While some of the Guiding Principles are embodied in hard 
law instruments, those that clarify grey areas or fill gaps are still soft law.119 
 
The term ‘soft law’ describes norms that are formally non-binding but habitually 
obeyed.120 Chayes and Chayes argue that the ‘interpretation, elaboration, application, 
and, ultlimately, enforcement of international rules [are] accomplished through a process 
of (mostly verbal) interchange among the interested parties.’ Because states feel 
compelled to justify their conduct and have those justifications accepted by other states, 
it pushes them in the direction of compliance with international law.121 Soft law can 
‘harden’ – that is, become international law – when states or international entities conduct 
activities in a regular manner and in the conviction that even if not responding to positive 
requirements of international law, they are at least authorized by and in conformity with 
such law.122 In the case of the Guiding Principles, they are regularly cited and used by 
UN agencies, regional organisation, NGOs, and governments. 123  In 2003, the UN 
Commission on Human Rights declared that the Guiding Principles had become a 
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‘standard’ in international efforts to protection internally displaced persons.124 Their wide 
usage and recognition as the normative framework for protection and assistance activities 
on behalf of the internally displaced, indicates a gradual hardening of the Guiding 
Principles.125  
 
While the Guiding Principles are directed at internally displaced persons, the provisions 
regarding the harm and repair associated with displacement are equally relevant and are 
regularly applied to refugees. The Guiding Principles explain that forced displacement is 
not necessary unlawful under international law. Displacement, forced evictions, and 
population transfers may be legal, if they are justified and if the state undertakes them in 
accordance with international standards. However, if the state forcibly displaces people 
in a way that is not in line with international standards, then it will be deemed illegal and 
termed ‘arbitrary displacement.’126 On this basis, the Guiding Principles require states 
(and non-state actors) to prevent and avoid conditions that might lead to arbitrary 
displacement.127 The recognition of arbitrary displacement as a violation of human rights 
is also articulated in article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), which protects against all forms of forced displacement through the right to 
choose one’s residence;128 the Pinheiro Principles, which protect all persons against being 
arbitrarily displaced from their home, land or place of habitual residence; 129  and 
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customary international humanitarian law, which restricts the forcible displacement of 
civilians.130 
 
Building upon the international recognition of arbitrary displacement as a breach of 
international law, advocates pushed to achieve criminal accountability for the violation 
of arbitrary displacement.131 International criminal prosecutions in Timor-Leste,132 the 
former Yugoslavia,133 and Iraq134 have treated displacement as a crime. Scholars have 
pushed such mechanisms to recognise that the experience of displacement goes beyond 
the act of arbitrary displacement, and includes the violations triggering displacement such 
as mass killings, arbitrary arrests, torture, and rape, as well as those that took place while 
the person was displaced, such as forced conscription and sexual assault.135  
 
Another transitional justice mechanism that has witnessed increased engagement with 
displacement is the truth commission. Historically, the crime of arbitrary displacement 
and the abuses endured by displaced populations have not been included in truth 
commission mandates, and have not figured prominently in the reports and 
recommendations issued by these institutions. Case in point: of the 32 truth commission 
reports publicly released to date, only nine address displacement.136 
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The South African TRC was pivotal in the development of the field of transitional justice. 
However, although over 3.5 million non-white South Africans were displaced from their 
homes and lands in the decades prior to the end of apartheid, South Africa did very little 
to pursue recognition or repair of the harm associated with forced displacement.137 The 
TRC was tasked with uncovering and recording instances of ‘gross human rights 
violations’ – defined narrowly as killings, torture, and severe mistreatment. This 
exclusive focus on individual crimes and the ‘excesses’ of the apartheid regime came at 
the cost of largely ignoring the institutional violence that characterised apartheid. Victims 
and activists had assumed that forced migration would be a core focus of the TRC. 
However, after noting that ‘forced removals’ were ‘an assault on the rights and dignity of 
millions of South Africans,’ the TRC claimed it could not acknowledge them since these 
violations ‘may not have been ‘gross’ as defined by the Act.’138 
 
By contrast to the South African TRC, truth commissions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
Guatemala, Peru, and Timor-Leste have each engaged with displaced persons, and the 
harms that led to their displacement, as well as those that took place during flight, and 
during asylum. 139  The Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, for example, 
noted that poverty and the loss of livelihoods led to forced displacement,140 and argued 
that many of the violations faced by Liberian women were heightened for women who 
had been displaced. 141  Timor-Leste’s truth commission documented the way that 
displacement caused more deaths than any other factor during Indonesia’s occupation.142 
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The Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification is one of the more successful 
TRCs in terms of integrating the perspectives of displaced persons. A primary aim of the 
Guatemalan Commission was to document the suffering and stigma endured by the 
displaced while in asylum. CEH investigators hiked into remote areas of the country to 
interview thousands of civilians who were displaced by the war. The Commission 
concluded that the murder and forced displacement of thousands of Mayan civilians 
during the Guatemalan civil war was genocide.143  
 
In addition to setting the framework for accountability for displacement international law 
also provides a framework for reparative action. The primary way this is framed is 
through the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation 
for Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law. The Basic Principles assert that victims of human rights 
abuses have a right to ‘adequate, effective and prompt reparation’ from the violating 
state.144 In this context, reparations are understood to encompass not only compensation 
and restitution, 145  but also satisfaction, which refers to remedies such as official 
apologies, judicial proceedings and truth commissions, 146  and guarantees of non-
repetition, which refers to the reform of laws and national institutions.147 According to 
this broad understanding, then, reparation constitutes an array of remedies that mirror the 
conventional mechanisms of transitional justice. While this framework does not provide 
a right to reparations specifically for refugees, the duty upon a state to redress harm for 
which it is responsible does not cease when the victim leaves its jurisdiction, as the duty 
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arises as a result of the violation itself.148 As a result, refugees fall within the standard 
international law approach to reparations. 
 
De Greiff notes that ‘whatever consensus there is in international law about reparations, 
it is only just emerging,’ and the boundaries of this obligation remain porous.149 Falk adds 
that as a result of this mixed state practice, the legal framework retains an ad hoc character 
that makes it impossible to draw any firm conclusions about legal expectations, much less 
frame this practice in the form of legal doctrine. For this reason, it is more appropriate to 
view reparations as ‘primarily an expression of moral and political forces at work in 
particular contexts.’150 Notwithstanding the inconsistent application of reparations, there 
are some positive examples, and reparations programs in Guatemala,151 Bosnia, Kosovo, 
Lebanon, and Northern Cyprus have attempted to distribute benefits to displaced persons 
for the violations that caused them to flee, for those they suffered while displaced, and 
for the crime of displacement itself.152 
 
While the number of mechanisms engaging refugees has increased, the framework 
structuring the interaction between transitional justice and refugees has remained fairly 
consistent. This framework is typified by three characteristics. The first is that transitional 
justice processes understand displacement as a legal violation of human rights. This 
shapes the understanding of the harm refugees suffer, the violations that each mechanism 
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will recognise, and the type of reparation that scholars deem most appropriate. Secondly, 
all refugee interactions with transitional justice have taken place within institutions led 
by the state. This means that it is the responsibility of the transitional state to set the 
mandate, decide the methodology, and manage the implementation of the transitional 
justice mechanism. And finally, refugee interactions with transitional justice have 
consistently prioritised refugee return as the ultimate goal.  
 
The following sections examine each of these factors in turn, in order to understand how 
scholars and practitioners structure the interaction between transitional justice and 
refugees, and what they hope the interaction will achieve. 
 
1.4.1 Displacement as a Violation of Human Rights Law  
 
Transitional justice is constructed around a framework of international law. 153  This 
begins with the standards its mechanisms apply, which are based on four pillars of the 
modern international legal system: international human rights law, international 
humanitarian law, international criminal law, and international refugee law.154 In addition 
to applying legal standards, transitional justice mechanisms also mirror legal processes. 
Sometimes this connection is explicit, as in the case of criminal prosecutions, drafting a 
new constitution, reforming the justice system or designing a system of amnesties. In 
other instances, such as truth commissions, the law often retains its influence indirectly. 
A truth commission might receive a mandate to make recommendations for criminal 
prosecutions, for instance, or may structure its testimony-gathering process along the 
lines of receiving evidence in court. This structure also means that people working on 
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transitional justice are usually required to possess legal expertise, and are, in fact, usually 
lawyers.155 This reinforces the influence of law.  
 
When it comes to the engagement of refugees in transitional justice, scholars seldom 
apply a critical lens to the dominance of international law. There seems to be wide 
acceptance that international law can somehow displace politics and resolve conflict.156 
Moreover, the uncritical use of legal discourse and legal mechanisms has the effect of 
portraying the institutions of transitional justice as neutral and apolitical, and, therefore, 
as an objective method of delivering justice.157 This lack of critical scholarship appears 
in sharp contrast to the broader scholarship on transitional justice as a whole. There is a 
large body of scholarship challenging the idea of transitional justice as a technical, legal 
process. 158  Critical scholars assert that the understanding of the law and justice as 
apolitical and easily abstracted from the surrounding social context is an exclusively 
Western and ethnocentric notion. 159  When practitioners apply the legal framework 
without considering the local political and social context, critical scholars emphasise, it 
contributes to transitional justice programs that do not function well in the political and 
legal cultures into which they are deployed,160  a lack of engagement between local 
communities and those programs,161 and a field that struggles to account for indigenous 
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and customary mechanisms of justice that do not fit within its legalistic and individualistic 
framework.162 
 
Rather than deploying a critical approach to the interaction between transitional justice 
and refugees, scholars tend to focus their attention on doctrinal issues associated with 
achieving legal accountability for displacement. Few scholars question what the 
dominance of law means for the understanding of the harm, and repair of displacement, 
and whether it impedes the ability of refugees to achieve their preferred justice outcomes. 
 
1.4.2 The State as a Transitional Justice Actor 
 
The second characteristic of the interaction between transitional justice and refugees is 
that it is a state-centred and state-driven process. This is typical of transitional justice 
generally. 163  Each of the prominent transitional justice mechanisms – trials, truth 
commissions and reparations programs – consists of an institutionalised process 
administered by the state.164 In each case, the state is almost always responsible for 
initiating the mechanism, setting its mandate and determining its methodology. 
Moreover, the governing framework of transitional justice, that of human rights law, 
international criminal law, and international humanitarian law, is primarily concerned 
with holding states accountable for breaches of their legal obligations.  
 
In counterpoint to these state-driven mechanisms, transitional justice scholars have 
developed a rich body of scholarship examining local, traditional or ‘grassroots’ 
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mechanisms of transitional justice.165 However, this ‘bottom up’ approach is yet to extend 
to instances of refugee engagement. Scholars addressing refugees confine their attention 
(and advocacy) to the processes of trials, truth commissions and reparations programs.166 
A small number of scholars consider alternative forms of transitional justice, such as the 
legal empowerment of refugee communities or the reconstitution of inter-personal, 
familial and communal relationships disturbed by displacement. 167  Despite these 
examples, non-institutional alternatives exist only in the margins. Perhaps an even larger 
gap is the lack of scholarly critique regarding the dominance of the state as a transitional 
justice actor, and what this means for the ability of refugees to obtain the justice outcomes 
they desire.  
 
A critical approach to the role of the state in transitional justice is even more important 
given that since the late twentieth century, most transitional justice interventions – and 
virtually all of those involving refugees – have taken place within the context of state-
building. State-building is the dominant paradigm for structuring international 
intervention and assistance in the wake of conflict. It emerged in the late 1990s and early 
2000s as part of the broader practice of peacebuilding.168 During the Cold War, the main 
security focus of the UN was traditional peacekeeping operations, which typically 
involved monitoring ceasefires or neutral buffer zones between former combatants. 
However, the post-Cold War political climate enabled a different type of engagement 
with countries emerging from conflict, which extended well beyond monitoring. This 
included what UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali termed ‘post-conflict peace-
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building.’169  At first, peace-building missions emphasised rapid democratisation and 
marketisation, but as countries descended back into conflict this approach became 
discredited.170 Instead, state failure – the problem these missions were aimed at ‘fixing’ 
– came to be seen primarily as an issue of poor governance and weak state capacity. As 
a result, in the late 1990s and early 2000s peacebuilding agencies began to emphasise the 
importance of strong government institutions, leading to the advent of ‘state-building.’171  
 
The end goal of state-building interventions is to construct a liberal democracy.172 State-
building practice generally assumes that the most effective way to assure the long-term 
resolution of conflict is to develop strong economic and political state institutions,173 and 
therefore emphasises building or strengthening the capacity of government to perform 
effectively the functions associated with modern statehood.174 This entails three general 
objectives: to foster democratic institutions; introduce the ‘universal’ value of the rule of 
law; and develop a market-driven economy.175 Within this paradigm, transitional justice 
is valued for its perceived contribution to the rule of law and democratisation,176 and, 
since the mid-2000s, has become increasingly embedded in state-building strategies.177  
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Since the focus of a state-building intervention is to create a strong and legitimate state, 
it is common for the new government to prioritise transitional justice activities intended 
to strengthen state institutions.178 This means that mechanisms such as building courts or 
prosecuting former leaders are favoured over longer-term, non-institutionalised processes 
oriented towards reconciliation, community-level justice mechanisms or redistribution.179 
This ‘top-down’ approach to justice ignores many of the actual mechanisms of social 
change at work, such as the agency of non-state actors,180 and often reduces engagement 
with the local communities and victims it purports to serve.181  
 
Delivering transitional justice in the context of state-building can jeopardise the ability of 
victims to achieve the justice outcomes they desire. One example is in relation to 
violations of economic and social rights. When transitional justice is delivered in the 
context of a state-building intervention, its mechanisms tend to foreground violations of 
civil and political rights, while pushing questions of economic violence and economic 
justice to the margins.182 This ignores structural violence such as systematic economic 
abuses, and the legacies of inequality and poverty, which is particularly damaging for 
marginalised groups such as women, minorities and those of a lower socio-economic 
status.183 By excluding socio-economic crimes from its mechanisms, critical scholars 
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assert, transitional justice fails to address versions of harm, loss and violence that relate 
to the experience of these marginalised groups.184  
 
Much of this critical scholarship holds relevance for the interaction between refugees and 
transitional justice. One additional factor related to the specific engagement of refugees 
in transitional justice is the relationship between the state and its refugee population. 
Refugees are those who have been forced out of their own national polity due to a lack of 
state protection. This raises particular questions concerning the way that state control over 
transitional justice mechanisms might affect refugee engagement in transitional justice, 
and whether state interests and refugee interests always align. This issue is addressed in 
further detail in the following section.  
 
1.4.3 Refugee Return as the Ultimate Goal  
 
A third theme of the scholarship and practice of transitional justice and displacement is 
refugee repatriation. There is a broad consensus amongst both scholars and practitioners 
that the ultimate goal of transitional justice is to resolve displacement through refugee 
return.185  UNHCR urges states to facilitate the participation of refugees in peace and 
reconciliation processes prior to their return, so that such peace processes might 
‘encourage repatriation, reintegration and reconciliation.’186 Scholars, also, suggest that 
exile can act as a transformative space, enabling refugee communities to develop their 
capacities to engage as political citizens when they eventually return.187 The opportunity 
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to participate in a truth commission, for instance, might help refugees to organise 
themselves into victim-advocacy groups, or to frame their grievances in terms the state 
recognises. This might enable them to better communicate their injuries, and needs, to 
the government of their home state, such that they might receive targeted support on 
return. 
 
The emphasis upon return is seen most clearly in the way that property restitution for 
refugees has been prioritised. However, a growing body of scholarship critiques the status 
of property restitution as the preferred remedy for displacement. Some claim that the 
emphasis on property return is fueled not by an intention to help refugees achieve justice, 
but by the political and economic concerns of (usually Western) asylum countries no 
longer willing to support large refugee populations.188 Moreover, placing an emphasis on 
property restitution associated with, or contingent upon, return can overshadow 
alternative remedies that refugees might prefer: some may not wish to return to a ‘home’ 
altered by war, but may prefer other forms of reparations such as compensation.189 Even 
for those who do wish to return, the principles of property restitution as currently reflected 
in international law are designed by Westerners with Western notions of property, law, 
process, and enforcement in mind, and do not necessarily reflect the reality of non-
Western, developing, agrarian or post-conflict societies.190 Relying on these essentially 
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Western standards may result in unintended, harmful consequences, particular if a one-
size-fits-all model of law reform is taken.191  
 
Notwithstanding this critique of property restitution as the best remedy, scholars continue 
to advocate the link between transitional justice and refugee return. Some assert that 
transitional justice can contribute to conditions of safety and dignity, necessary for 
refugee return.192 It can do this, scholars suggest, by prosecuting those who committed 
human rights violations during the conflict, reforming security institutions, such as the 
police and military, or distributing benefits through restitution and compensation 
processes to strengthen displaced persons’ socio-economic security. 193  In addition, 
transitional justice may create condition of dignity by recognising refugees as rights-
bearers, and offering them a way to obtain redress for the past violation of their rights.194 
This can restore the dignity of refugees by acknowledging their individual and collective 
suffering, and establishing their inclusion as full citizens in the new state. 
 
Other scholars discuss the intersection of transitional justice and refugee return through 
the lens of reconciliation. Reconciliation in this context remains a fluid and contested 
concept, but most authors agree that it describes a process, rather than an end state or 
outcome.195 In general terms, it constitutes a process through which a society moves from 
a divided past to a shared future,196 and is fundamentally about building relationships of 
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trust and cohesion at multiple different levels, from the individual, inter-personal and 
communal, to the national and international.197 Scholars suggest that reconciliation is 
relevant to refugee return in two respects. Firstly, they argue, reconciliation is necessary 
in order to address the open and underlying tensions that exist between returned refugees 
and their non-displaced compatriots, and amongst the displaced community itself.198 By 
revealing and validating the experiences of different groups, transitional justice can 
reduce social tensions between ‘those who stayed, and those who left,’ thus contributing 
to reconciliation on an interpersonal level.199  
 
Secondly, scholars suggest that reconciliation must take place between the refugee and 
their state. Human rights violations – including those associated with displacement – 
often lead victims to feel they were treated as less than human or ‘second class citizens,’ 
which is a serious harm that a government must repair if it is to govern effectively.200 
Reconciliation in this context seeks to mend the relationship between the state and its 
citizens, while lending legitimacy to the new government enterprise.201 Advocates claim 
that the processes of transitional justice may contribute to reconciliation between state 
and citizen by officially acknowledging periods and patterns of past violations, 202 
working as a tool of social reintegration for previously marginalised refugees,203 and 
enabling returning refugees to rebuild their lives and their place in the political 
community.204 The overall aim of these interactions is to restore, or possibly build afresh, 
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the refugee’s state-citizen relationship.205  The return of refugees is itself sometimes 
described as integral to reconciliation of a society as a whole, and essential to the goals 
of peace, stability, reconciliation and economic development.206  
 
Whether refugee return is, in all circumstances, an appropriate end for transitional justice 
to pursue features only rarely in the literature. Missing from this discussion completely is 
the voice of refugees themselves. There is limited recognition that for many refugees, 
repatriation is both less ideal and less desired than is generally assumed by the 
international architects of postwar reconstruction. 207  Generally, however, return is 
viewed as an inevitable part of the refugee experience, and a desirable part of a 
transitional justice strategy.  
 
1.5 Inclusion of Refugee Voices   
 
The voice of the refugee is of central importance both to my thesis, and Refugee Studies 
in general. One of the most influential scholars on this topic is Agamben, who argues that 
the act of excluding persons from the nation-state system – that is, the very process of 
generating refugees – is not just a consequence of the nation-state system, but the very 
signifier of sovereign power. The defining feature of sovereignty, according to Agamben, 
is the ability to revoke the privileges of citizenship, what he refers to as the ‘sovereign 
exception.’ 208  Revoking the privileges of citizenship results in the suspension of 
sovereign protection and law, and creates what Agamben refers to a ‘zones of exception.’ 
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When a person is banned from the realm of sovereign power to one of these zones of 
exception, they are stripped of their political life (bios) and revert to a form of bare life 
(zoe). In doing so, they become the homo sacer (‘set-apart man.’) The homo sacer was a 
figure in Ancient Roman law who could be killed with impunity, and whose death also 
held no sacrificial value. He could not rely on the protection of the state but was still 
subject to its power over his life and death. As such, the homo sacer possesses biological 
life, but that life has no political significance.209 
 
For Agamben, the refugee camp constitutes one such zone of exception. It is a non-
political space that facilitates the bio-political management of ‘life as animal.’210 Once 
relegated to the camp, the refugee is left with no reliable form of protection, respect, 
accountability, or method to make claims and seek enforcement of his or her rights, since 
the state is the only party to whom such petitions may be made, and those living in the 
camp are outside the state’s protection.211 While citizens are able to experience a full 
existence that comes from a politically qualified form of life and the ability to participate 
in various social, cultural and economic pursuits, refugees are allocated a bare life which 
necessitates only the basics of food, shelter and medical care to be sustained.212  
 
Humanitarian actors responding to refugee needs occupy a controversial position for 
scholars such as Agamben. Agamben argues that humanitarian organisations ‘grasp 
human life in the figure of bare or sacred life, and therefore, despite themselves, maintain 
a secret solidarity with the very powers that they ought to fight.’213 Malkki builds upon 
this position by detailing the standardised way of talking about and handling the ‘refugee 
                                                        
209 Ibid, 18.  
210 Ibid, 167.  
211 Ibid, 171.  
212 Peter Nyers, above n 15, 98. 
213 Giorgio Agamben, above n 26, 133. 
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problem’ that has emerged among national governments, humanitarian and refugee 
agencies since World War II.214 Camp administrators remain constantly focused on the physical condition 
and wellbeing of refugees with little regard for their political needs, and the encamped victims are expected to display 
an attitude of passive acceptance of the external aid and intervention provided, up to and including being spoken for in 
the name of their safety.
215
 The effect of these representational practices is to set up an 
anonymous, minimal humanity from which refugees cannot escape, with the effect that 
refugee voices are systematically silenced.216  
 
Critical scholars charge that most discourse on refugees is dominated by the languages of 
refugee relief, policy science, and development, each of which claims to produce 
authoritative narratives about refugee lives.217 The same might be said of the existing 
scholarship on transitional justice and displacement, where there are few empirical case 
studies, and only very rare acknowledgement of refugee voices. Rather than describing 
refugee perspectives on their own terms, the scholarship deals predominantly with policy 
concerns, describing the practical, legal and methodological challenges of involving 
displaced persons in transitional justice through a discourse of human rights.218  
 
In order to counter this bias, I aimed for my thesis to engage with the perspective of 
refugees, so that ‘voices from below’ might be heard and heeded.219 I drew on the work 
of other transitional justice scholars who emphasise the importance of place-based 
approaches, rooted in an understanding of transitional justice as co-constructed by those 
whom it affects most.220 I also drew on scholars who bring a more nuanced reading to 
                                                        
214 Liisa Malkki, ‘Speechless Emissaries: Refugees, Humanitarianism and Dehistoricization’ (1996) 11(3) 
Cultural Anthropology 377, 386-390.  
215 Jenny Edkins, ‘Sovereign Power, Zones of Indistinction, and the Camp’ (2000) 25(1) Alternatives: 
Global, Local Political 3, 14. 
216 Liisa Malkki, above n 214, 386 and 390. 
217 Ibid, 386. 
218 Roger Duthie, above n 2, 17. 
219 Patricia Lundy and Mark McGovern, above n 75, 265.  
220 Moses Okello, ‘Afterword: Elevating Transitional Local Justice or Crystallising Global Governance?’ 
in Rosalind Shaw and Lars Waldorf (eds), Localizing Transitional Justice: Interventions and Priorities 
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Agamben’s work, such as those who argue that although refugees may have lost their 
communities and livelihoods, they still hold political views and political agency.221 When 
refugee lives and communities are analysed at the micro-political level, individual lives 
far more complex than bare life emerge, and moments of refugee resistance and political 
agency become clear.222  
 
1.6 Structure of Thesis  
 
My thesis offers an empirical study of the interaction between transitional justice and 
displacement in Liberia and Afghanistan. My overall research question is: Does 
transitional justice, as currently practised, address the harm suffered by refugees, and 
align with the justice preferences of refugees? In each country, I examine how refugees 
participated in formal transitional justice processes, and how they engaged with the ideas 
and objectives of transitional justice on their own terms. I interrogate the three themes 
that dominate the literature on transitional justice and refugees: namely, the use of human 
rights law to understand displacement; the reliance on state-led mechanisms; and the 
assumption that refugee return constitutes the ultimate objective of refugee involvement 
in transitional justice. In doing so, I aim to make the following contributions:  
 
Firstly, an understanding of how the use of a legal, rights-based approach affects refugee 
engagement with transitional justice. I examine how the dominance of law affects the 
                                                        
after Mass Violence, (Stanford University Press, 2010) 276. See also: Susan Thomson and Rosemary Nagy, 
‘Law, Power and Justice: What Legalism Fails to Address in the Functioning of Rwanda's Gacaca Courts’ 
(2011) 5(1) International Journal of Transitional Justice 11, 11-30. 
221 Jenny Edkins, ‘Sovereign Power, Zones of Indistinction, and the Camp’ (2000) 25(1) Alternatives: 
Global, Local Political 3, 14. 
222 For example, see Dan Bousfield, ‘The Logic of Sovereignty and the Agency of the Refugee: Recovering 
the Political from ‘Bare Life’’ (Working Paper No. 36, York Centre for International and Security Studies, 
October 2005) 1; Nicholas Papastergiadis, ‘The Invasion Complex: The Abject Other and Spaces of 
Violence’ (2006) 88B(4) Geografiska Annaler 429, 437; William Walters, ‘Acts of Demonstration: 
Mapping the Territory of (Non-)Citizenship’ in Engin F. Isin and Greg M. Nielsen (eds), Acts of Citizenship 
(Zed Books, 2008) 182,187–188. 
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way in which harm is defined, and the way in which the repair of that harm is 
consequently approached; and, ultimately, how these understandings, and the dominance 
of law generally, affect the ability of refugees to achieve their preferred justice outcomes. 
 
Secondly, I address what the dominance of the state as a transitional justice actor means 
for refugees. I build upon the critical scholarship concerning the delivery of transitional 
justice in the context of state-building, and address the gap in knowledge concerning 
refugees as specific actors. I consider how state and refugee interests aligned or differed 
in the two case studies, the type of conflict that arose between the state and its refugee 
population in relation to transitional justice, how that conflict was resolved, and the affect 
this had upon the ability of refugees to achieve their preferred form of justice. 
 
And, finally, my work offers an understanding of the way in which refugees consider the 
objective of their participation in transitional justice. In doing so, I question the scholarly 
assumption that repatriation is the ultimate objective of the interaction between 
transitional justice and displacement. I examine how the emphasis on return affects 
refugee engagement in transitional justice, and whether an alternate understanding might 
result in justice outcomes better aligned to those preferred by refugees. 
 
I acknowledge that my own thesis research suffered a number of deficiencies concerning 
the inclusion of refugee voices. While I was able to meet with Liberian refugees and 
interview them directly, in Afghanistan my position as a researcher made it impossible 
(or at least unethical) to conduct interviews with Afghan refugees. To compensate, I 
sought alternate sources of data that provided insight into refugee perspectives: for 
example, I was able to spend long periods observing refugees engaged in activities 
associated with transitional justice, and I located newspaper articles that directly quoted 
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refugee voices, as well as secondary research sources that offered direct engagement with 
Afghan refugee populations. Through these and other sources, I aimed to construct a 
detailed picture of how refugees engaged with the ideas transitional justice, and thereby 
generate a clearer understanding of their perspectives on the harm and repair of 
displacement.  
 
Chapter 2 explains my conceptual framework, ethical considerations, data collection 
methodology, and process of analysing the data resulting from fieldwork. It integrates my 
choice of methodology with the objectives of my thesis, and describes how, and why, I 
designed my particular thesis methodology. 
 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 then discuss the first case study, Liberia. The case study begins by 
examining the Liberian TRC, which engaged the Liberian refugee population resident in 
Buduburam refugee camp, Ghana. The Liberian government, together with practitioners 
and scholars, assert that participating in the TRC gave refugees the opportunity to 
communicate to their government whatever information they felt was most important to 
them,223 and that, by participating in the TRC, Liberian refugees and members of the 
diaspora became part of the reconciliation process, and were included within the Liberian 
nation.224 I interrogate this claim from the perspective of refugees themselves, taking into 
account the TRC’s mandate, objectives and methodological framework.  
 
The second part of the Liberian case study shifts attention from the conventional, state-
led mechanism of the TRC, to the different way that refugees themselves engaged with 
                                                        
223 Laura Young and Jennifer Presholdt, ‘Refugee Participation in Peacebuilding: The Case of Liberian 
Refugee Participation in the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ (2010) 20(2) Journal for 
Peace and Justice Studies 117, 130. 
224  Patricia Minikon and Susan Shepler, ‘Documenting Human Rights Abuses Among the Diaspora: 
Lessons Learned from the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ in Noha Shawki and Michaelene 
Cox (eds), Negotiating Sovereignty and Human Rights (Ashgate Publishing, 2009) 141, 154.  
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the ideas and practices of transitional justice. I examine the activities of one NGO active 
in Buduburam refugee camp, Population Caring Organisation. Through two community 
programs known as Peace Cells and the Tribal Leaders’ Reconciliation Forum, refugees 
pursued ideas of truth-telling, reconciliation and accountability in a form that differed 
significantly from the TRC. I demonstrate that the TRC and the refugee-led forums 
understood the harm and repair of displacement very differently, and that their different 
structures and objectives led to the recognition of markedly different voices.  
 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 turn to the second case study, Afghanistan. I begin by examining the 
conventional approach to transitional justice in Afghanistan. Generally, scholars describe 
the Afghan government’s attempts (or lack thereof) to implement transitional justice as a 
failure. I challenge this perspective by examining alternate forums for the pursuit of 
transitional justice objectives, including those initiated by refugees themselves. I first 
examine the process of drafting the 2004 Constitution in Afghanistan, and consider 
whether engaging refugees led to a more inclusive idea of citizenship, and provided a 
platform through which refugees could rebuild their state-citizen relationship.  
 
The second part of the case study on Afghanistan examines two processes not typically 
recognised as transitional justice mechanisms: out-of-country voting, and community 
development through the National Solidary Program. I consider how these two processes 
related to the understanding of harm and repair held by refugees, and how these processes 
enabled refugees to pursue the justice outcomes they valued. I also examine how these 
two forums provided alternative ways for refugees to engage with their state, and rebuild 
their state-citizenship relationship in a contextualised way    
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Chapter 9 concludes by reflecting on the findings of the case studies. Despite the disparate 
contexts, a number of similarities emerged between refugee experiences in Liberia and 
Afghanistan. Overall, refugee engagement in transitional justice emerged as far more 
complex than the normative predictions made in the literature. In conventional 
transitional justice forums, refugees often struggled to speak, and be heard, which 
compromised their ability to obtain justice on their own terms. Instead, refugees often 
pursued accountability, truth-telling and reparations through forums that would not be 
recognised as transitional justice in a conventional sense, but which reflected the broad 
objectives of transition justice while providing refugees with an opportunity to engage 
with their own justice priorities. This prompts a reconsideration of the way scholars and 
practitioners conceive of, and analyse, the interaction between transitional justice and 
displacement, and how we should understand the ultimate objective of this interaction.    
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CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The field of transitional justice has been characterised as ‘faith-based,’ rather than ‘fact-
based.’1 This is evidenced in the scholarship in two different ways. Firstly, there is a 
disproportionate emphasis on the ‘moral-philosophical and jurisprudential aspects’ of 
transitional justice processes.2  Scholars are more often concerned with laying out the 
value-driven justification for transitional justice than assessing its impact, or 
understanding local experiences. Secondly, scholars frequently direct their attention to 
determining ‘best practice,’ and explaining to other advocates how transitional justice 
might be most effectively implemented. In doing so, they emphasise issues of legal 
doctrine, and centre their attention on responding to policy concerns, with little concern 
shown towards establishing an evidence base for their approach.3 Overall, then, there is 
paucity of evidence-based literature on the effects of transitional justice, and the 
experiences of those who participate in its processes.4 
 
These concerns informed the design of this thesis, and are discussed in detail in this 
chapter. The chapter begins with the conceptual framework that underpins the thesis, and 
how this framework determined the choice of methodology. I outline some of the key 
ethical challenges that arose during the research, and how I adapted my research design 
to them. Then I explain how I designed my thesis methodology, including my choice of 
                                                        
1 Oskar Thoms, James Ron, Roland Paris, ‘The Effects of Transitional Justice Mechanisms: A Summary 
of Empirical Research Findings and Implications for Analysts and Practitioners’ (Working Paper, Centre 
for International Policy Studies, University of Ottawa, April 2008) 5. 
2 David Backer, ‘Cross-National Comparative Analysis’ in Hugo Van Der Merwe, Victoria Baxter and 
Audrey Chapman (eds), Assessing the Impact of Transitional Justice: Challenges for Empirical Research 
(USIP, 2009) 23, 60. 
3 Roger Duthie, ‘Introduction: Incorporating Transitional Justice into the Response to Displacement’ in 
Roger Duthie (ed), Transitional Justice and Displacement (Social Science Research Council, 2012) 11, 27. 
4 Oskar Thoms, James Ron, Roland Paris, above n 1, 31. 
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data collection sites, participants, and documentary sources. I conclude by reflecting on 
the process I used to draw conclusions from the thesis data.  
 
2.2  Conceptual Framework and Ethical Considerations 
 
The field of Refugee Studies has grappled with the methodological challenges of 
researching refugee populations, and provides a starting point for my research. Refugee 
Studies emerged as a field of enquiry in the 1980s, primarily in response to the rapid 
growth of refugees and asylum-seekers during that decade.5 It takes the category of 
refugee as both its primary object and the boundary for its research, focusing on the 
exploration, analysis and definition of that label.6 It is a cross-disciplinary field, with the 
majority of contributions coming from the disciplines of Law, Anthropology and Political 
Science.7  
 
The term ‘refugee’ requires critical consideration, in order to understand exactly what the 
term signifies, and the implications of that categorisation.8 The history of the academic 
use of the word reveals that it is not, in fact, a sociological category but a bureaucratic 
label, originating from the world of policy.9 This means that bureaucratic state interests 
and the procedures of humanitarian agencies are crucial determinants in defining the label 
of refugee.10 It is widely recognised by anthropologists that there is no such thing as a 
                                                        
5 B.S. Chimni, ‘The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies: A View From the South’ (1998) 11(4) Journal of 
Refugee Studies 350, 353.  
6 Roger Zetter, ‘Refugees and Refugee Studies: A Label and An Agenda’ (1988) 1(1) Journal of Refugee 
Studies 1, 5. 
7  Anna Schmidt, ‘I Know What You’re Doing,’ Reflexivity and Methods in Refugee Studies’ (2007) 26(3) 
Refugee Survey Quarterly 82, 84. 
8 Richard Black, ‘Fifty Years of Refugee Studies: From Theory to Policy’ (2001) 35(1) International 
Migration Review 57, 63.  
9 Giulia Scalettaris, ‘Refugee Studies and the International Refugee Regime: a Reflection on a Desirable 
Solution’ (2007) 26(3) Refuge Survey Quarterly 36, 41. 
10 Roger Zetter, ‘Labelling Refugees: Forming and Transforming a Bureaucratic Identity’ (1991) 4(1) 
Journal of Refugee Studies 39, 41. 
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generalisable refugee experience, and no set of particular traits that exist within every 
refugee.11 Moreover, refugees themselves often conceive their identity in very different 
terms from those bestowing the label.12  
 
Acknowledging that ‘refugee’ is not a natural label but a constructed one, and one that is 
often contested by those to whom it is applied, raised both substantive and methodological 
issues for my research. Substantively, it led me to explore how the field of transitional 
justice came to recognise the categories of refugee and displacement, the meaning that 
transitional justice scholars and practitioners assign to those terms, and what this means 
for the way in which transitional justice engages refugees in practice. Methodologically, 
it prompted me to recognise that governments, the UN and refugees often hold very 
different understandings of the term refugee, and to critically consider the way I use the 
term refugee myself. This is not to suggest that my approach avoids such categorisation, 
since there is no methodology that can escape labels,13 and no matter what definition or 
terminology the researcher chooses to use, it will have implications for the research 
project. However, what I did attempt to do was consider how the labels I employ are 
defined, who controls those definitions, and how different perspectives concerning the 
definition of ‘refugee’ can complement or conflict with each other.14  
 
Throughout my thesis I adopt an ‘actor-oriented’ perspective, which means that I engaged 
with refugees as social and political agents, rather than as passive victims. 15  I was 
conscious that labels involve relationships of power, in that more powerful actors use 
                                                        
11 Lisa Malkki, ‘Refugees and Exile: From Refugee Studies to the National Order of Things’ (1995) 24 
Annual Review of Anthropology 495, 496.  
12 Roger Zetter, above n 10, 40. 
13 Ibid, 59. 
14 Roger Zetter, ‘Refugees, Repatriation and Root Causes’ (1988) 1(2) Journal of Refugee Studies 99, 105-
106. 
15 Kieran McEvoy and Lorna McGregor, ‘Transitional Justice From Below: An Agenda for Research, 
Policy and Praxis’ in Kieran McEvoy and Lorna McGregor (eds), Transitional Justice from Below: 
Grassroots Activism and the Struggle for Change (Hart Publishing, 2008) 1, 5.  
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labels to influence how particular issues and categories of people are regarded and treated. 
This affected the way in which I use the term refugee, as well as the term transitional 
justice. I intentionally sought refugee perspectives on the two labels, and then engaged 
their views throughout my research. For example, in 2012, UNHCR issued a cessation 
clause with respect to Liberia, which meant that as of 30 June 2012, UNHCR and the 
governments of Liberia and Ghana no longer recognised Liberians as refugees. 16 
Regardless of this legal change, Liberians continued to refer to themselves, often very 
consciously, as refugees. Throughout my thesis, I refer to Liberians living in Buduburam 
refugee settlement as refugees, in recognition of their self-defined identity. I also 
incorporated their explanations for why they remained in exile, which often differ from 
those conventionally associated with refugeehood.17 
 
Another methodological challenge common to both Refugee Studies and transitional 
justice is the way that scholarship often combines scholarly research with advocacy. 
Research on displacement often takes place within a policy setting, and has developed 
side by side with humanitarian agencies such as UNHCR.18 The same can be said of 
transitional justice, where scholars regularly work as legal advocates.19 These scholar-
advocates use the lives of vulnerable others not only to generate scholarship, but also to 
promote their own research, and ultimately their own careers.20 This position, scholars 
argue, creates an ethical obligation upon researchers to add value to the lives of the people 
they are researching, recognising them as subjects in the process and not simply as 
                                                        
16 UNHCR, Implementation of the Comprehensive Strategy for the Liberian Refugee Situation, including 
UNHCR's Recommendations on the Applicability of the "Ceased Circumstances" Cessation Clauses 
(UNHCR, 13 January 2012). 
17 Kevin Carragee and Wim Roefs, ‘The Neglect of Power in Recent Framing Research’ (2004) 54(2) 
Journal of Communication 214, 223. 
18 Richard Black, above n 8, 67.  
19 Megan Bradley, Refugee Repatriation: Justice, Responsibility and Redress (Cambridge University Press, 
2013) 73.  
20  Katherina Heya, ‘A Disability Lens on Sociolegal Research: Reading Rights of Inclusion from a 
Disability Studies Perspective’ (2007) 32(1) Law and Social Inquiry 261, 281. 
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sources of data.21 Some take this a step further and justify research into others’ suffering 
only if alleviating that suffering is an explicit objective.22  This ‘dual imperative’ of 
scholarship and advocacy creates a fundamental conflict for the researcher. There is a 
constant battle to maintain academic independence and intellectual rigor, while 
simultaneously producing research relevant to policy concerns and that is able to 
ameliorate suffering.23 
 
To address these concerns in my research, I designed the methodology for data collection 
in a way that is empowering for refugee participants, and that has the potential to bring 
about social change for, or within, refugee communities.24 In doing so, I focused on the 
capacity of refugees to challenge existing structures. This meant, for example, that I did 
not only ask refugees their views in relation to the conventional mechanisms of 
transitional justice; but, I also questioned their responses to those mechanisms, and the 
actions they took outside or in parallel to the conventional processes. I framed interview 
questions in a way that encouraged participants to reflect upon their own, or their 
community’s, strengths and agency. 
 
My thesis also engaged a range of traditional ethical concerns, revolving around the 
principles of consent, the right to privacy, and protection from harm. The minimum 
requirements for informed consent are that participants are fully and adequately informed 
about the purposes, methods, risks and benefits of the research and that agreement to 
participate is fully voluntary, the end goals being that informed consent safeguards 
                                                        
21 Richard Hugman, ‘Social Work Research and Ethics’ in Ian Shaw et al (eds), The Sage Handbook of 
Social Work Research (Sage Publications, 2010) 149, 152. 
22 David Turton, ‘Migrants and Refugees’ in Tim Allen (ed), In Search of Cool Ground: War, Flight, and 
Homecoming in Northeast Africa (Africa World Press, 1996) 96, 96. 
23 Richard Black, above n 8, 58.  
24 Eileen Pittaway and Linda Bartolomei, ‘Field Research Reports: Kakuma, Kenya, Sri Lanka, Ethiopia 
and the Thai–Burma Border’ (Report, Centre for Refugee Research, 2005) 247. 
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participants from harm, coercion and exploitation.25 However, the standard interpretation 
of informed consent is based on the assumption that participants are autonomous, 
understand the implications of giving consent, and are in relatively equal positions of 
power with researchers. In the refugee context, vulnerability, compromised autonomy, 
mistrust and the complexities of community representation make the issue of informed 
consent more complex.26 This means that obtaining informed consent in the traditional 
sense may not be sufficient to discharge the ethical burden on the interviewer. In the case 
of my research, it meant that I closely considered the topics and questions for which I 
could ethically seek refugees’ consent. For instance, when interviewing refugees in 
Liberia, I avoided any questions about past harm, since revisiting traumatic events could 
cause the narrator to experience further emotional suffering, and I did not feel I could 
ethically ask participants to assume that risk. In Afghanistan, I made the decision not to 
interview refugee participants since my position as a UNHCR officer diminished the 
possibility of obtaining genuine informed consent. 
 
In order to incorporate both the methodological and ethical issues arising throughout my 
research project, I focused on developing reflexivity. Reflexivity, according to Giddens, 
refers to the uniquely human capacity to reflexively monitor one’s own actions. 27 
Reflexivity occurs in two forms: ‘endogenous’ and ‘referential.’ Endogenous reflexivity 
requires the researcher to reflect on the way in which they construct the process of 
research, for instance by being conscious about bias and assumptions. Referential 
reflexivity involves the relationship between the researcher and the researched. 28 
                                                        
25  Catriona Mackenzie, Christopher McDowell and Eileen Pittaway, ‘Beyond “Do No Harm”: The 
Challenge of Constructing Ethical Relationships in Refugee Research’ (2007) 20(2) Journal of Refugee 
Studies 299, 301.  
26 Ibid, 302. 
27 Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Polity Press, 1990) 36.  
28 Tim May, ‘Reflexivity in the Age of Reconstructive Social Science’ (1998) 1(1) International Journal 
of Social Research Methodology 7, 8.  
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Together, these forms of reflexivity constitute an acknowledgement that the researcher is 
not an objective, impartial recorder of facts, but holds their own conceptual frame and 
worldview, interprets and mediates the data in their own way, and affects by their very 
presence the kind of research data that is collected.29  
 
A reflexive approach recognises the value in human research subjects engaging directly 
with the research. This contrasts with modernist approaches to research, which 
intentionally create distance between observer and observed in order to maintain control 
over their subjects, setting up unequal power relations between the researcher and 
research subject.30 A reflexive approach, by contrast, prompts researchers to consider 
how their research subjects may react to the ways they are portrayed, and to give them 
the opportunity to comment on, modify, change and/or correct scholars’ interpretations 
of what the subjects said.31  
 
My research design aimed to take into account these conceptual and ethical 
considerations. It intended to produce what McEvoy describes as a ‘thick’ description of 
what took place, an account of the ‘complex, multilayered and actor oriented’ dimensions 
of transitional justice.32 I took a qualitative approach to data collection in order to gain 
insight into a field where little is known,33 and to highlight the participants’ point of 
view.34 As refugee views and experiences emerged during interviews, I looked beyond 
                                                        
29  Jane Elliot, Using Narrative in Social Research: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches (Sage 
Publications, 2005) 20.   
30 Alexandra Jaffe, ‘Involvement, Detachment, and Representation on Corsica’ in Caroline Brettell (ed), 
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31 Caroline Brettell, ‘Introduction: Fieldwork, Text and Audience’ in Carolie Brettell (ed), When They Read 
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the data as a source of objective or factual information, and sought to understand what it 
revealed about the broader culture, framework and relations of power in which people 
made sense of their lives.35 
 
Overall, my thesis takes the form of a structured, focused case study. This means that it 
is structured around general questions that reflect the research objective, and that these 
questions are asked of each case study to guide and standardise data collection.36  It is 
focused in that it deals only with certain aspects of the historical cases examined.37 In 
both cases I limit my examination to transitional justice mechanisms: in Liberia, to the 
TRC and the grassroots activities of PCO; and in Afghanistan, to the process of drafting 
the Constitution, out-of-country voting, and national development.    
 
Another methodological challenge concerned the choice of case studies. There are few 
instances where refugees have been involved in transitional justice, and as a result it was 
difficult to meet the traditional criteria for a comparative study, such as choosing two 
cases that are literal replicates, or that are notable for their difference.38 Instead, within 
the limited case study options, I aimed to identify two countries that shared key contextual 
features, but differed in the precise way they engaged refugees in transitional justice.  
 
Liberia and Afghanistan share four contextual features. Both countries had experienced a 
violent and prolonged civil war, characterised by violence carried out by citizens of that 
country against their compatriots. As a response to this violence, both countries initiated 
some form of transitional justice, which took place in the context of an active UN state-
                                                        
35 Jane Elliot, above n 29, 28. 
36 Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences 
(MIT Press, 2005) 67.  
37 Ibid.  
38 Robert Yin, Case Study Research, Design and Methods (Sage Publications, 2nd ed, 1994) 46. 
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building mission, and was initiated and managed by the transitional government. In both 
Liberia and Afghanistan the state chose to engage its refugee population in those 
transitional justice activities. These commonalities made it possible to compare the 
effects of state-building upon refugee engagement in transitional justice.  
 
The differences between Liberia and Afghanistan give insight into the variety of ways 
that transitional justice and displaced persons can interact, and the implications of these 
differences for refugees. For example, in Liberia, the new government sought out the 
involvement of displaced persons in its TRC, and treated them as a distinct group of 
citizens characterised by their displacement. In Afghanistan, by contrast, the transitional 
government integrated refugees into the process of drafting a new Constitution by treating 
them no differently from other non-displaced Afghan citizens. 
 
Overall, then, my thesis constitutes qualitative research in the form of a structured, 
focused case comparison. I relied on snowball sampling, and collected data through semi-
structured interviews. Within this framework, the contextual differences between Liberia 
and Afghanistan necessitated some differences in methodology. With this in mind, the 
following sections reflect on the specific methodology used in Liberia and Afghanistan. 
 
2.3 Liberia  
 
Liberia is located on the west coast of Africa, bordering Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire and 
Guinea. In 2014 its population was estimated at 4.1 million persons. In terms of religious 
beliefs, the country is predominantly Christian (85.6 per cent), with a large Muslim 
minority (12.2 per cent). Ethnically Liberia is comprised of sixteen identifiable 
indigenous ethnic groups, plus those of Americo-Liberian descent (about 5 per cent) and 
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a small number of miscellaneous groups.39 It is broken into fifteen counties, each of which 
corresponds to territory historically claimed by an indigenous ethnic group.40 
 
From 1990 until 2003, Liberians suffered through a brutal civil war. The conflict resulted 
in the deaths of more than 200 000 people, widespread human rights abuse, and pervasive 
displacement. Since the end of the conflict, the Liberian government has taken a number 
of steps to address the country’s violent history. Most visibly, in 2009, it established a 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which collected over 20 000 statements, held 
public hearings, and published a narrative report attributing responsibility for past 
atrocities, as well as making detailed recommendations to the Liberian government 
regarding political, economic and legal reforms. One novel aspect of the Liberian TRC 
was its decision to engage displaced Liberians. This was significant as it allowed Liberian 
refugees to have their suffering acknowledged by the new government, and gave them 
the opportunity to contribute to recommendations for political, economic and legal 
reforms.  
 
My first case study is an examination of the way in which the Liberian Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission engaged displaced Liberians. Specifically, I examined the 
experiences of the Liberian refugee population resident in Buduburam refugee settlement 
in Ghana, as well as those who had lived in the settlement but had since returned to 
Liberia. I also observed the work of a grassroots NGO initiated and run by refugees in 
Buduburam settlement that engaged both with the TRC, as well as with the ideas of 
transitional justice and reconciliation more broadly. My aim was to understand how 
refugees perceived their engagement in the TRC, and the impact it had on their return and 
reintegration. I also examined the ways in which refugees engaged in practices of truth-
                                                        
39 Ayodeji Olukoju, Culture and Customs of Liberia (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006) 3. 
40 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, Consolidated Final Report (2009) vol 2, 13. 
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telling, accountability and reconciliation on their own terms, and what this reveals about 
the practice of transitional justice more generally. While there were other mechanisms of 
transitional justice present in Liberia, such as the Palava Hut national reconciliation 
program, it was not possible for Liberian refugees to participate while they were living in 
asylum. My thesis is concerned with those mechanism available to refugees while in 
asylum, and therefore I have focused on the TRC and grassroots forums active in 
Buduburam refugee settlement.  
 
I travelled to Liberia in late February 2013. For the first month, I focused on becoming 
familiar with the local culture and context, identifying key informants, and undertaking 
archival research at the TRC. I also conducted a first round of interviews in and around 
the capital, Monrovia. During this period, I realised that I had made a number of 
assumptions in my original research proposal about the relationship between refugees and 
transitional justice. Originally, I hypothesised that involving refugees in transitional 
justice would increase the level of political agency possessed by refugees, and lead to 
meaningful outcomes for them. However, my initial interviews revealed that rather than 
a site of ‘empowerment,’ transitional justice was actually a site of conflict between the 
state and its refugee population. I made some adjustments to my research questions, and 
then carried out another two months of interviews with participants in and around 
Monrovia. I then spent approximately one month conducting interviews in Gbarnga in 
central Liberia, a town with a population of 34,000 persons, and Ganta in northern 
Liberia, a town with a population of 41,000.41 Both towns are significantly smaller than 
Monrovia, whose population is approximately 1.1 million. After completing my 
fieldwork in Liberia, in mid June 2013 I travelled to Ghana, and spent one month 
                                                        
41 Government of the Republic of Liberia, National Housing and Population Census (2008) 12.  
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conducting interviews in Buduburam refugee settlement, the site of the TRC’s activities 
with Liberian refugees in 2009.  
 
In both Liberia and Ghana, I conducted interviews with three categories of people. These 
were refugees, former refugees who had repatriated to Liberia, and key actors, including 
refugee community leaders, TRC staff, UN and NGO staff, and Liberian academics. 
Refugee participants were the most difficult to identify, as there are no databases or other 
records documenting Liberian refugees who have repatriated, and no record of refugees 
who had participated in the TRC. Therefore, I had to rely on chain referral sampling (also 
known as the ‘snowball’ method) to identify refugee participants in both Liberia and 
Ghana. In the snowball method, research participants use their social networks to refer 
the researcher to other people who could potentially participate in the study.42 This form 
of participant identification is often beneficial – or necessary – in order to identify a 
hidden population, or groups that are not easily accessible.43  
 
There are a number of risks associated with the snowball method. One risk is that it can 
exclude those who are not linked to the individual at the centre of the snowball. Another 
concern, particularly in refugee contexts, is that the researcher may have little choice but 
to place a community leader at the centre of the snowball, and this leader may exert tight 
control over their community. 44  To overcome these risks, I established multiple 
‘snowballs’ with unrelated persons at their centre. I conducted interviews in a range of 
locations, both urban and non-urban, and incorporated refugees who had, and had not, 
participated in the TRC or grassroots transitional justice forums in order to compare their 
                                                        
42  Greg Guest et al, Qualitative Research Methods: A Data Collector’s Field Guide (Family Health 
International, 2011) 5.  
43 Ibid, 6. 
44 Catherine Ebbs, ‘Qualitative Research Inquiry: Issues of Power and Ethics’ (1996) 117 (2) Education 
217, 218.  
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experiences. I recorded basic biodata to ensure I had a relatively even distribution of 
participants across ethnicity, sex, age, and background. 
 
In total, I carried out 72 interviews with refugees or returned refugees. Of these, 24 were 
refugees living in Buduburam refugee settlement in Ghana, consisting of 10 women and 
14 men. 11 had participated in the TRC and 13 had not. I also carried out 48 interviews 
with refugees who had lived in Buduburam refugee settlement, but had since repatriated 
to Liberia. This consisted of 20 women and 28 men, of whom 18 had participated in the 
TRC while they were living in Buduburam settlement, and 30 had not. I carried out 15 
interviews with key actors including TRC staff, Liberian officials, Liberian academics 
and NGO staff. I was concerned that asking people their tribe could be a sensitive issue, 
so replaced it with the proxy question of dialect spoken. Most participants in Ganta were 
of the Gio or Mano ethnic groups, and in Gbarnga were Kpelle. In Monrovia and Ghana 
there was a mixture of ethnicities, but a slight majority of Krahn. 
 
I conducted semi-structured interviews, which combine the unstructured, open-ended 
interview with the directionality of set questions, to produce focused qualitative data.45 
Interviews were conducted on an individual basis unless the participant requested 
otherwise, and on average went for one hour. I conducted the interview wherever the 
participant felt most comfortable, sometimes in private (such as their home) or sometimes 
in public (such as a café). The interviews took place in mix of English and Liberian 
English. Many of those I interviewed had spent time living in Ghana, which meant that 
they were used to adapting their Liberian English (which can be difficult for non-
Liberians to understand) for a non-Liberian audience. During interviews, I took 
handwritten notes transcribing the conversation, which I later reviewed and converted 
                                                        
45  Stephen Schensul, Jean Schensul and Margaret LeCompte, Essential Ethnographic Methods: 
Observations, Interviews and Questionnaires (Altamira Press, 1999) 149. 
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into typed transcripts. I also took in-depth field-notes describing what I observed in the 
communities I was researching in. Before concluding the interview, I provided 
individuals with an opportunity to ask further questions of me and of the aims of the 
research. An example of my interview questions can be found at Annex 1.  
 
I took seriously Rodgers’ suggestion that there are academic benefits for researchers to 
‘hang out’ with their target population. 46  In Liberia, I rented a furnished room in 
downtown Monrovia and travelled to each of my interviews by public transport. Due to 
the irregularity of transport, this meant that I often had time after the interview to talk 
with my interviewee and their family or neighbours. It also gave me time to chat with 
Liberians on the bus or in the shared taxi. I also spent a lot of time in local cafes and 
markets talking to Liberians. When I travelled to Gbarnga and Ganta for interviews, I did 
so by public transport and stayed in a local setting. In Buduburam refugee settlement, I 
lived in a rented room within the settlement, and used local facilities. This gave me the 
opportunity to chat everyday with my neighbours and other refugees living in the area. I 
also accepted invitations to attend soccer games, church services, choir practice, and 
primary school classes. While the information or insights gleaned during such 
conversations did not form part of my formal research findings, it provided an invaluable 
window into the economic, social, political and cultural context of my research subjects.  
 
Wherever possible, I supplemented my interviews, and triangulated the information I 
obtained therein, with written records sourced in Liberia and Ghana. One main source of 
data were written minutes and reports related to the Peace Cells and Tribal Leaders’ 
Reconciliation Forum, described at length in Chapter 6. However, one limitation is that 
these written records are almost always ad hoc and incomplete. Numerous PCO staff 
                                                        
46 Graeme Rodgers, ‘“Hanging Out” with Forced Migrants: Methodological and Ethical Challenges’ (2004) 
21 Forced Migration Review 48, 48. 
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explained that as repatriation and deportation of Liberian refugees increased in 2008, it 
became difficult to retain systematic records of events that had passed.47 As a result, while 
such documents cannot provide a full picture, they do offer a richer understanding of the 
activities at that time. 
 
At the end of my time in each of Ghana and Liberia, I provided the ‘centre’ of each of my 
snowballs with a summary of my research and its anticipated trajectory, and asked that 
they share it with the other research participants. I also recorded the email addresses of 
participants who wished to receive a copy of my research once completed.  
 
2.4 Afghanistan  
 
Afghanistan has historically been the link between Central Asia, the Middle East and the 
Indian sub-continent. It shares borders with Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan and China and, reflecting its geographic location, is made up of at least a 
dozen major ethnic groups. The dominant ethnic group is Pashtun (42 per cent), with 
sizable Tajik (27 per cent), Hazara (9 per cent) and Uzbek (9 per cent) minorities. There 
are also much smaller numbers of Aimak (4 per cent), Turkmen (3 per cent), Baloch (2 
per cent) and other (4 per cent) ethnic groups. The vast majority of Afghans are Muslims, 
with only 1 per cent of the population claiming to be of another religion. Of those who 
practice Islam, 80 per cent are Sunni Muslim, and 19 per cent are Shia Muslim. As of 
2014, Afghanistan’s population is estimated at 31.8 million.  
 
Afghanistan has been at war almost continuously since 1978. This was not one single 
war, but a series of conflicts with changing sets of political actors who were alternately 
                                                        
47 Interview with Morris, Liberian return refugee (Monrovia, 7 April 2013).  
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in power and opposition. All sides throughout the various phases of conflict committed 
war crimes and egregious human rights violations.48 These decades of conflict have 
destroyed much of the nation’s economy and infrastructure, and produced large refugee 
populations, estimated at around 30 per cent of the population. 
  
My case study focused on the drafting of the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan, and the 
Loya Jirga that accompanied it. The government of Afghanistan involved Afghan 
refugees living in Pakistan and Iran in both processes on the same basis as other non-
displaced Afghans. I examined how refugees experienced this engagement, and whether 
it furthered the objectives of transitional justice. In addition, I also explored how refugees 
themselves perceived ideas of justice, accountability and reparations. This led me to focus 
on two specific mechanisms: refugee enfranchisement in Presidential elections, and the 
way in which refugees were engaged by a national development program known as the 
National Solidarity Program.  
 
Afghanistan provided a different set of methodological challenges compared to those I 
faced in Liberia. In Afghanistan, I was only able to gain access to the country, and 
permission from my university to conduct research, due to my affiliation with UNHCR. 
In late July 2013, I took a leave of absence from my thesis to take up a 9 month contract 
with UNHCR Kabul as a Protection Officer. Unexpectedly, my position with UNHCR 
gave me responsibility for a number of issues related to Afghan refugees and transitional 
justice. I represented UNHCR in matters related to refugee participation in the upcoming 
elections, refugee participation in the Loya Jirga, and refugee repatriation. I also obtained 
access to relevant internal documents, relevant actors within government, the UN, NGOs 
and civil society, and had the opportunity to speak directly with refugees about their 
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in Afghanistan’ (Thematic Report, Afghan Analysts Network, 30 June 2013) 6. 
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concerns and demands linked to the above issues. This work formed part of my ordinary 
employment, and was not something that I initiated or pursued for the sake of my PhD. 
However, midway through my UNHCR contract, and after conferring with the 
management at UNHCR, I lodged an application with the ANU Ethics Office to include 
Afghanistan as a second case study, and the Ethics Office approved the application.  
 
The exposure to practical ways in which refugees were engaging with transitional justice 
allowed me to identify themes and activities that I would not otherwise have recognised. 
After identifying these areas, I was able to conduct desktop research and identify relevant 
open sources materials. The bulk of the research I conducted in Afghanistan pertains to 
document analysis. UNHCR provided me with a number of internal but unclassified 
documents relating to refugee involvement in the Loya Jirga and elections, as well as 
refugee repatriation. I was also able to trace records of regular communication between 
UNHCR and refugees.  
 
On a number of occasions I gained access during work meetings to information from UN, 
government or NGO staff. I have not used any of this information directly as I obtained 
it in my role as a practitioner and not as a researcher, and those who were speaking had 
not given their informed consent. In a small number of instances, I approached key actors 
outside formal work interactions and explained that, separate to my position with 
UNHCR, I was also a PhD student. Most were willing for me to interview them provided 
I did not identify them. I did not approach actors where I thought that doing so could 
jeopardise the relationship UNHCR shared with them, for instance in the case of 
government employees, where I was concerned that my joint identity would generate 
suspicion towards UNHCR.  
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For ethical reasons, I did not interview any Afghan refugees. I was concerned that my 
position as an officer with UNHCR would give refugees the impression that I had the 
ability to provide material or other valuable assistance to them, and, that they would 
perceive that refusal to participate in my research would have negative consequences for 
their family. In such a context it would have been impossible to obtain genuine consent. 
As part of my ordinary work duties, I was required to meet periodically with refugees to 
discuss issues related to transitional justice. However, I have not directly used any 
information obtained during such discussions, as there was no ethical way for me to 
obtain refugee consent.  
 
2.5 Analysing the Data 
 
In analysing the data obtained through fieldwork interviews, I employed an inductive 
process that combined case study analysis and the identification of recurring patterns or 
themes. 49  First, I conducted open coding, a process that involves breaking down, 
examining, comparing, conceptualising, and categorising the data.50 Through interaction 
with the data, making comparisons, asking questions about the data and analysing when 
and why there are differences and the reasons for these differences, I fashioned 
interconnections and derived concepts.51 This meant that the theories that emerged arose 
directly from the data I collected. I triangulated the data through observation, informal 
discussions with people at the research sites, and a varied based of interviewees, which 
enabled me to crosscheck the information provided by a single informant. The use of 
multiple methods and multiple data sources, including drawing on pre-existing literature, 
                                                        
49 Michael Quinn Patton, Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods (Sage Publications 3rd ed, 2002) 
452-453, 463-465. 
50 Anselm Strauss and Juliet Corbin, Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for 
Develping Grounded Theory (Sage Publications, 2nd ed, 1998) 61. 
51 Michael Quinn Patton, above n 49, 470-477. 
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helped to ensure greater reliability of findings. 
 
Participant observation was a particularly rich method of triangulating, interrogating and 
better understanding the data collected through interviews. I traveled in person to each 
case study location, aimed to build rapport with the people I was interviewing or who 
were involved in relevant aspects of each case study, and spent a prolonged amount of 
time engaging with those people, or the research sites generally. These methods allowed 
me to obtain the observational data required to support my fieldwork interviews.52 
 
In addition to interviews and observation, I also critically analysed key texts. Drawing on 
a range of critical approaches to international law, I examined documents including those 
produced by the TRC in Liberia and the Constitutional Commission in Afghanistan, 
political speeches and policy statements of the respective governments, legislation, UN 
reports, NGO reports and media releases, and newspaper reports.  
 
A number of methodological issues arose during fieldwork that may have influenced the 
outcomes of my research. One was the difficulty in achieving a gender balance amongst 
interviewees. The majority of key actors and community leaders were men, reflecting a 
gendered hierarchy amongst both Liberian and Afghan populations. Although I made an 
effort to interview equal numbers of men and women, I was unable to achieve this in 
either case study. A second limitation is that the views of participants reflect their 
opinions at a particular point in time. When I conducted fieldwork, at least five years had 
passed since both the Liberian TRC and the Afghan constitution-drafting process 
concluded. Perspectives on issues as complex as transitional justice, and the way 
participants view their interactions with transitional justice are not fixed and are 
                                                        
52 Greg Guest, Emily Namey and Marilyn Mitchell, Collecting Qualitative Data: A Field Manual for 
Applied Research (Sage Publishing, 2013) 75. 
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constantly questioned, revised, and reinterpreted by the narrators, as well as the 
researchers that record them.53 
 
2.6 Conclusion  
 
Through this thesis, I aimed to contribute not only to the gap in scholarly knowledge, but 
also to the methodological gap. I did this by undertaking a critical, multilayered study of 
how transitional justice has engaged displaced persons in practice. As far as possible, I 
employed an empirical methodology, since empirical studies are well placed to explore 
popular attitudes towards justice and identify sites of resistance, challenge and 
modification.54 In addition, in order to allow ‘voices from below’ to be heard and heeded, 
I took a participatory approach, which meant that I focused on the voices of refugees, 
rather than the normative claims of scholars.55 
 
This approach had an impact not only on the methodology of the thesis, but also on the 
direction of the research, and the way I interpreted the findings. In the Liberian case study, 
the empirical, refugee-led focus enabled me to identify sites of divergence between 
conventional understandings of truth, reconciliation and accountability, and those held by 
refugees. This, in turn, provided a richer understanding of the way in which refugees 
experienced the work of the Liberian TRC. In the Afghanistan case study, the same 
approach prompted me to reconsider who, exactly, defines the boundaries of transitional 
justice. Rather than defining the boundaries of transitional justice according to established 
normative or legal principles, as is the conventional practice, I focused on the way in 
                                                        
53 David Engel and Frank Munger, Rights of Inclusion: Law and Identity in the Life Stories of Americans 
with Disabilities (Chicago University Press, 2003) 9. 
54 Eve Darian-Smith, ‘Ethnographies of Law’ in Austin Sarat (ed), The Blackwell Companion to Law and 
Society (Blackwell Publishing, 2004) 545, 556. 
55 Patricia Lundy and Mark McGovern, ‘Whose Justice? Rethinking Transitional Justice from the Bottom 
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which refugees themselves defined those boundaries. This led to quite a different 
conception of the goals, mechanisms, and methods of transitional justice. 
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CHAPTER 3:  
THE LIBERIAN TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter introduces the Liberian case study, focusing on the Liberian Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. A truth and reconciliation commission (TRC) is a temporary 
body, usually empowered by the state, to engage directly with the affected population in 
order to investigate a pattern of past events.1 TRCs rose to prominence as a practice of 
transitional justice in the 1980’s, in part as a reaction to the dominance of criminal trials. 
In contrast to the individualised, combative nature of trials, TRCs use narrative testimony 
in order to understand the full extent and scale of serious violence that has affected a 
society.2 Since that time, they have grown in prominence, and are now considered one of 
four pillars of successful peacebuilding, essential for achieving reconciliation and lasting 
peace after violent conflict.3 
 
The Liberian TRC was initiated in response to a brutal, fourteen-year civil war that came 
to an end in 2003. Its proceedings, findings and perceived impact have been subject to 
mixed assessments by both scholars and the general Liberian population. While some 
consider the TRC a success, many others are critical. Often, this critique is based on 
deficiencies faced by many TRCs, such as manipulation by political figures,4 a weak 
                                                        
1 Priscilla Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions 
(Routledge, 2nd ed, 2011) 11-12. 
2 Elizabeth Stanley, ‘Truth Commissions and the Recognition of State Crime’ (2005) 45 British Journal of 
Criminology 582, 583. 
3 Michele Flournoy and Michael Pan, ‘Dealing with Demons: Justice and Reconciliation’ (2002) 25(4) The 
Washington Quarterly 111, 111-123; John Hamre and Sullivan Gordon, ‘Toward Postconflict 
Reconstruction’ (2002) 25(4) The Washington Quarterly 85, 85-96. 
4 Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict 
Societies, UN Doc. S/2011/634 (12 October 2011) para 24. 
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justice system, and insufficient time to carry out investigations.5 Rather than focusing on 
these critiques, my aim throughout this case study is to understand how the TRC 
constructed its ideas of truth, reconciliation and transition, and, equally, how refugees 
engaged with or contested those constructions.  
 
The chapter begins by sketching the history of the Liberian conflict, and the context 
within which the Liberian TRC was initiated. I describe the processes and findings of the 
TRC, and the subsequent reaction of the Liberian public. I then introduce the ideas of 
truth and reconciliation as constructed, rather than natural, concepts. I argue that the 
TRC’s mandate, objectives, processes and final report contributed to a particular kind of 
truth, a certain view of reconciliation, and a specific narrative about the new Liberian 
state and its people.  
 
3.2 Civil War and Displacement in Liberia 
 
In 1816, a group of wealthy and influential American citizens, connected by their 
antislavery beliefs, formed the American Colonization Society. Their intention was to 
find a home for the increasing number of freed black slaves present in the United States, 
and, in pursuit of this end, in 1822 they established a colony on the west coast of Africa.6 
Using funds they had raised in the United States, they began to resettle to this colony free-
born black Americans, freed slaves of African descent, and Africans freed from captured 
slave ships. People resettled in this way became collectively known as Americo–
Liberians, a name that continues until the present day.7 Although they never constituted 
more than 5 per cent of the total Liberian population, the Americo-Liberians were 
                                                        
5 Ibid, para 51. 
6 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, Consolidated Final Report (2009) vol 2, 13. 
7 Ibid. 
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stronger than the indigenous inhabitants politically, economically and militarily. As a 
result, they were able to acquire land and slowly establish their dominance over the 
indigenous population.8 The Americo-Liberians consolidated their power in 1847, when 
they formally founded Liberia as a nation-state. Over the next hundred years, the 
Americo-Liberians implemented a political system that denied economic opportunities, 
political rights and the opportunity for social mobility to indigenous Liberians, and 
attempted to impose cultural, religious, economic, social and political standards on a 
diverse collection of indigenous groups.9  
 
The first significant challenges to this system began in the 1970s. Throughout the 1970s, 
a number of progressive Americo-Liberians who had spent time studying in the United 
States returned to Liberia. They used the University of Liberia as a platform to teach 
indigenous Liberians about their rights under a democratic system, and worked to 
mobilise citizens to challenge the Americo-Liberian system of governance. 10  This 
provided an organised platform for growing social dissent amongst indigenous Liberians. 
After an Americo-Liberian called William Tolbert assumed the Presidency in 1971, he 
implemented a number of political reforms intended to improve the situation of 
indigenous Liberians. They were, however, limited in nature and did not address the 
fundamental inequalities that existed between indigenous Liberians and their Americo-
Liberian compatriots. As social dissent continued to grow, the economy deteriorated 
significantly. On 14 April 1979, indigenous Liberians gathered en masse to demonstrate 
against a steep rise in the price of the nation’s staple food, rice. Despite the demonstration 
being peaceful, President Tolbert allegedly instructed the police to shoot at 
demonstrators, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of indigenous Liberians. Many 
                                                        
8 Stephen Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy (New York University Press, 2007) 43.  
9 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, above n 6, vol 2, 99. 
10 Aaron Weah, ‘Hopes and Uncertainties: Liberia’s Journey to End Impunity’ (2012) 6(2) International 
Journal of Transitional Justice 331, 333.  
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Liberians perceive these so-called ‘rice riots’ as the beginning of the civil conflict that 
would engulf Liberia a decade later.11  
 
Following the 1979 rice riots, tensions between indigenous Liberians and the Americo-
Liberians led to a coup in 1980, headed by an indigenous Liberian called Samuel Doe. 
Doe killed President Tolbert and then assumed the Presidency himself, thus becoming the 
nation’s first non-Americo-Liberian President. Most indigenous Liberians initially 
applauded the overthrow of the Tolbert regime, however they were soon disillusioned by 
the incapability of the new leader and of his military junta to govern the country 
adequately.12 The decade-long reign of President Doe was characterised by repression 
and violence, and a significant increase in ethnic tensions and ethnic-based violence 
across the country. Starting with the coup, members of Doe’s ethnic group, the Krahn, 
came to control most of the leading national political and military state institutions, 
despite the fact that they constituted a mere 4 per cent of the total population.13 Facing 
significant political opposition from the Gio and Mano ethnic groups, Doe attempted to 
build a rival alliance with the Mandingo ethnic group by appointing them to political 
positions and helping them to secure land. As a result, violence between the Krahn and 
Mandingo on the one hand, and the Gio and Mano on the other, became increasingly 
frequent throughout the 1980’s.14   
 
It was within this context that the Liberian civil war began. In response to Doe’s 
repressive and discriminatory regime, a Liberian of mixed Americo-Liberian heritage, 
Charles Taylor, established a rebel group known as the National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
                                                        
11 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, above n 6, vol 2, 15. 
12 Jeremy Levitt, The Evolution of Deadly Conflict in Liberia (Carolina Academic Press, 2005) 197-198. 
13 Max Sesay, ‘Civil War and Collective Intervention in Liberia’ (1996) 67 Review of African Political 
Economy 35, 37.  
14 Stephen Ellis, ‘Liberia 1989-1994: A Study of Ethnic and Spiritual Violence’ (1995) 94 African Affairs 
166, 167.  
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(NPFL). In December 1989, the NPFL invaded Liberia from its base in Côte d'Ivoire, 
intending to overthrow the regime of President Doe.15 This incursion marked the opening 
of a brutal fourteen-year civil war in Liberia.16  While the war had a distinct ethnic 
element, it was not simply about ethnic rivalry. Rather, it involved much deeper questions 
of national identity and distribution of resources, stemming from the very way that Liberia 
was settled. In a country so rich in natural resources, greed, too, played a prominent role, 
and as the war continued unabated it came to be characterised by ‘power, money, plunder 
and revenge.’17  
 
This first phase of the conflict ended in 1996. A cessation of hostilities was brokered in 
September 1995 through the Abuja Peace Accord, but violence continued until a lasting 
ceasefire finally held in August 1996. The Abuja Peace Accord was signed between 
Taylor, the Liberian national armed forces and six other warring factions, who agreed to 
national elections in July 1997. Taylor won the elections, with 75 per cent of the vote.18 
This might seem an anomalous result, given Taylor’s role in the civil war, but many 
Liberians believed he was the only candidate able to ensure an end to the bloodshed. For 
the next two years Liberians were able to live without the daily reality of war, although 
Taylor’s authoritarian and repressive rule was responsible for a range of abuses directly 
against those perceived to be against him.  
 
In 1999, civil war reignited in Liberia. Liberian refugees living in Guinea, motivated by 
what they saw as a persistent pattern of ethnic bias, political exclusion, human rights 
abuses, and corruption under Taylor’s rule, formed a rebel group known as Liberians 
                                                        
15 Stephen Ellis, above n 8, 72. 
16 Gerry Cleaver and Simon Massey, ‘Liberia: A Durable Peace at Last?’ in Oliver Furley and Roy May 
(eds), Ending Africa’s War: Progressing to Peace (Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006) 179, 179-180.  
17 Stephen Ellis, ‘Mystical Weapons: Some Evidence from the Liberian War’ (2001) 31(2) Journal of 
Religion in Africa 222, 224. 
18 Jeremy Levitt, above n 12, 209-210.  
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United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD).19 The head of LURD, Sekou Damate 
Conneh, was an ethnic Mandingo, but the membership of LURD itself was more diverse, 
incorporating Krahn, Mandingo and Gio as well as small numbers of other ethnicities. 
LURD’s inclusive makeup reflected how widely Liberians had come to oppose Taylor’s 
rule.20 In addition, LURD allegedly received support from the governments of Sierra 
Leone, Guinea and the US, each of whom also had an interest in Taylor’s removal. In 
April 1999, LURD invaded Liberia from Guinea. Although their primary demand was for 
the abdication of Taylor from the office of president, their emergence in turn led to a 
resumed escalation of violence and again destabilised the country.21  
 
In 2003, a second rebel group joined the conflict, known as the Movement for Democracy 
in Liberia (MODEL). MODEL originated in Côte d'Ivoire, drawing many of its members 
from refugee camps and receiving support from the government of Côte d'Ivoire. Its 
members were mostly Krahn. Together, LURD and MODEL launched continuous attacks 
against Taylor’s government, insisting that he relinquish the Presidency.22 On 18 August 
2003, following many failed attempts, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed 
in Accra, Ghana, between the Government of Liberia, LURD and MODEL. This signaled 
the end of the 14 year war.23 By now, the Special Court for Sierra Leone had indicted 
Taylor for his involvement in the war in Sierra Leone, and he renounced the Presidency 
and went into exile in Nigeria.  
 
                                                        
19 Nicholas Cook, Liberia: 1989-1997 Civil War, Post-War Development and US Relations (Congressional 
Research Service, 2004) 5. 
20 Ibid. 
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The destruction caused by the fourteen-year span of civil war was immense. More than 
200 000 people had been killed, mostly civilians, out of a prewar population of 2.5 
million. Virtually all of the Liberian population had been forced to flee their homes for 
some period during the conflict, and at the war’s end, official figures estimated that 1.2 
million persons were internally displaced, and 700 000 persons were refugees.24 The 
country’s economy and infrastructure were almost entirely destroyed by conflict. As a 
result of this destruction, many people found themselves unable to return to their pre-war 
homes and livelihoods. Before the war, about 70 percent of Liberians were rural 
farmers; 25  however, by 2008, almost a third of the country’s population lived in 
Monrovia.26 
 
Liberian refugees faced significant challenges upon return to Liberia. UNHCR attempted 
to provide some assistance to the 233 364 Liberians living in neighbouring countries who 
were officially registered as refugees.27 However, this was limited to physical assistance 
to return, and a very basic reintegration package consisting of basic food and house 
supplies. Once these refugees left the transit centre which was their administrative point 
of return, they were provided with very little ongoing support.28 Those who were not 
registered with UNHCR were not eligible for even this limited assistance. In areas where 
returning refugees lived, UNHCR consistently reported a lack of basic educational 
facilities, health care, safe drinking water, sanitation, shelter, roads and employment 
opportunities. 29  Returning refugees also struggled to access adequate housing, and 
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 75 
 
reclaim property.30  
 
The damage caused by civil war has had a lasting impact on the country overall. In 2014, 
the World Bank estimates that Liberia had a GDP per capita of approximately USD 878, 
ranking it 181 of the 185 countries in its ranking system.31 As a result of poverty and 
deprivation, Liberia ranks 175 among the 187 countries listed in the 2014 Human 
Development Report,32 and the average life expectancy of a Liberian citizen is just 58 
years.33   
 
3.3 The Liberian TRC 
 
The 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement created the framework for a two-year 
transitional government, setting out a broad range of reforms, political commitments, and 
a demobilisation plan. During the negotiations for the Peace Agreement, all of the warring 
factions refused to consider the possibility of a war crimes tribunal. However, those same 
groups feared a backlash from both their domestic and international audiences if they 
asked for a blanket amnesty.34 The compromise agreed to by all factions present was that 
of a TRC, along the lines of the South African model.35 The Liberian TRC was thus 
established in June 2005, through the Act to Establish the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of Liberia (‘TRC Act’), and given a mandate to investigate violations that 
took place during the period spanning from January 1979 until October 14, 2003. 
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The TRC commenced its activities in 2008. Its first phase involved the collection of 
narrative statements from Liberian victims and perpetrators. This process resulted in the 
collection of 20,560 individual accounts documenting 163,315 violations that took place 
during the mandated period.36 The TRC also asked a series of questions about the impact 
of the conflict, and how Liberia could achieve reconciliation and recover as a nation. The 
second phase of the TRC’s activities involved public and in-camera hearings, where those 
who had given narrative statements had the opportunity to voice their experiences. In 
total, the TRC held more than 800 public and in-camera hearings, receiving testimony 
from both victims and perpetrators. Throughout these hearings it made a range of efforts 
to ensure the inclusion of women, children, the elderly, those with disabilities and other 
vulnerable groups.37 The TRC published its Final Report on June 30, 2009, taking into 
account the information gleaned from both narrative statements and public hearings.  
 
3.4 Truth and Reconciliation in the Liberian TRC  
 
Within the field of transitional justice, the idea of justice is generally conceived in two 
alternative ways: retributive and restorative. Retributive justice constitutes a method for 
using legal processes as state-sanctioned revenge.38 It is characterised by criminal trials, 
and is conventionally focused on the perpetrator. Restorative justice, by contrast, seeks 
to empower the victim, by focusing on the harm he or she has suffered.39 It aims to 
promote the resolution of conflicts through social reconciliation, and, in the field of 
transitional justice, finds its institutional expression in truth commissions.40 
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The Liberian TRC, in contrast to most other truth commissions, built its proceedings 
around a concept of retributive, rather than restorative, justice. The TRC Act mandated 
the TRC to promote ‘peace, security, unity and reconciliation.’ 41  However, it then 
required that the TRC pursue these objectives through a retributive framework. The TRC 
Act mandated the TRC to investigate violations of human rights and international 
humanitarian law, determine those responsible for such violations, and determine the 
impact of armed conflict and violations upon victims.42 Most significantly, the TRC Act 
stipulated that once it had concluded its activities, the TRC was to make binding 
recommendations to the President as to which perpetrators should face criminal 
prosecution.43 In support of this goal, the Act empowered the TRC with a range of legal 
powers, including the capacity to compel the production of information relevant to its 
investigations,44 to issue a subpoena compelling attendance at its proceedings,45 and to 
recommend amnesty for those who disclosed their acts and displayed remorse.46 This 
meant that ‘unlike most TRCs that are preoccupied with truth and reconciliation, 
accountability and justice...were vital to the work of the Liberian TRC.’47 
 
The public reaction to the TRC’s retributive approach to justice was mixed. Some 
members of the Liberian public were enthusiastic about the official accusations of 
wrongdoing and the naming of names, but many became disillusioned and reproached the 
TRC when prosecutions did not materialise.48 Others appreciated the opportunity to tell 
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their story of victimhood and receive official acknowledgement from their state, but were 
dismayed by the lack of remorse shown by perpetrators.49 These different views on the 
role of the TRC, and the relationship between reconciliation and accountability meant 
that, overall, the TRC was considered by many Liberians to be more divisive than 
reconciliatory.50 
 
The mixed public reaction to the TRC demonstrates the contested nature of both ‘truth’ 
and ‘reconciliation.’ The meaning of reconciliation is very broad, consisting of a process 
through which a society moves from a divided past to a shared future,51 primarily by 
building relationships of trust and cohesion.52 Exactly what that process looks like, and 
how such relationships might be rebuilt, is controversial amongst scholars. A prominent 
question in such debates is whether reconciliation requires forgiveness. In order to avoid 
the conclusion that reconciliation does require the victim to forgive, some scholars adopt 
a more modest conception of ‘coexistence’53 or ‘social reconstruction.54  
 
Truth commissions are based on the assumption that reconciliation will result from the 
public documentation of human rights abuses, together with the creation of an ‘agreed-
to’ historical record of the past.55 This was the case also with the Liberian TRC, whose 
mandate suggested that public dialogue would lead to ‘national peace, security, unity and 
reconciliation.’56 However, the Liberian TRC added an additional element necessary for 
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reconciliation: that of criminal retribution. In its Final Report, the TRC asserts that the 
ends of justice, peace and reconciliation could not be achieved without legal prosecution 
of those accused of war crimes.57 In this way, then, the message of reconciliation became 
intimately tied to a narrative around retribution.  
 
Truth, also, does not mean the same thing to all people. Narratives emerging through 
truth-telling processes are not universal forms of speaking, nor do they necessarily 
constitute objective truths; rather, they are ‘particular instances, synopses of experience, 
told at given times for specific audiences and located in distinct spatial and temporal 
contexts.’58 The South African TRC spoke about four different kinds of truth: forensic, 
narrative, social, and restorative.59 Forensic truth refers to gathering evidence and facts 
about human rights violations and missing persons; narrative truth refers to storytelling 
by victims and perpetrators, and communicating personal truths and multi-layered 
experiences to a wider public; social or dialogical truth refers to the truth of experience 
that is established by interaction, discussion and debate; and restorative or healing truth 
refers to documentation or acknowledgement that gives dignity to victims and 
survivors.60 
 
These different forms of truth are often incompatible.61 Therefore, if a truth commission 
encapsulates in its mandate or objectives a number of different kinds of truth, it can face 
significant methodological problems. For example, if a truth commission is mandated to 
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promote the healing of victims, then it would be expected to give primacy to the 
individual stories of survivors, delivered in conditions determined by the needs of those 
victims, and thus generating a ‘narrative’ form of truth. However, if the truth commission 
is mandated to achieve accountability of perpetrators, then it owes those who stand 
accused of crimes a greater measure of due process in order to ensure that the naming of 
those deemed guilty rests on solid evidentiary ground, and will thus be more likely to 
generate a form of ‘forensic’ truth.62 
 
As with most truth commissions, the Liberian TRC aimed foremost to generate forensic 
truth. This perspective was reinforced by the requirement that it provide the Liberian 
government with a list of perpetrators recommended for criminal prosecution. In this 
context, the TRC believed that the ‘accuracy’ of the data it collected through narrative 
statements would be vital to the credibility of the recommendations regarding 
prosecutions. 63  In order to ensure the accuracy of the truth it produced, the TRC 
contracted a US-based organisation, the ‘Human Rights Data Analysis Group’ 
(HRDAG), to manage the statement-taking processes.64 The TRC selected the HRDAG 
due to its claimed ‘scientific approach’ to truth telling: it employs social scientists and 
statisticians, and specialises in the use of information technology and quantitative 
methods. Through its technocratic approach to truth-telling, the HRDAG claims to be 
able to ‘transform information into scientifically-defensible knowledge to create a clear 
historical record,’65 and, subsequently, create ‘the most accurate truth possible.’66  
 
                                                        
62 Ibid, 40.  
63 Kristen Cibelli, ‘Benetech Analyzes Human Rights Data for the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission’ on Benetech, Beneblog: Technology Meets Society (6 August 2009) 
<http://benetech.blogspot.com.au/2009/08/benetech-and-liberian-truth-and.html>. 
64 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, above n 6, vol 1, 31.  
65 Human Rights Data Analysis Group, Liberia <https://hrdag.org/liberia/>. 
66 Human Rights Data Analysis Group, Projects <https://hrdag.org>. 
 81 
 
The primary way in which the HRDAG generated what it claimed was ‘scientifically-
defensible’ truth, was through its use of a data collection model known as the ‘who did 
what to whom?’ model. As the name suggests, this model is based on ensuring that each 
narrative statement contains the details of who did what to whom.67 The HRDAG worked 
with the TRC to design its statement form, train statement-takers, take statements and 
code the resulting data in a way that reflected this methodology.68 During each interview, 
the statement-taker would ask questions in order to obtain a ‘factual account’ of events 
that took place.69 These accounts were recorded onto a standardised statement form, 
which HRDAG then analysed in order to identify the individual violation, victim and 
perpetrator, termed ‘countable units.’ The countable units were then coded according to 
a controlled vocabulary of 23 separate violations. The TRC had identified these 23 
violations as reflective of the violence Liberians experienced most commonly during the 
conflict, and which also fell within its mandate. By coding the narrative statements, 
HRDAG ensured that every account contained a recognised violation, plus an individual 
victim and perpetrator. Coded information was then entered into a specialised database,70 
resulting in a dataset of nearly 180 000 violations and relatively complete data about 
victims, violations and perpetrators.71 
 
Based on the information collected and coded from narrative statements, the TRC’s Final 
Report provided the Liberian government with recommendations for prosecutions. In 
order to do so, it outlined a list of individual violations it determined took place during 
the mandated period, categorised according to the legal categories of egregious domestic 
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crimes, gross violations of human rights, and serious humanitarian law violations.72 It 
then attributed responsibility for these violations to a list of individuals, including 102 
mercenaries from Sierra Leone, Guinea, Gambia, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, 
and South Africa. 73  Groups of individual perpetrators, corporate perpetrators, and 
government perpetrators were also attributed with responsibility for a number of 
violations. While it attributed all warring factions with responsibility for violations of 
international humanitarian and human rights law, Taylor’s NPFL was identified as the 
worst violator.74 The TRC Report recommended the establishment of an ‘Extraordinary 
Criminal Tribunal for Liberia’ and named 116 individuals, including former President 
Charles Taylor, to face the Tribunal.75 Less punitive actions were recommended against 
50 political leaders and others associated with the former warring factions. Under its 
power to grant amnesty, the TRC relieved 39 persons from prosecution on account of 
their confessions and expressions of remorse.76  
 
In addition to criminal prosecutions, the TRC also endorsed the use of the ‘Palava Hut’ 
system. It recommended 6,000 persons to the Palava Huts hearing process, a traditional 
justice measure aimed at creating accountability through community engagement.77 It 
also suggested that if additional persons, outside those it had already named, wished to 
admit a wrongful act committed during the war and seek pardon from the community, 
they could approach the Palava Hut mechanism. Its jurisdiction was limited to public 
sanctions for supporting warring groups, factions and lesser crimes. Through the Palava 
Hut mechanism, traditional leaders would then adjudicate the matter and come to a 
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binding decision.78 
 
The TRC’s methodological approach meant it was driven by process, rather than 
substantive issues of justice. The TRC intentionally prioritised the creation of forensic 
truth through the use of ‘scientific’ data collection techniques, believing that this would 
justify its recommendations for prosecution. However, after the release of its Report, the 
TRC was heavily criticised by both ordinary Liberians and academics for its failure to 
explain how its processes were linked to its determinations. There is little connection 
between the evidence set out in the TRC Report and the list of names recommended for 
prosecution. Some of those recommended for prosecution were not named anywhere else 
in the Report, making it unclear for which violations they stood accused, and exactly what 
evidence was levied against them. 79  In addition, there were inconsistencies in the 
recommendations for punishments. For example, the TRC Report documented in detail 
the war crimes committed by Senator Prince Johnson, and recommended that he should 
be prosecuted but not politically excluded. However, for the incumbent President Sirleaf, 
whose only proven crime was donating USD10 000 to Charles Taylor before his war-
time brutality became known, the Report recommended exclusion from political office 
for 30 years.80 
 
The emphasis on process over substantive justice also meant that the TRC was blind to 
the existence and extent of violations of economic and social rights taking place during 
the war. The TRC was mandated to investigate all gross human rights violations and 
international humanitarian law. The scholarly understanding of these categories includes 
not only violations of civil and political rights such as death or rape, but also violations 
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of economic, social and cultural rights.81 Under international law, civil and political rights 
are indivisible from economic, social and cultural rights,82 and the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights has argued that the inclusion of abuses of economic and social rights 
within post-conflict criminal prosecutions and truth and reconciliation processes is an 
important element of achieving social justice.83 In addition, the TRC’s mandate extended 
to what it termed ‘economic crimes.’ As such, it was empowered, and arguably even 
required to discuss violations of economic, social and cultural rights.   
 
Despite its mandate, the TRC’s analysis of past abuses barely touched upon violations of 
economic, social, and cultural rights. The TRC Report stated briefly that following its 
investigations, it determined that the root causes of the fourteen-year civil war were 
poverty, corruption, and inequality. However, in the details that follow, the TRC Report 
focused almost exclusively on civil and political rights, such as death, rape and property 
destruction, while sidelining violations relating to economic, social and cultural rights, 
such as those related to healthcare, poverty or extreme deprivation. On a very few 
occasions, the TRC did identify an individual perpetrator (usually a company) as 
responsible for economic crimes in relation to timber, logging and mining. However, it 
completely avoided the pervasive issue of economic inequality and social discrimination, 
despite its direct links to the cause of the conflict, and the prevalence of these issues in 
the lives of ordinary Liberians. This created a significant gap between the TRC’s findings 
on the causes of the conflict, and its legal analysis of abuses committed.84 
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The TRC’s reliance on the individualised, ‘who did what to whom’ methodology 
contributed in large part to the invisibility of violations of economic and social rights. In 
order to be recorded, and thus included in the findings of the TRC Report, each narrative 
statement had to identify a recognised violation, as well as an individual victim and 
perpetrator. Violations that did not have an easily identifiable perpetrator – such as lack 
of access to livelihoods, or an inability to achieve an education – could not be recorded, 
and were thus sidelined in the reporting. The lack of an identifiable person to be held 
accountable for violations of economic and social rights is a recognised challenge within 
transitional justice processes, making these types of injustices unsuitable for criminal 
prosecution, and, even in truth seeking processes, difficult to account for.85 While the 
TRC could arguably have moved away from the strict data collection model set up by the 
HRDAG, it prioritised a consistent process over engaging in substantive issues of justice, 
and thus undermined its ability to address the violation of economic and social rights.  
 
A second implication of the TRC’s focus on process over substantive justice concerns 
was that it limited the identity of those giving testimony to one of two options: victim, or 
perpetrator. A key element in the TRC’s construction of truth was its creation of victim 
and perpetrator as distinct, and opposed, identities. This began with the TRC Act, which 
specified that the TRC was to provide the opportunity for ‘victims and perpetrators’ of 
human rights violation to have their voices heard and to present testimony to the TRC.86 
This was also a requirement of the ‘who did what to whom’ methodology, which required 
each violation to be associated with a distinct victim and perpetrator. The Final Report 
reflected this dichotomy, reporting that 94 per cent of those who contributed to the TRC 
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were victims, versus the other 6 per cent who were perpetrators.87 The TRC Report made 
one exception: that of child soldiers, whom it describes as ‘perpetrators and mainly 
victims,’ 88  and notes that it has become common practice of international criminal 
tribunals to exclude children under the age of 18 from prosecution for grave human rights 
violations.89  
 
Recognising only victims and perpetrators undermines substantive justice outcomes by 
excluding those who do not fit clearly within either category. In practice, the distinction 
between victim and perpetrator is often unclear, and individuals can share elements of 
both. Moreover, recognising only two categories of identity excludes those persons who 
were beneficiaries of the system or mere bystanders, for instance, despite the fact that 
they often constitute a vast part of the population. This oversight has the potential to 
undermine the aims of a truth commission, since the inclusion of people who do not fit 
precisely into the category of victim or perpetrator is vital for the regeneration of an 
inclusive civic national identity and thriving political community. 90  By excluding 
bystanders, beneficiaries and populations that were structurally and indirectly, rather than 
directly, affected by war, truth commissions often fail to provide a sufficient bridge from 
the divided past of ‘perpetrators versus victims,’ to a united future of all survivors of 
conflict, regardless of their past role.91 
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3.5 The Narrative of Transition   
 
Any attempt to deal with the past presents a number of challenges to countries recovering 
from conflict. New governments are often concerned with turning previously bitterly and 
brutally divided polities into spaces of unity and democratic stability.92 This requires 
grappling not only with questions concerning accountability and reconciliation, but also 
those pertaining to the way in which a nation should remember its past. This is a problem 
of history writing: how to create the ‘imagined community’ of the new democratic nation 
on the strength of an account of the past to which previously warring groupings – with 
disparate, even incommensurate, versions of events – would now consent.93 Despite the 
difficulties, creating an imagined community is essential to a country’s ability to recover 
from conflict, since a nation’s unity depends on a shared identity, which in turn depends 
largely on a shared memory.94 
 
Since there is no one ‘theatre of memory’ which all members of a national polity inhabit, 
the process of arriving at a national narrative, or shared memory, is very much one of 
construction.95 Modern societies need a wide range of different institutions that store and 
construct collective memories, and, in the modern context, legal institutions replace 
rituals and traditions, institutionalised archives and bureaucracies provide a way of 
storing memories, and museums and memorials celebrate the past.96 Within this process 
of memory construction, transitional justice, and truth commissions in particular, often 
play a key role. A central task of a truth commission is to write the history of a period of 
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violence.97 In contrast to popular memories of violence and conflict, which are multiple, 
fluid, indeterminate and fragmentary, truth commissions play a vital role in fixing 
memory and institutionalising a view of the past conflict.98 This process of construction 
is not simply an exercise in recounting facts, but also involves developing an underlying 
ethical narrative of wrongdoing, linked to an imperative to prevent such wrongdoing from 
happening again.99 
 
A truth commission may contribute to the creation of a new, redeemed national identity 
by symbolising a moment of transition.100 A transition entails a process of ‘unmaking, or 
dismantling’ the past, while simultaneously ‘remaking and rebuilding’ the future. 101 
Truth commissions are particularly adept at symbolising this process of transition – both 
the unmaking of the past, and the remaking of the future – since their time-bound mandate 
splits history into separated periods: what happened before, and what came after, the 
period of transition. This creates an impression of the transitional period as a ‘rupture,’ 
separating the wrongful past from the reformed present, and thus allowing a nation to 
transform its identity. 102  By explicitly condemning past behaviours and by publicly 
addressing the systematic violence conducted by the old regime, the new government can 
demonstrate its efforts to guarantee that similar events do not recur in the future, and thus 
restore the faith of the society in the state.103 
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One critique scholars make of the idea of transition constituting a ‘break’ with the past is 
that it often hides the way that violence and exclusion continue into the present. Violence 
against women, for example, is a continuing issue in many ‘post-conflict’ societies, which 
may be a product, in part, of the sense of dislocation, powerlessness and unemployment 
experienced by male combatants when they return home. 104  However, since truth 
commissions only describe instances of violence associated with the period of historical 
conflict, the ongoing experience of violence against women is concealed. In the 
transitional narrative of a truth commission, past and present are no longer relatable, 
since, as Robert Meister puts it, ‘the cost of achieving a moral consensus that the past was 
evil, is to reach a political consensus that the evil is past.’105  
 
An important function of the Liberian TRC was to create a national narrative concerning 
the past, as well as the country’s transition to a peaceful future. By the end of its 14-year 
civil war, the country lacked a strong national identity, and held few symbols of unity 
that could appeal to all citizens or unite the strong divide between ethnic and class-based 
subgroups.106 Within this context, the TRC was established and bestowed with a mandate 
to foster truth, justice and reconciliation amongst the divided and traumatised population. 
It was mandated to look both backwards, in order to understand how Liberia descended 
into conflict, and forwards, in order to make recommendations that could ensure the 
country averted a repetition of the past.107 The TRC hoped to both trigger and support a 
transition within Liberia by providing a mechanism through which the country could 
                                                        
104 Rosemary Nagy, ‘Transitional Justice as Global Project: Critical Reflections’ (2008) 2 (29) Third World 
Quarterly 275, 280. See also Christine Chinkin and Hilary Charlesworth, 'Building Women into Peace: 
the International Legal Framework' (2006) Third World Quarterly 27(5) 937, 946. 
105 Robert Meister, ‘Human Rights and the Politics of Victimhood’ (2002) 16(2) Ethics and International 
Affairs 91, 96. 
106 Emmanuel Dolo, Ethnic Tensions in Liberia’s National Identity Crisis: Problems and Possibilities 
(Africana Homestead Legacy Publishers, 2007); Republic of Liberia, A Strategic Roadmap for National 
Healing, Peacebuilding and Reconciliation (Republic of Liberia, June 2012) 9. 
107 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, above n 6, vol 2, xxiii. 
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confront its ‘bitter past,’ learn from its past mistakes, and move towards peace, 
reconciliation and the rebuilding of the Liberian state.108 
 
The TRC was instructed to carry out its mandate in two specific ways. Firstly, it was to 
identify the root causes of the conflict.109 The TRC was directed to examine events taking 
place in ‘the recent, difficult chapter in our national history,’ which was specified to span 
from the rice riots of January 1979, until the official end of hostilities in October 2003.110 
In addition to this 34-year period, the TRC was also instructed to conduct a critical review 
of Liberia’s ‘historical past,’ in order to acknowledge and understand the historical 
antecedents to the conflict, and correct historical falsehoods associated with the disunity 
of Liberia.111 
 
The TRC determined that at the root of the war was Liberia’s ‘as yet unresolved historical 
problem of political identity and legitimacy,’ brought about by the political decision of 
the early Americo-Liberian leadership to build a separatist state that discriminated against 
indigenous Liberians.112 An array of factors stemmed from this history and contributed 
to the civil war, including poverty, limited access to education, economic, social, civil 
and political inequalities, identity conflict, land tenure and distribution, and the lack of 
reliable and appropriate mechanisms for the settlement of disputes.113 Having established 
the root causes of the conflict, the TRC proceeded to paint a highly detailed, factual 
picture of abuse and inequality that began with the arrival of the American Colonization 
Society in 1822, and culminated in the fourteen-year civil war. In this way, it created a 
                                                        
108 Ibid, Acknowledgements, xxi, 208.  
109 Liberia: An Act to Establish the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia 2005 (Liberia) 10 June 
2005, art IV, s 4.  
110 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, above n 6, vol 2, 420. 
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clear narrative linking the past to the recent conflict, and identified a range of 
discriminatory practices that would have to change in order for Liberia to transition into 
a more peaceful future.  
 
However, while the TRC described past abuses in detail, it made no mention of ongoing 
violations or discrimination taking place in Liberia. In fact, it commended the ‘peace-
building aspirations of the (present) government,’114 and phrased the recommendations it 
made towards the new government in very general terms, or in a way that indicated some 
level of reform was already taking place. For instance, the TRC recommended that the 
government strengthen the judiciary and expedite reforms ‘already underway’ to promote 
a culture of respect for human rights. 115  Similarly, the TRC referred to the ‘poor 
governance and maladministration’ of past governments, naming numerous successive 
governments in power both during and prior to the civil war.116 There was no mention on 
ongoing maladministration, even though at the time the TRC published its Report, 
corruption remained pervasive through all levels of government and prevented ordinary 
Liberians from achieving an adequate standard of living.117  By only referencing the 
unethical administration of past governments, the TRC created a narrative that inferred 
the present government was exempt from those same criticisms, thus suggesting a 
transition had, in fact, taken place.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
114 Ibid, 90. 
115 Ibid, 346-350, 424. 
116 Ibid, 323.  
117 International Crisis Group, Liberia: How Sustainable is the Recovery? (Africa Report 177, International 
Crisis Group, 19 August 2011) 17.   
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The second way the TRC was required to carry out its mandate was to determine those 
who were responsible for committing domestic and international crimes against the 
Liberian people.118 In 2006, when President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf inaugurated the TRC, 
she asserted that:  
Our country cannot continue to evade justice and the protection of human rights 
… Our government will ensure that those culpable of the commission of crimes 
against humanity will face up to their crimes no matter when, where, or how.119 
 
In the same way that the TRC suggested reconciliation was only possible with the 
prosecution of war criminal, then, it also built a conception of transition around the idea 
of ‘settling accounts.’120 
 
The TRC took a retributive approach to transition not only in the way the it looked 
backward to condemn past violations, but also in the way it looked forward and envisaged 
a transformed Liberia. In order to further strengthen ‘national integration and unity with 
a view to establishing a common identity,’ the TRC recommended that the Liberian 
government enact legislation to outlaw all symbols and cleavages of disunity and 
segregation, and to make it an offense to request the ethnic identity of any individual ‘in 
a derisive manner.’ The end result, the TRC declared, was that in the new Liberia, the 
ethnicity or tribal affiliation of each Liberian citizen would be ‘protected by law.’121 
 
 
                                                        
118 Liberia: An Act to Establish the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia 2005 (Liberia) 10 June 
2005, art IV, s 4.  
119 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, Consolidated Final Report (2009) vol 2, 1. 
120 Andrew Schaap, Political Reconciliation (Routledge, 2005) 18. 
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3.6   Conclusion 
 
The practices of the Liberian TRC demonstrate how it constructed its ideas of truth, 
reconciliation, and national transition. The existing scholarship on the Liberian TRC 
obscures this process of construction by focusing on the technical aspects of the TRC, 
such as the legal standards that informed the TRC’s methodology for data collection, or 
the number and type of violations the TRC recorded. This approach overlooks how the 
TRC’s methodology was informed by, or contributed towards, a particular understanding 
of truth, reconciliation and transition. In fact, the TRC’s methodological choices had a 
direct impact upon the type of truth it generated, and on the way it understood 
reconciliation. The TRC took a forensic approach to truth, which meant that it equated 
truth with the provision of objective facts, rather than entailing social dialogue or 
unstructured personal stories. It also framed reconciliation in terms of retribution, which 
meant that it pursued justice through legal prosecution, rather than dialogue or 
forgetting.122  
 
If truth, reconciliation and transition are constructed concepts, then it is possible – likely, 
even – that more than one construction exists. In the existing scholarship, the focus on 
the technical elements of the TRC’s proceedings means that scholars do not consider the 
possibility that Liberian nationals might contest the TRC’s equation of truth with 
objective facts, or of reconciliation with retribution. There is a failure to ask how, and for 
whom, the TRC generated what kind of truth, and what kind of reconciliation. The need 
to engage in this deeper reflection is supported by scholars like Catherine Cole, who 
suggests that in relation to the South African TRC, it is in the disjunctions between how 
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participants wished to perform their truth, versus the public iteration of truth the TRC 
itself performed, that we can perceive the complexity of knowledge the TRC brought into 
being.123  
 
The following two chapters address this issue in the Liberian context. They examine the 
ways in which refugees engaged with the TRC’s constructions of truth, reconciliation and 
transition, how they contested those ideas, and what the TRC’s constructions meant for 
their own perceptions of justice.  
                                                        
123  Catherine Cole, ‘Performance, Transitional Justice, and the Law: South Africa’s Truth and 
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CHAPTER 4: ENGAGING REFUGEES IN THE LIBERIAN TRC 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
The Liberian TRC asserted that its proceedings generated a national perspective 
concerning both the conflict and the aspirations of the Liberian people for a better future.1 
This claim was based in part on its inclusion of a diverse range of Liberian nationals in 
its proceedings. Two groups to benefit from this inclusive approach were Liberian 
refugees resident in West Africa, and the Liberian diaspora resident in the United States 
(US). The TRC used their inclusion to acknowledge displacement as a violation of human 
rights and investigate the lived experience of displacement, which constituted a unique 
contribution to the practice of truth commissions. At the very least, by extending the 
activities of the TRC to refugees, the Liberian government indicated that external 
displacement does not preclude political involvement in domestic matters. At best, by 
including refugees in the national reconciliation process, the Liberian government 
recognised that displaced Liberian constituted a valued part of the Liberian nation, and 
made efforts to understand their perspectives on the past conflict and the future rebuilding 
of the nation.2 
 
The TRC suggested that it had managed to unite the varied experiences and perspectives 
of individual Liberians under a collective memory, and common vision forward. The 
problem with this idea, and the idea of collective memory generally, is that it implies a 
                                                        
1 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, Consolidated Final Report (2009) vol 2, xxi.  
2 Patricia Minikon and Susan Shepler, ‘Documenting Human Rights Abuses Among the Diaspora: Lessons 
Learned from the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission,’ in Noha Shawki and Michaelene Cox 
(eds), Negotiating Sovereignty and Human Rights (Ashgate Publishing, 2013) 154. See also: Laura Young 
and Jennifer Prestholdt, ‘Refugee Participation in Peacebuilding: the Case of Liberian Refugee 
Participation in the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ 20(2) (2010) Journal for Peace and 
Justice Studies 117, 133. 
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consensus.3 However, memory, both individual and collective, is a contested terrain, and 
claims about the past are very often met with counter-claims.4 As the previous chapter 
demonstrates, ideas of truth, reconciliation and transition are constructed concepts, and 
are open to alternate conceptions. This chapter seeks to understand how refugees both 
contributed towards, and contested, the TRC’s concepts of truth, reconciliation and 
transition. Then, by understanding the spaces of convergence and divergence, we can 
understand the relationship between Liberian refugees and the collective memory and 
common vision the TRC claimed to have created.  
 
The chapter begins by describing the basis for refugee involvement in the Liberian TRC, 
and how the TRC structured its engagement with displaced persons. I examine the terms 
on which refugees were able to give testimony, and how they contested these terms, as 
well as the TRC’s interpretation of truth and reconciliation. I then examine how refugee 
testimony was used to contribute to the TRC’s narrative concerning transition, and how 
refugees challenged this narrative.  
 
4.2 Engaging Displaced Liberians 
 
The Liberian TRC’s engagement with displaced Liberians began not with refugees, but 
with the US-based diaspora. Liberia’s history is deeply intertwined with that of the US, 
beginning most visibly with the establishment of the American Colonization Society in 
1822. It was this intervention, and the resulting subjugation of the indigenous Liberian 
population to the minority Americo-Liberians, that provided the foundation for the civil 
                                                        
3  Iwona Irwin Zarecka, Frames of Remembrance: The Dynamics of Collective Memory (Transaction 
Publishers, 1994) 67. 
4 David Thelen, ‘Memory and American History’ (1989) 75(4) The Journal of American History 1117, 
1127. 
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war some 170 years later.5 The colonial relationship between the US and Liberia also 
created and sustained a large diaspora population of Liberians resident in the US. Since 
the military coup of 1980 and the outbreak of civil war in 1989, the US had hosted over 
100,000 Liberian nationals, including most of the country’s educated elite and former 
political officials. 
 
There is a widely held belief amongst Liberians that the US-based diaspora was 
responsible for the civil war, due to their active transnational influence.6 In order to 
address this, the TRC established a Diaspora Committee and gave it a mandate to take 
evidence from Liberians resident abroad. 7  It appointed Commissioner Massa 
Washington, a Liberian national who had fled the conflict and was residing in the US, as 
the Committee’s chair. According to Commissioner Washington, the reason that the TRC 
was vitally concerned with US-based Liberians was that:  
 
Elements in the US diaspora put Taylor’s invasion together. And once the war 
began, the same diaspora kept it going with funding for ammunition and food … 
This involvement remained right up to the end. When the peace talks convened in 
Accra, and news of Charles Taylor’s indictment reached the US, many people 
rushed to airports … to get on a flight to Ghana. They wanted to arrive in time to 
get cabinet posts. In the light of this history…a truth commission that did not go 
to America would have been a joke.8 
 
In order to manage the practical aspects of its engagement with the US diaspora, the TRC 
partnered with an American organisation known as The Advocates for Human Rights 
(The Advocates.) The Advocates is a non-profit, volunteer-based legal organisation, 
                                                        
5 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, above n 1, vol 2, 17.  
6 Mary Moran, Liberia: The Violence of Democracy (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005) 459. 
7 Liberia: An Act to Establish the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia 2005 (Liberia) 10 June 
2005, Art VIII, s 27, ss A. 
8 Johnny Steinberg, ‘A Truth Commission Goes Abroad: Liberian Transitional Justice in New York’ (2011) 
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whose work includes representing immigrants and refugees resident in the US, training 
groups that protect human rights, and conducting human rights education for the public, 
policy-makers, and children. The TRC chose The Advocates as a partner due to its close 
ties with the US-based Liberian population. At the time of its partnership with the TRC, 
The Advocates had provided legal assistance to hundreds of Liberians resident in the US, 
and trained dozens of volunteer attorneys to handle Liberian asylum cases.9 Importantly, 
The Advocates was also able to draw upon its existing donor base of philanthropic 
foundations and private donors in order to fund its activities, since the TRC had no 
available resources.10  
 
In the beginning, the TRC took the position that refugees who wished to take part in the 
TRC should return home to Liberia, and it distributed materials to this effect within 
refugee communities.11 It was The Advocates, and not the TRC, that pushed for the 
TRC’s activities to be extended to the refugee population resident in West Africa. The 
Advocates asserted that engaging Liberian refugees living in West Africa was essential 
for obtaining an accurate picture of the conflict and its effects, as well as in order to ensure 
justice for victims.12 The TRC concurred, and agreed to extend its activities to the refugee 
population. 13  In subsequent media statements, the TRC explained that refugee 
participation was essential since at least 25 per cent of the Liberian population was forced 
to flee the country during the civil war, making displacement one of the most widely 
experienced violations of that period.14  
 
                                                        
9 The Advocates for Human Rights, A House with Two Rooms: Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of Liberia Diaspora Project (DRI Press, 2009) 36.  
10 Ibid, 37.  
11 Liberia Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Bulletin (May-June 2006) 4.  
12 Johnny Steinberg, above n 8, 35.   
13 The Advocates for Human Rights, above n 9, 35. 
14 International Centre for Transitional Justice, ‘Liberian Truth Commission Reaches Out to Diaspora in 
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The TRC chose Buduburam refugee settlement as the site for its refugee engagement. 
Buduburam refugee settlement is located approximately 35km from Accra, Ghana’s 
capital.15 The Ghanaian government provided the space at the start of Liberia’s war in 
early 1990, anticipating that it would accommodate 5,000 refugees. However, the 
prolonged nature of the conflict, combined with the instability in nearby asylum countries 
Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone, caused a rapid expansion of the refugee population, and 
at the height of its population, in 2003, UNHCR estimated that the settlement 
accommodated some 42 000 Liberian refugees.16 Recent population figures are more 
difficult to verify, since there is no regular census and only irregular monitoring by 
UNHCR or other actors. According to UNHCR, in 2009 Buduburam settlement hosted 
some 14 000 refugees registered with UNHCR, plus some thousands of unregistered 
refugees. Population estimates from refugee community leaders covering the same period 
are considerably higher, at approximately 30 000 refugees total, including those both 
registered and unregistered with UNHCR. By the time the TRC arrived to gather 
testimony, most refugees had been living in Buduburam for at least ten years, and many 
had been there since the start of the conflict in 1990.17 
 
During fieldwork discussions, refugees often referred to Buduburam settlement as a ‘mini 
Liberia,’ since virtually all of the 16 indigenous tribes, as well as those of Americo-
Liberian descent, are present in Buduburam settlement. In a number of respects, refugees 
and non-refugees share similar experiences as deprivation and experiences of trauma are 
common across all Liberians. One returned refugee pointed out in an interview with me: 
‘People here in Liberia also live like refugees: there’s no security, no jobs, people’s minds 
                                                        
15  Colloquially, the settlement is referred to as a camp, and this terminology appears throughout my 
interviews. However, in the body of the text, I retain the official name of the settlement.  
16 Veronique Genaille et al, ‘UNHCR / WFP Joint Assessment Mission: Buduburam and Krisam Camps’ 
(Final Report, July 2006) 11. 
17 The Advocates for Human Rights, above n 9, 327. 
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are not straight, they are also struggling.’ 18  However, the specific social context of 
Buduburam refugee settlement, the impact of protracted displacement, and the ongoing 
physical and political estrangement from their home government had a number of distinct 
effects on refugee engagement with the TRC, as well as on the way in which the Liberian 
government engaged with the refugee population. 
 
Notwithstanding these similarities between Buduburam settlement and Liberia, there 
were also a number of significant differences. The residential layout of the settlement is 
extremely dense, and there are only very limited shared social spaces. Numerous 
interviewees explained that having all tribes living together, in cramped conditions, with 
many people suffering psychological stress, resulted in unavoidable and volatile ethnic 
tensions. 19  The cramped conditions and inability to find (or afford) alternative 
accommodation also meant that people could not avoid running into other residents, and 
often had to live alongside others who had harmed them or their family during the war. 
In the view of refugees, this situation was markedly different from Liberia, where ‘at least 
you could choose where to live, you could move, you could live in Monrovia and avoid 
people you didn’t want to see.’20 
 
Before traveling to Buduburam refugee settlement, The Advocates spent several months 
training statement-takers. Trainers were drawn from a wide range of disciplines, 
including The Advocates staff, psychologists, Liberian professionals and community 
leaders, academics, and even the TRC Commissioners who made periodic visits to the 
US.21 Training was structured around a legal framework. Of the six hundred volunteers 
                                                        
18 Interview with Richardson, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 14 May 2013). 
19 Interview with Morris, returned Liberian refugee (Monrovia, 13 May 2013); Interview with Richardson, 
Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 14 May 2013). 
20 Interview with Morris, returned Liberian refugee (Monrovia, 13 May 2013).  
21 The Advocates for Human Rights, above n 9, 42.  
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The Advocates identified and trained, almost all were American lawyers. Each statement-
taker completed a training program that focused on the legal framework supporting the 
TRC, including the TRC's mandate, international human rights and humanitarian law, and 
the statement taking protocols and policies. 22  Non-legal topics covered included 
psychology, dealing with traumatised people, and interviewing techniques.  
 
Refugee participation in the TRC was unexpectedly high. On the first day of statement 
taking, thousands of refugees lined up to give testimony, exceeding all predictions and 
overwhelming the capacity of staff from the TRC and The Advocates to receive them. To 
meet the demand, The Advocates trained ten refugee statement-takers, who then worked 
alongside TRC staff and The Advocates to take statements.23 In total, 1377 refugees in 
Buduburam settlement gave statements to the TRC. This figure is particular large when 
compared to the number of Liberians resident in the US who agreed to give statements to 
the TRC. Although the population of Liberians resident in the US is higher than the 
number resident in Buduburam settlement, only 237 Liberians across the US agreed to 
participate in the TRC.24 
 
Statement-giving mirrored the domestic process, with small amendments made for the 
refugee context. One such amendment was that prior to receiving testimony, The 
Advocates used a detailed disclosure form to advise the statement-giver of the risks they 
faced by testifying. This was particularly important for perpetrators, since the immunity 
provisions established by the TRC Act did not apply outside of Liberia. Perpetrators who 
confessed to crimes could potentially face negative immigration consequences, since 
most visa conditions excluded those who had committed crimes. The Advocates offered 
                                                        
22 Ibid.  
23 Ibid, 38.  
24  Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm, ‘A Volunteer’s Perspective on the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission Diaspora Project’ (2010) 2(3) Journal of Human Rights Practice 386, 398. 
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to refer each statement-giver to a pro bono immigration or criminal law lawyer prior to 
giving a statement if they wished to obtain legal advice about testifying. Testifiers were 
also offered the option of giving an anonymous statement, and could opt to testify in 
camera before the TRC Commissioners.  
 
The statement-giving process also mirrored the TRC’s domestic process. According to 
practitioners from The Advocates, the refugee directed the interview process according 
to whatever information they felt it was important for the TRC to know, although 
interviewers had a guide for questions and had received extensive training on how to 
conduct an interview.25 During this process, refugees were directly asked about their 
experience of displacement.26 Most refugees met individually with a statement-taker, 
although The Advocates also held interviews with groups who wished to provide specific 
information to the TRC, such as a group representing disabled refugees, and an 
organisation of former child soldiers.27  
 
Originally, the TRC planned to hold public hearings in the settlement. According to the 
TRC Report, the TRC cancelled the hearings due to confrontations between Liberian 
refugees and the Ghanaian authorities.28 However, a TRC official offered an alternate 
account, explaining that the TRC was worried that it would not be able to provide 
adequate security for its staff, or for refugees who wished to testify: 
 
The TRC didn’t hold public hearings in the camp because of security concerns. 
The difference between Liberia and Ghana is that in Liberia, people would 
publicly name the perpetrator, and then if something happened to [the person who 
                                                        
25 Laura Young and Jennifer Prestholdt, above n 2, 122. 
26 The Advocates for Human Rights, above n 9, 42.  
27 Laura Young and Jennifer Prestholdt, above n 2, 123. 
28 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, Preliminary Findings and Determinations (2009) vol 
1, 32.  
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had testified], everyone would suspect the perpetrator [as the person who 
committed the harm]. And then, because the National Police and Army are here 
in Liberia, action would be taken. There was still risk [in testifying] in Liberia, 
but at least it was safer than in the camp. In the camp, there was no security. The 
Liberian government was concerned with its own security and also they couldn’t 
protect anyone in the camp. There was also a lack of funding. So they opted out 
of public hearings in the camp.29 
 
In lieu of full-scale public hearings, the TRC invited two refugees from Buduburam 
settlement to testify in Liberia, symbolically representing the West African refugee 
community.30  
 
The lack of public hearings meant that for most refugees the only way they interacted 
with the TRC was through providing a narrative statement. It is worth noting that this is 
likely to have had an impact upon the way in which refugees experienced the TRC, and 
understood its objectives and outcomes, since the public hearings and statement-taking 
were designed to value a different kind of ‘truth.’ Parallels can be drawn with the case of 
South Africa, where scholars describe the disparity between the quantitative social 
science methodologies that predominated in the statement-taking process, and the 
qualitative methods that were operated in the public hearings.31 In its statement-taking, 
the South African TRC’s notion of factual/forensic truth demanded a positivist approach, 
one that sought to combat a past record of lies and half-truths with ‘hard,’ authenticated, 
accurate and comprehensive data, or ‘cold facts.’ By contrast, it treated the 
personal/narrative truth emerging through public hearings as innately expressive of 
complex emotions, multiple layers of experience, and a way of conveying the dignity of 
                                                        
29 Interview with TRC official, (Monrovia, 27 March 2013).  
30 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, above n 1, vol 2, 73.  
31 Catherine Cole, Performing South Africa’s Truth Commission (Indiana University Press, 2009) 166.  
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the individual giving testimony.32 Had Liberian refugees been given the opportunity to 
engage in public hearings, they might have held different perspectives concerning the 
type of truth, and reconciliation, the TRC generated.  
 
4.3 Contesting Truth and Reconciliation  
  
The Liberian TRC aimed to generate a ‘national perspective’ reflective of ‘the people of 
Liberia.’33 This claim encompassed displaced Liberians, including the refugee population 
in West Africa, who were invited to participate in the TRC on the same basis as other 
Liberians. In the words of TRC Chairman, Counselor Jerome Verdier, the TRC wanted 
‘to hear from Liberians in the diaspora as a way of affording all Liberians the opportunity 
to be heard, to be listened to, to be acknowledged, and to be validated.’34 This section 
considers this assertion from the perspective of Liberian refugees living in Buduburam 
settlement, Ghana. In particular, it examines how refugees both embraced and contested 
the TRC’s construction of both truth, and reconciliation, and the way that those 
constructions and conflicts affected their engagement with the TRC’s formal proceedings.  
 
The Advocates asserted that the TRC gave refugees the opportunity to relay to the 
Liberian government ‘whatever information they felt was important.’ 35  In practice, 
however, the type of testimony refugees were able to give was constrained by the 
procedural requirements the TRC put in place concerning the type of testimony it was 
willing to receive. The TRC’s mandate specified that only violations occurring between 
1989 and 2003 could be the subject of its proceedings; nothing taking place after the 
official end of hostilities would be considered. In addition, the TRC set a controlled 
                                                        
32 Ibid, 164.  
33 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, above n 1, vol 2, xxi.  
34 Patricia Minikon and Susan Shepler, above n 2, 147. 
35 Laura Young and Jennifer Prestholdt, above n 2, 130. 
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vocabulary of 23 human rights violations regarding which it would take testimony.36 
Violations falling outside these 23 categories could not be recorded, and thus could not 
contribute towards the TRC’s findings. Furthermore, each statement was required to 
identify an individual victim and an individual perpetrator.37 Overall, this meant that in 
order to be recognised by the TRC, a refugee had to describe their experience from an 
individualised perspective, in terms of a recognised violation of their human rights, 
committed by a perpetrator, taking place before 2003. These terms were encapsulated by 
the ‘who did what to whom’ methodology that structured the TRC’s data collection.  
 
The ‘who did what to whom’ methodology had two distinct repercussions for refugee 
participants: firstly, it affected who was willing to testify, and secondly, it affected the 
type of testimony refugees provided. The first way it did so was by setting the individual 
as the basic unit of testimony. Only an individual could give testimony, which testimony 
had to concern their own personal experiences. This was problematic for many refugees, 
who were reluctant to talk about what happened to them personally.38 For some, this was 
because they believed that doing so would result in their being re-traumatised.39 For 
others, it was because they didn’t want to publically broadcast their experience of the 
war.40 For many who held these convictions, the problem was not in recalling atrocities 
per se, but rather in the extent and type of detail that the TRC demanded they give.41 This 
reduced the willingness of some people to testify. In the words of one interviewee: 
 
                                                        
36 Kristen Cibelli, Jule Kruger and Amelia Hoover, Descriptive Statistics from Statements to the Liberian 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Report, Human Rights Data Analysis Group, June 2009) 24. 
37 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, above n 1, vol 2, 87. 
38 Interview with Isaac, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 15 May 2013). See also: Interview with 
Esther, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 29 May 2013); Interview with Peter Doe, Liberian 
returned refugee (Monrovia, 26 April 2013). 
39 Interview with Kaba, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 13 May 2013); Interview with Isaac, Liberian 
returned refugee (Monrovia, 15 May 2013). 
40 Interview with Esther, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 29 May 2013). 
41 Interview with Joe Myers, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 10 June 2013). 
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Some [TRC] questions were very direct, very harsh, and I didn’t want to answer 
them. They would ask you ‘Did you know Mr X did so and so?’ Most of the 
questions were closed, they weren’t flexible. It’s better to ask: ‘How was it?’ 
because then the person can be flexible and tell the whole story.42 
 
The focus on the individual also constrained the type of information that statement-givers 
were able to provide. Refugees were not able to speak about experiences in the abstract, 
but had to relate everything back to their own individual experience. As one interviewee 
explained:  
 
At the TRC, people were only allowed to answer strict questions about what 
happened directly to them. But this is a problem. If you ask the big question: 
‘What happened, during the war?’ then it gives a totally different answer to asking 
someone ‘What happened to you during the war?’ The first one lets you describe 
what you saw, what you heard, what the general situation was. But instead, the 
TRC wanted to do a very narrow thing, it wanted your testimony only in order to 
indict someone, not to understand what had happened.43 
 
Refugees criticised not only the requirement that they speak from an individualised 
perspective, but also the requirement that they relate their testimony to an individual 
perpetrator. Some linked their unwillingness to identify a perpetrator to the particular 
context of living in a refugee camp. A number of refugees felt that naming perpetrators 
living in the community would have the effect of expelling them from the community, 
something that was both practically unfeasible and ethically unwarranted. As one 
interviewee noted:  
 
We have a saying in Liberia, ‘There’s no bad bush for a bad child.’ This means 
that you cannot cast a child into the bush and abandon them there when they do 
                                                        
42 Interview with Peter Doe, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 26 April 2013).  
43 Interview with Madison, Liberian returned refugees (Monrovia, 11 April 2013).  
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something bad. It’s the same for adults or children, it’s the same for all people, 
you have to keep them around, you cannot banish them away.44 
 
Others argued that to accuse someone of a crime while living in such close proximity 
amounted to a serious security risk. With people living so closely to each other, and no 
option to move elsewhere, it was impossible to avoid running into other residents. As a 
result, testifying against perpetrators who were living in the settlement raised significant 
security issues. Refugees were often afraid that the people against whom they had testified 
would find out, and seek revenge.45 This fear was compounded by the lack, or perceived 
lack, of protection from the Ghanaian authorities.46 Refugees were also worried to testify 
about perpetrators living in Liberia, as they were afraid that the accused would find out 
and take revenge against them.47 
 
Other refugees did not want to allude to a perpetrator at all, even if that perpetrator 
remained without a specific identity. One reason for this was that in the view of some 
refugees, the war was ‘chaos, nobody knew what they were doing,’ and in such a context 
it would be meaningless to assign responsibility to anybody at all.48 The difficulty in 
enacting this approach when giving testimony was that the TRC statement-taking was 
structured in such a way that it was impossible to speak of a violation without inferring 
the existence of a perpetrator. This is a feature of the criminal law tradition generally: 
when victims speak in the voice of the victim, they must speak as if there were an agent 
responsible for their loss.49 One cannot conceive of the victim of an atrocity or injustice 
without being able first to image, and then to project onto another, the intention of 
                                                        
44 Interview with Isaac, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 15 May 2013).  
45 Interview with Richardson, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 14 May 2013); Interview with Esther, 
Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 29 May 2013). 
46 Interview with David, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 3 May 2013).  
47 Interview with Peter Doe, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 26 April 2013). 
48 Interview with Ebenezer, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 1 June 2013). 
49 Robert Meister, ‘Human Rights and the Politics of Victimhood’ (2002) 16(2) Ethics and International 
Affairs 91, 102.  
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committing the harmful act. A number of refugees lamented that they while they wished 
to talk about the harm they suffered, the legal, human rights approach of the TRC meant 
that there was no possibility to reflect upon past harm in an abstract, unembodied way.50 
 
It was not only refugee victims who critiqued the individualised approach of the TRC, 
but also refugees who fell into the category of perpetrator. Like victims, perpetrators also 
had to speak about violations they had personally committed. They were required to 
provide the information necessary for a criminal trial: the details of what, who, where, 
when the crime occurred – but not their motivations. In this way, as with other truth 
commissions, the Liberian TRC shied away from ‘making sense of’ those who commit 
atrocities, and ‘the social conditions eliciting such conduct from them,’ choosing to focus 
instead on the gathering of factual evidence. 51  This functioned to ‘demonis[e] the 
demonisers,’ and shut down the possibility for dialogue.52 As one refugee explained:  
 
Knowing the history and making reconciliation are completely different aims and 
you can’t do both at the same time. People should explain why they were in the 
war, rather than exactly what they did. We are more interested in the root cause. 
People can say they killed, but there’s no need to say how they did it. That’s not 
a good strategy for peacebuilding.53 
 
Structuring the statement-giving process around an individualised, fact-based account led 
to a strong perception amongst refugees that the point of the TRC’s activities, and the act 
                                                        
50 Interview with Mr Suah, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 12 June 2013); Interview with 
Rita, Liberian returned refugee (Gbarnga, 29 June 2013) Interview with Pastor Zulu, Liberian returned 
refugee (Ganta, 27 June 2013); Interview with Rancy, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 7 
June 2013); Interview with Isaac, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 15 May 2013); Interview with Peter 
Doe, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 26 April 2013). 
51 Mark J. Osiel, Mass Atrocity, Ordinary Evil, and Hannah Arendt: Criminal Consciousness in Argentina’s 
Dirty War (Yale University Press, 2001), 3.  
52 Robert Meister,  above n 49, 103. 
53 Interview with Rancy, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 7 June 2013). See also interview 
with Esther, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 29 May 2013).  
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of providing a statement, was to ‘make perpetrators pay for what they did.’ 54  This 
perception was compounded when, on numerous instances, TRC officials would arrive 
with photos of a specific perpetrator, or information about a large-scale violation. The 
statement-taker would then seek out people from the area where the alleged violation(s) 
had taken place, and ask the statement-giver what they knew about the perpetrator, or 
event.55 This generated a view amongst refugees that any information they provided was 
‘like taking evidence against the perpetrator,’56 rather than about hearing the full story of 
the statement-giver, or creating dialogue to understanding the full history of what 
happened during the war.  
 
A number of refugees reported that they tried to speak in a way that fell outside of the 
‘who did what to whom’ methodology. For instance, they would speak in general terms 
of harm they suffered without attributing it to a specific incident, or violation, or 
perpetrator.57 However, whenever a statement-giver spoke in this general way, then the 
interviewer would direct them to be more specific, to identify a particular incident, who 
the perpetrator was, exactly what happened, and to whom the violation occurred. The 
frustration at not being able to speak in the way they wished led some to argue that the 
TRC was just about ‘demanding people speak in the same way … it is about the TRC and 
the government, not about the people.’58 
 
Other refugees argued that the TRC would better achieve its objective of social 
reconciliation by creating a forum for ‘daily talking, knowing each other, understanding 
                                                        
54 Interview with Evon, Liberian refugee (Monrovia, 7 May 2013). 
55 Interview with Peter Doe, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 26 April 2013). 
56 Interview with Madison, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 11 April 2013). 
57 Interview with Mr Suah, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 12 June 2013); Interview with 
Rita, Liberian returned refugee (Gbarnga, 29 June 2013); Interview with Pastor Zulu, Liberian returned 
refugee (Ganta, 27 June 2013); Interview with Rancy, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 7 
June 2013); Interview with Isaac, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 15 May 2013); Interview with Peter 
Doe, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 26 April 2013). 
58 Interview with Esther, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 29 April 2013).  
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each other,’ rather than focusing on individualised, fact-based statement-taking.59  A 
number of refugees tried to push the TRC in this direction, and approached TRC members 
with requests to generate dialogue between those living in the settlement. For example, 
one refugee asked the TRC to help him initiative dialogue with an in-law from a different 
tribe, who held a deep grudge against him due to his tribal affiliation. However, the TRC 
took no action, other than to refer him to the statement-takers.60 
 
In a range of ways, then, refugees contested the TRC’s construction of both truth and 
reconciliation. The Liberian TRC aimed to generate a forensic version of truth, aimed at 
quantifying the scale and extent of past violence, and capable of sustaining 
recommendations for criminal prosecution. This meant it was focused on explaining 
which regions experienced the most deaths, for instance, or which rebel groups or 
individuals committed the most egregious crimes during a particular time period. 
Refugees, on the other hand, preferred a narrative, or social version of truth. Narrative 
truth, in this context, refers to storytelling by victims and perpetrators, and 
communicating personal truths and multi-layered experiences. Social or dialogical truth, 
on the other hand, refers to the truth of experience that is established by interaction, 
discussion and debate.61 
 
In the view of a number of refugees, the ability to speak freely, in general terms, and in 
dialogue with others – that is, in a way that reflected narrative or social truth – was a 
much more effective way of capturing the complexity of the war, and the refugee 
experience. When they had to speak in terms of violations they had personally 
                                                        
59 Interview with Mr. Doe, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 30 May 2013).  
60 Interview with Joe Myers, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 10 June 2013).  
61 Martina Fischer, 'Transitional Justice and Reconciliation: Theory and Practice' in Beatrix Austin, Martina 
Fischer and Hans Giessmann (eds), Advancing Conflict Transformation: The Berghof Handbook II 
(Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2011) 406, 411. 
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experienced or witnessed, numerous refugees asserted that the TRC reduced their identity 
to that of a victim, and nothing more. This suggested they were both passive and helpless, 
and silenced the many ways that people had negotiated their loss, rebuilt their lives, and 
created a new existence quite apart from that of victimhood. Instead, people wanted to 
talk about ‘how we found a new way, how we recovered, how we built something out of 
our lives that isn’t just about being a victim.’62 
 
The focus on generating forensic truth, rather than narrative or social truth, had a number 
of significant repercussions for the way in which the TRC engaged with refugees. When 
the TRC came to Buduburam settlement it had two priorities: to make sure that procedures 
in Buduburam camp were consistent with those taking place in Liberia and amongst the 
US diaspora, and, secondly, to enable as many refugees as possible to give statements.63 
In order to carry out these priorities, it focused on ensuring that the formal statement-
taking process was consistent between each refugee, following almost precisely the same 
format. It also gave statement-givers a set quota to reach each day, in order to ensure that 
all those who wished to give statements would have the opportunity to speak to a 
statement-taker.64 While prioritising a formal statement-taking process was essential in 
order to generate a consistent dataset, by focusing on these technical goals, the TRC failed 
to engage with the way in which context – namely, living in a refugee camp – affects 
people’s way of thinking and behaving. 
 
While there is no single refugee ‘experience,’ there is a well-established convention 
regarding how refugees interact with UNHCR and Western government while in asylum. 
When registering with UNHCR and applying for refugee status, the refugee must explain 
                                                        
62 Interview with Antonio, Liberian returned refugee (Ganta, 28 June 2013). 
63 Interview with TRC official (Monrovia, 9 April 2013).  
64 Interview with Evon, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 7 May 2013). 
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who they are, testify about the reasons for their displacement, justify why they cannot go 
back to their own country, and describe the problems they are facing in asylum. The 
UNHCR officer then has the power to believe or disbelieve this testimony, and 
subsequently grant or decline refugee status. Sometime later, if the refugee is considered 
eligible for resettlement to a third (usually Western) country, they will meet with an 
immigration officer and once again provide what is essentially a narrative victim 
statement, concerning why they fled, why they cannot go back, and what dangers they 
currently face. This context means that refugees are accustomed to their testimony being 
put to a specific use: that of convincing a judge that they meet the definition of a refugee, 
or the definition of resettlement eligibility. This system also turns the refugee’s story into 
a type of currency, which, if used correctly, can result in significant benefits. As a result 
of this context, when a person in a position of power asks: “Why did you leave your 
country?” the responding refugee cannot help but interpret that question with a range of 
expectations and assumptions.  
 
Among refugees living in Buduburam settlement, the context of living in a refugee camp 
led to a widespread belief that one purpose of the TRC’s activities was to pursue 
resettlement solutions for refugees.65 As one TRC official recalled:  
 
When we [the TRC staff] first arrived in Ghana, there were thousands of people 
wanting to give statements, because they thought that the TRC was going to 
resettle them all to the US. When the TRC explained more about their processes 
                                                        
65 Interview with Zinnah Fawson, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 25 April 2013); Interview with 
Peter Doe, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 26 April 2013); Interview with Liona, Liberian returned 
refugee (Monrovia, 1 May 2013); Interview with Flomo, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 3 May 
2013); Interview with Richardson, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 14 May 2013); Interview with 
Moses, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 29 May 2013); Interview with Fitz, Liberian 
refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 6 June 2013); Interview with Joe Myers, Liberian refugee 
(Buduburam refugee settlement, 10 June 2013).  
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and that it had nothing to do with resettlement, many people declined to be 
involved, and were no longer interested.66 
 
Refugee interviewees gave several reasons for the misunderstanding. UNHCR’s 
resettlement program was active at the time the TRC was taking testimony in the camp, 
and several refugees recalled that a number of families had been successful in their 
resettlement endeavours only a few months before the TRC’s arrival, raising the 
collective hopes of others that resettlement possibilities were still on the horizon. 67 
Unwittingly, the TRC then propped up this hope through its own program design and 
method of statement-taking. The first way it did so was through the use of The Advocates 
as statement-takers. Several refugees explained that: ‘People were excited to talk because 
they see outsiders [i.e. Western visitors] as always related to resettlement.’68 The fact that 
the TRC outsourced its activities to an American organisation, whose staff consisted 
almost entirely of Caucasian lawyers, undermined the claim that the TRC was a national 
process.  
 
Moreover, the questions asked by statement-takers mirrored almost precisely the 
questions UNHCR would ask during refugee status determination and resettlement 
interviews. Firstly, the TRC asked a statement-giver for their biodata information, then 
their reasons for leaving Liberia, the troubles they faced in Buduburam settlement, and 
finally why they could not return to Liberia.69 The similarity in format to refugee status 
determination interviews with UNHCR, or resettlement interviews with immigration 
                                                        
66 Interview with TRC official (Monrovia, 27 March 2013).  
67 Interview with Richardson, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 14 May 2013). 
68 Interview with Liona, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 1 May 2013). See also interview with Fitz, 
Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 6 June 2013); Interview with Joe Myers, Liberian refugee 
(Buduburam refugee settlement, 10 June 2013).  
69 Interview with Zinnah Fawson, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 25 April 2013).   
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officials, led many refugees to believe that the TRC interviews were in some way related 
to those two processes.  
 
The belief that giving testimony to the TRC was related to resettlement directly affected 
the type of testimony refugees provided. Refugees in the settlement were very familiar 
with UNHCR’s criteria for resettlement eligibility. One interviewee explained that 
‘UNHCR puts refugees into groups according to their story: there is women-at-risk, or 
torture, or other vulnerable groups. So you have to show you belong to one of these groups 
[if you want to be resettled.]’70 The perceived link between resettlement and the TRC led 
some refugees to believe that if you framed your testimony in a way that met the UNHCR 
criteria for resettlement, this would increase your chances of the TRC pursuing a 
resettlement solution on your behalf. This encouraged people to tell a particular kind of 
story, or focus on particular elements of their experiences. Some refugees and TRC staff 
complained that this undermined the statement-taking process as it caused refugees to 
exaggerate their testimony: “People told [the TRC] what they thought they wanted to hear 
in order to get resettlement. They made life seem much worse, made things up, because 
they were thinking about resettlement.”71 This does not mean that refugees did not have 
traumatic experiences. However, testimony was framed in order to meet demands quite 
outside those with which the TRC was concerned.  
 
Once the TRC became aware of this widespread misconception, staff from the TRC and 
The Advocates attempted to address the issue directly. Together, they held public 
information sessions and spoke personally to each testifier to explain that giving 
testimony was in no way linked to resettlement.72 This is in line with a standard theme 
                                                        
70 Interview with Richardson, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 14 May 2013). 
71 Interview with Morris, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 7 April 2013).  
72 Interview with TRC official (Monrovia, 27 March 2013).   
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throughout the literature on transitional justice, that practitioners must communicate 
clearly the purpose and limitation of mechanisms to those participating, in order to 
manage their expectations.73  The shortcoming of this approach is that it provides a 
technocratic solution to a problem that is rooted in social context, without addressing why 
the misbelief and expectations arise. In the case of the TRC, even though the TRC told 
them that providing testimony had no connection to resettlement, refugees explained that 
this message was not convincing, because the process of giving a statement remained 
nearly identical to the UNHCR process for resettlement.74 As one refugee explained, 
‘Why would the TRC act like UNHCR if they’re not doing something for resettlement? 
It doesn’t make sense.’75 Faced with a contradiction between the experience of testifying 
and the public statements made by the TRC, many refugees were persuaded by what the 
TRC actually did, rather than what the TRC claimed it was doing.  
 
The TRC’s data-driven process determined the framework for almost all its interactions 
with refugees. The TRC used a structured, formal method of interacting with participants, 
relying predominantly upon standardised interviews and official information sessions. It 
placed value on abiding by the rules of a set process and ensuring each individual had a 
consistent experience, rather than developing individualised relationships. With their 
interactions with the TRC confined to a single interview, many refugees complained that 
it was difficult for them to engage in its proceedings, since there was no sense of dialogue, 
and no possibility to develop rapport with TRC officials. One refugee expressed a 
commonly held sentiment that the TRC staff simply arrived, ‘got people’s stories, and 
then left,’ with no ongoing communication regarding what had happened to the testimony 
refugees provided, or the recommendations they made regarding government reforms or 
                                                        
73  Megan Bradley, ‘Displacement, Transitional Justice and Reconciliation’ (Forced Migration Policy 
Briefing No. 9, Refugee Studies Centre, April 2012) 3.  
74 Interview with Morris, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 7 April 2013). 
75 Interview with Zinnah Fawson, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 25 April 2013). 
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social reconciliation.76 It was ‘like you write a letter and send it and then there’s no 
response.’77  
 
One area where refugees pushed for more engaged involvement with the TRC was in 
relation to their repatriation. Many refugees had a genuine desire to engage with the TRC 
in the hope that doing so would affect government policies and improve their prospects 
for return. As one refugee explained:  
 
People talked to the TRC because they are fed up with being in exile and want to 
go home, so they want to talk about why they can’t return, to see if the TRC could 
change some of those reasons, improve them, convince them that it was okay to 
return.78 
 
One TRC official reported that some refugees were suspicious that the TRC would try to 
force them to return to Liberia. Realising that this perception was detrimental to TRC 
proceedings, TRC staff addressed the issue in a number of way. The first was through 
formal outreach meetings, where officials explained that the TRC was only interested in 
gathering testimony and not in forcing refugees to return.79 During the interactions, some 
TRC officials suggest that return might be possible because Liberia was now more secure. 
When these suggestions came from those resident in the US (as was the case for many of 
the TRC staff and all of The Advocates staff), refugees often reacted with hostility. One 
refugee spoke of the antagonism, explaining: ‘Some of the TRC staff were telling us that 
we should go back ‘home’ to Liberia. So we told them “Why don’t you leave the USA 
and come and live at ‘home’ in Liberia?”’80 
                                                        
76 Interview with Gus, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 13 May 2013). 
77 Interview with Oliver, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 11 June 2013).  
78 Interview with Esther, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 29 May 2013).  
79 Interview with TRC official (Monrovia, 27 March 2013). 
80 Interview with Sylvester, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 14 May 2013). 
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However, other refugees reported having informal discussions about the possibility of 
return with TRC officials who were domiciled Liberian nationals. In these cases, refugees 
often embraced the opportunity to obtain informal, first-hand information about the 
current situation in Liberia for returned refugees.81 One Liberian TRC official who was 
resident in Liberia recalled:  
 
Many people asked me personally about security in Liberia, and what life would 
be like after they return. I would say I used to be here [in Buduburam settlement] 
as a refugee before, and now I’ve gone back and I have a job, so it is possible. I 
would talk about the circumstances and the general security situation, and people 
were very interested to know about this.82 
 
4.4 Challenging the Transition Narrative  
 
In its Final Report, the Liberian TRC constructed a narrative concerning Liberia’s history 
of conflict, one implication of which was to suggest that a transition had taken place in 
Liberia. It did this by breaking the history of Liberia into separate, disconnected parts, 
speaking of violations in exclusively past terms and in contrast to the imagined future. 
This narrative had specific implications for refugees. It undermined their claims that 
Liberia remained an unsafe place, and concealed the fact that upon return, it was highly 
likely that they would continue to face the violation of their economic and social rights, 
and would struggle to achieve an adequate standard of living. Throughout their 
engagement with the TRC, refugees attempted to contest this narrative concerning 
transition, and to generate an alternate understanding of the conflict and ongoing reality 
of existence in Liberia. This section examines how these issues materialised.  
                                                        
81 Interview with Kaba, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 13 May 2013).  
82 Interview with TRC official (Monrovia, 27 March 2013). 
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Refugees featured in only minor ways in the TRC’s official narrative. Overall, 
approximately 6 per cent of TRC statements came from refugees, including those living 
in Ghana (1300 statements), Nigeria (31 statements) and the UK (8 statements).83 An 
additional 1 per cent (227 statements) came from Liberians resident in the US. The TRC 
Report did acknowledge that a large part of the Liberian population experienced forced 
displacement. 84  However, the main Report did not provide any details of these 
experiences, other than to note that Liberians ‘faced major challenges’ in their countries 
of asylum.85 Instead, refugee statements were treated in the same way as statements made 
by non-displaced Liberians: namely, they were coded and then compiled into a statistical 
dataset concerning experiences that took place during the war, in Liberia.86 Data from 
refugee statements was used to understand the demographic profile of refugee victims, 
the types of violations refugees experienced in Liberia during the conflict, and the groups 
or persons responsible for committing those violations.87 
 
The TRC provided details of the lived experience of displacement in an Annex to its main 
Report, entitled ‘A House with Two Rooms.’88 Here, refugee statements were used to 
produce a narrative describing the trauma of fleeing to another country. In order to 
understand the different phases that make up the refugee experience, the TRC used what 
is known as the ‘triple trauma paradigm.’89 This concept was developed by refugee 
service providers in Western countries of asylum, and posits that refugees experience 
trauma in three specific instances: in the country of origin, during flight, and in the 
                                                        
83 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, above n 1, vol 2, 187.  
84 Ibid, 258, 263, 271, 272, 273.  
85 Ibid, 321,322. 
86 Kristen Cibelli, Jule Kruger and Amelia Hoover, above n 36, 45-50. 
87 Ibid, 46-49. 
88 The Advocates for Human Rights, above n 9.  
89 Ibid, 303.  
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country of asylum.90 The TRC Report structured its description of the refugee experience 
accordingly, describing the violent experiences refugees had during the war and which 
triggered displacement; the difficulties they faced when fleeing Liberia for a safer place; 
and the discrimination and violations they continued to experience while living in 
asylum.91   
 
In describing refugee experiences during the war, the TRC used a framework of human 
rights to demarcate which experiences it would recognise, and those it would not. So, for 
instance, the TRC Report described the triggering events leading to displacement in terms 
of violations such as murder, torture, or abduction of family members of refugees; it 
described flight from Liberia in terms of the inability to find food, water, medical care, 
and safety;92 and it characterised the experience of living in Buduburam refugee camp in 
terms of inadequate access to water, sanitation, medical care, and education.93 
 
The triple trauma paradigm fails to acknowledge a fourth instance of trauma in the refugee 
experience: that of repatriation. This is likely because the refuge service providers in 
Western countries who developed the triple trauma paradigm would rarely have to deal 
with this fourth phase, since the refugees to whom they provide treatment do not generally 
face the imminent prospect of return; and, even if they do, those service providers are not 
responsible for responding to the trauma associated with repatriation. As a result, the 
triple trauma paradigm misses an essential part of many refugee experiences: that of 
returning to a country wrecked by war, with few resources and limited support, after an 
                                                        
90 Ibid, 303. 
91 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, above n 1, vol 2, 282-285. 
92 Ibid, 283. 
93 Ibid, 284. 
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absence of many years. In such a situation, return is not a victorious or even comfortable 
home-coming, but rather the start of a new cycle in a new and challenging environment.94 
 
While the TRC documented the trauma experienced by refugees throughout the war, 
during flight, and in asylum, it barely acknowledged the trauma of return. There is no 
description at all in the TRC Report, or in the Annex dealing with specifically with 
displacement, concerning the experience of returned refugees. One resource that dealt 
briefly with the trauma of return was a 600-page report produced by The Advocates, 
separately to the TRC Report, dedicated to documenting the experience of displaced 
Liberians. The Advocates’ report references the unwillingness of refugees to return very 
briefly, suggesting that refugees were concerned about security, livelihoods, a lack of 
savings, having nobody and no place to return to, psychological trauma, and a fear of 
former perpetrators now in power. 95  However, The Advocates did not provide any 
objective information to support these concerns, or any evidence concerning how 
refugees fared once they had returned. Instead, The Advocates’ report glosses its 
discussion of refugee return with optimism, stating, for instance, that: “Many people in 
Liberia lost everything they had: possessions, homes, families, security and employment. 
Nevertheless, many Liberians repeatedly told the TRC of their desire to return home and 
aid their country in its recovery.”96  
 
For many refugees, the reasons for their continued displacement related specifically to 
the deprivations they were likely to experience on return. Although virtually all Liberian 
refugees traced their initial flight from Liberia to the violence of the civil war, most 
                                                        
94 Khalid Koser and Richard Black, ‘The End of the Refugee Cycle?’ in Khalid Koser and Richard Black 
(eds), The End of the Refugee Cycle? Refugee Repatriation and Reconstruction (Beghahn Books, 1999) 2, 
12. 
95 The Advocates for Human Rights, above n 9, 335.  
96 Ibid, 16.  
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refugees remained unwilling to return to Liberia due to the challenges they would face in 
achieving an adequate standing of living. These included a lack of assets and income-
generating activities in Liberia, a lack of support structures in terms of food, education 
and health, and weak community links especially for the younger population who had left 
Liberia when they were children.97 During my fieldwork interviews, refugees repeatedly 
explained that since they had fled Liberia at the start of the war in 1990, fourteen years in 
exile meant that they had no home in Liberia, nobody there to help them, and no way to 
make a living, rendering return unfeasible.98 People in Liberia stigmatised those who had 
left, and would refer to them as people who had ‘wasted’ their years living in exile and 
who were therefore returning to a life with ‘nothing, and nothing to build on.’99 
 
These sentiments are reflected in the work of Nao Omata, who describes the many 
challenges Liberian refugees experienced upon return. Many Liberian refugees survived 
their years in Buduburam settlement by mobilising resources and connections they had 
built through relational networks. Since these networks were associated with the 
settlement, they were not readily transferable to Liberia. As a result, many repatriating 
Liberians found themselves without a means of livelihood and no personal linkages, and 
thus in much poorer living conditions in Liberia than in Buduburam.100 Each returnee had 
different adjustment capacities, dependent largely on their degree of access to livelihood 
assets and networks in Liberia: returnees with a meagre asset base confronted more 
challenges upon their repatriation compared with those with a stronger asset profile.101 
For the majority of returnees who were unable to access effective connections in their 
                                                        
97 Veronique Genaille et al, above n 16, 13.  
98 Interview with Franklin, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 3 June 2013).  
99 Interview with Gus, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 13 May 2013). 
100 Naohiko Omata, ‘Repatriation and Integration of Liberian Refugees from Ghana: the Importance of 
Personal Networks in the Country of Origin’ (2013) 26(2) Journal of Refugee Studies 265, 280.   
101 Naohiko Omata, ‘‘Repatriation is Not for Everyone’: The Life and Livelihoods of Former Refugees in 
Liberia’ (UNHCR New Issues in Refugee Research, Research Paper No. 213, June 2011) 25.  
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country of origin, their vulnerability was generated, or exacerbated, as a consequence of 
their repatriation. Therefore, Omata concludes, it is inaccurate to say that the refugee 
plight ended with their physical return to their country of origin.102 
 
From the perspective of refugees, then, the TRC’s narrative concerning transition 
appeared in sharp contrast to their lived experience. While the extreme violence 
associated with the violation of their civil and political rights had largely ceased with the 
war’s end, a different kind of violence continued: that of severe economic deprivation. 
The TRC’s narrative that the past was bitter and difficult, but that a transition had taken 
place and Liberia’s future would now be different silenced the voices of refugees who 
were ‘worried about accommodation, jobs, food.’103  Since the TRC did not address 
ongoing violations of economic and social rights, refugees felt that that the TRC offered 
little of practical value to their lives, and did not address their concerns around return.104 
As one refugee explained:   
 
The TRC didn’t help people because it was focused on courts, not on social needs. 
It would have been better if it changed its focus to social development, part of 
which would be helping refugees when the returned, for example with shelter, 
school, medical help. Something to help them have a home.105 
 
Refugees also contested the role that The Advocates and the TRC implied the Liberian 
government had to play in the transition. When discussing the unwillingness of refugees 
to return to Liberia, the TRC suggested that it related to individual inadequacies specific 
to each refugee, such as their fear of seeing perpetrators; their lack of skills to make a 
living in Liberia; and their lack of family or other connection. 106  This located 
                                                        
102 Ibid., 24. 
103 Interview with Evon, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 7 May 2013). 
104 Interview with Soweto, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 5 June 2013). 
105 Interview with Evon, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 7 May 2013). 
106 The Advocates for Human Rights, above n 9, 335. 
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responsibility for the unwillingness to return with the individual refugee, and their 
individual fear and trauma. The TRC did not link the fear refugees held towards 
perpetrators to the state’s inability to provide adequate security to its citizens, for instance, 
or to the endemic corruption that had allowed perpetrators to obtain positions of power 
in the new government. As a result, there appeared to be little onus on the new 
government to respond to the individualised concerns of refugees regarding return.  
 
In numerous ways, then, refugees contested the TRC’s use of their testimony in its 
construction of a national narrative. While the TRC used refugee testimony to 
demonstrate how destructive the past was, many refugees wished to use their testimony 
to justify their displacement, and why they could not return to Liberia. Refugee 
perspectives implied that a transition is a process, not a single moment, and that different 
actors can hold considerably different views as to the extent and content of the change 
that has taken place, and what it means for people’s lives. This, in turn, undermines the 
very notion that a transition has, in fact, taken place.  
 
4.5 Conclusion  
 
Scholars claim that truth-telling processes may acknowledge and affirm displaced 
persons’ narratives and experiences, and help reposition refugees as full, rights-bearing 
members of the political community. 107  The Liberian refugee experience with the 
Liberian TRC offers a more nuanced understanding of this claim, by demonstrating 
importance of asking whose narrative and experiences truth-telling acknowledges and 
affirms, and for which people – and to what extent – citizenship offers as a solution. For 
some Liberian refugees, the opportunity to provide testimony to the TRC did affirm their 
                                                        
107  Megan Bradley, ‘Truth-Telling and Displacement: Patterns and Prospects’ in Roger Duthie (ed), 
Transitional Justice and Displacement (Social Sciences Research Centre, 2012) 189, 216.  
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narratives and experiences. Those who wished to testify on an individual basis about 
physical violence that occurred to them or their family during the war, for instance, likely 
found the TRC a supportive forum. Equally, refugees who supported the criminal 
prosecution of perpetrators and wished to give testimony to further this end are likely to 
have found affirmation in the TRC’s proceedings (although prosecutions ultimately failed 
to materialise.)  
 
However, other refugees found that the TRC was unable to provide a platform to support 
the narrative they wished their government and Liberian society to recognise. The TRC’s 
‘who did what to whom methodology’, which required each person to speak on an 
individual basis, about a past violation of a civil or political right committed by an 
identifiable perpetrator, provided terms too narrow to incorporate the experiences many 
refugees wished to recount. They were unable to speak of ongoing violations of their 
economic and social rights, for instance, and were prevented from speaking about their 
suffering in general terms, or in ways that fell outside the canon of human rights. The 
inability to speak on their own terms ultimately prevented many refugees from achieving 
the justice outcomes they desired. 
 
For the majority of refugees, the TRC failed to reinstate their status as full, rights-bearing 
members of the political community. While the TRC formally included refugees on the 
basis of their membership in the Liberian polity, it took a restrictive view of their political 
rights as Liberian citizens. While Liberians living in the US were recognised as full 
political beings entitled to dual citizenship and external voting rights, those living in West 
Africa found the political aspects of their citizenship ignored by the TRC. Instead, the 
TRC appeared to assume that the full citizenship of refugees would be fulfilled only upon 
return. This assumption aligned with the TRC’s narrative concerning the ‘transition’ it 
 125 
 
claimed had taken place in Liberia; however, it was disputed by Liberian refugees who 
wished to be recognised as political actors even while living in Buduburam refugee 
settlement.  
 
The Liberian case study demonstrated that when scholars claim that transitional justice 
mechanisms can give a voice to the voiceless, they typically assume a model of voice in 
which victims can both speak and be heard, but fail to recognise the unevenness of social 
fields and their saturation with power.108 Refugees had little ability to change the terms 
on which they could engage with the TRC, or to expand the kind of narratives and 
experiences it would recognise. However, this is not to suggest that refugees passively 
accepted the mode of truth-telling the TRC offered. In fact, alongside the TRC refugees 
worked to create their own forums for truth-telling and accountability, through which 
they could also express their interpretation of what it means to be a Liberian citizen. The 
following chapter explores these spaces, in order to understand how refugees generated 
their own practices of transitional justice.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
108 Fiona Ross, ‘On Voice and Being Heard: Some after-Effects of Testifying Before the South African 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ (2003) 3 Anthropological Theory 325, 327. 
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CHAPTER 5: GRASSROOTS TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
IN BUDUBURAM REFUGEE SETTLEMENT 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
From its inception, the stable and accessible conditions found in Buduburam refugee 
settlement attracted international humanitarian organisations and donors. This led to a 
consistent presence of what are broadly termed peace programs, aimed at educating 
participants about conflict resolution techniques, nonviolence, cooperation, moral 
sensitivity, self-esteem, social rehabilitation and critical thinking. 1  In Buduburam 
settlement, these programs drew on a range of techniques to carry out their goals, 
including education, forums for dialogue, and counseling. The Initiative for the 
Development of Former Child Soldiers, for instance, provided counseling services and 
training on conflict resolution, while the Centre for Youth Empowerment conducted 
school programs on peacebuilding.  
 
Through the auspices of peace programs, refugees living in Buduburam settlement began 
to engage with the ideas of transitional justice. This chapter focuses on the activities of 
one particular community-based organisation active in the settlement, the Population 
Caring Organisation (PCO), which created two programs to deal with reconciliation at 
the community level. The first, known as Peace Cells, consisted of weekly meetings 
designed to promote dialogue within the refugee community. The second, the Tribal 
Leaders’ Peace and Reconciliation Forum, brought together elders, tribal leaders and 
religious leaders in order to discuss the role of the tribes in the war, and to pursue 
                                                        
1 Eric Brahm, ‘Peace Education’ in Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess (eds), Beyond Intractability (Conflict 
Information Consortium, July 2006) <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/peace-education>. 
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reconciliation at the leadership level.2 PCO did not refer to either of these programs as 
transitional justice. However, both programs engaged with ideas of truth-telling, 
accountability, reconciliation and collective memory. As such, the objectives of the two 
PCO forums often mirrored those of transitional justice, even if the methodology 
employed by the refugee-led forums differed considerably from that of conventional 
transitional justice.  
 
This chapter examines the way in which refugees pursued the objectives of transitional 
justice through the two PCO forums. It describes how the refugee-led forums prioritised 
relationships over law, and dialogue over prosecution. This approach led to conceptions 
of truth, reconciliation and transition that differed markedly from those of the Liberian 
TRC. The different methodological approach, as well as the varied understandings of 
truth, reconciliation and transition, meant that the refugee-led forums generated narratives 
about the conflict, and the repair of past harm, which different markedly from those of 
the Liberian TRC.  
 
5.2 Grassroots Reconciliation in Buduburam Refugee Settlement  
 
PCO was established in 2003 by a Liberian refugee who lived in Buduburam settlement, 
Emmanuel Dolo. His primary motivations were to facilitate open discussion amongst the 
Buduburam refugee community, and, through this dialogue, generate reconciliation 
amongst Liberians resident in Buduburam. 3  One of the founding members of PCO 
explained: 
 
                                                        
2 Jane Lawson, ‘What Happens After the War? How Refugee Camp Peace Programs Contribute to Post-
Conflict Peacebuilding Strategies’ (Research Paper No. 245, UNHCR, October 2012) 9.  
3 Interview with Moses, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 29 May 2013).  
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If you look at the organisations that encourage peacebuilding, they all focus on 
training. They all try to train people but they don’t actually get people to do 
something to solve their own problems. … The cause of the previous conflict was 
that people were not consulted, they were just forced to do things and they didn’t 
get to talk and decide for themselves. So we tried to help people to talk and find 
their own solutions.4 
 
In early 2004, PCO established its Peace Cells. Peace Cells were community groups 
focused on generating dialogue about the causes of the Liberian conflict, its 
consequences, and to identify solutions to problems that were caused by, or related to, the 
conflict.5 Over the course of five years, Peace Cells addressed a range of topics including 
tribal prejudice and hatred, forgiveness and reconciliation, mediation and negotiation 
strategies, and transitional justice.6 
 
From February until May each year, PCO spent time designing the curriculum for Peace 
Cell meetings, in conjunction with the refugee community. In the early months, Peace 
Cell leaders and other PCO staff would talk to refugees in their respective zones, often 
utilising questionnaires, in order to find out what challenges refugees were facing that 
might make an appropriate topic for discussion. They also considered political events 
likely to affect refugee interests, such as the TRC’s planned visit to Buduburam 
settlement. On the basis of community views and broader context, PCO staff would 
generate a number of topics for discussion at that year’s meetings, held between June and 
December. Each topic was associated with a set of five or six discussion questions, 
intended to stimulate dialogue among participants. 
 
                                                        
4 Interview with Morris, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 7 May 2013). 
5 Population Caring Organisation (PCO), ‘Practical Steps on How to Run a Peace Cell’ (Paper presented at 
PCO Community Peace Cell Leaders’ Workshop, Buduburam refugee settlement, 2005) 1.  
6 PCO, Annual Report 2006-2007 (PCO, undated) 12-13.  
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From June until November, Peace Cells met on a weekly basis. A Peace Cell was set up 
in each of the 10 zones of Buduburam settlement, and refugees were encouraged to attend 
the same Cell regularly, ideally in the zone where they resided. Prior to each meeting 
PCO would disseminate leaflets to those in the area in order to inform them about that 
evening’s topic, and invite them to come along.7 Most meetings saw at least 20 persons 
attend, and many topics drew crowds of 50 to 60 persons per Peace Cell. By encouraging 
consistent attendance at the same Peace Cell, PCO aimed to generate a desire amongst 
participants to contribute to the shared goals of the Peace Cell community.8 A Peace Cell 
leader was responsible for facilitating the discussion that ensued, and all those in 
attendance were actively encouraged to participate in discussions.  
 
The Tribal Leaders’ Forum was established in September 2004. 9  It was created in 
response to a perceived deficit of the Peace Cells: namely, their failure to engage the tribal 
leadership present in the camp. PCO aimed to create a forum that could pursue 
reconciliation between tribal leaders, in the hope that their influence amongst their own 
tribes might enhance prospects for reconciliation amongst the refugee community.10 By 
targeting the tribal leadership, the Forum aimed to enhance prospects for reconciliation 
amongst the refugee community more generally, due to the strong influence tribal 
leadership held within their respective communities. Moreover, the Tribal Leaders’ 
Forum was expected to ‘fill the reconciliation gap’ that existed between ‘high-level 
reconciliation activities’ such as the TRC which focused on ‘top political actors in 
Monrovia,’ and grassroots peacebuilding initiatives which tended to target only victims.11 
                                                        
7 Interview with Liona, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 1 May 2013).  
8 Interview with Esther, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 4 June 2013).  
9 Interview with Moses, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 29 May 2013). 
10 Interview with Elder Gee, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 29 May 2013). 
11 Tribal Leaders’ Peace and Reconciliation Forum (Tribal Leaders’ Forum), Letter dated 3 November 2004 
from Emanual Dolo of PCO to Mr. Thomas Albrecht, UNHCR Representative, Ghana (PCO, 3 November 
2004) 1. 
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The Tribal Leaders’ Forum met twice a month, engaging on alternate week in discussion 
groups and capacity-building activities.12 The Forum brought together leaders from each 
of Liberia’s 16 tribes (each of which was present in Buduburam settlement) as well as 
religious groups (namely the Buduburam Imam Council and the Buduburam Christian 
Council). Like the Peace Cells, discussions were structured around set topics. Each topic 
raised an issue specific to tribal reconciliation, such as participant views on the obstacles 
to peace and reconciliation between the tribes, and different strategies to overcome those 
obstacles with the refugee community in Buduburam settlement.13  
 
In a number of respects, Peace Cell meetings and the Tribal Leaders’ Forum worked in 
tandem. The PCO leadership would set the curriculum for the Peace Cells, which would 
then be used to structure both the discussion and capacity-building activities carried out 
in the Tribal Leaders’ Forum. By targeting different segments of the refugee community, 
they hoped to increase their reach to both ordinary Liberians and the tribal, religious and 
community leaders within the settlement. In doing so, both forums struggled to achieve 
equal participation across genders and ethnicities: Peace Cells were usually attended by 
more women than men, whereas the Tribal Leaders’ Forum struggled to achieve more 
than 25% female representation,14 and both forums involved a majority of Christians and 
a spread of ethnicities commensurate with the settlement’s demographics overall.   
 
The following section addresses a number of themes common to the way in which the 
Peace Cells and the Tribal Leaders’ Forums structured their activities.  
 
                                                        
12 Tribal Leaders’ Form, Action Plan (PCO, September 2006) 1. 
13 PCO, above n 6, 17. 
14 Interview with Esther, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 4 June 2013). 
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5.3 Reconciliation through Relationships, not Prosecution 
 
Both Peace Cells and the Tribal Leaders’ Forum were structured around relationships, 
rather than legal processes. A large reason for this stemmed from the seeming absence of 
law’s protective cover in the settlement. The Ghanaian authorities were responsible for 
law and order in Buduburam settlement. However, the relationship between Liberian 
refugees and the Ghanaian authorities – as well as between refugees and the Ghanaian 
population more broadly – was strained, and refugees raised fears of ill-treatment from 
both groups. 15  This reinforced the importance of tribal leadership for the refugee 
community:  
 
The police should have the job to enforce the law. But here, whoever the police 
like becomes right, and that is injustice. You have to pay for everything, including 
the hospital slip the police give you to evidence you’ve been assaulted. Because 
of such corrupt practices, people prefer to go to the tribal elders, they think they 
are better than the courts or police.16 
 
This context meant that Liberian refugees often looked to each other, and their tribal 
leadership, in order to solve their daily problems. This, in turn, placed importance on the 
strength of good intra-community relationships. 
 
For Peace Cells, the focus on creating reconciliation through relationships began with the 
choice of leadership. PCO identified Peace Cell leaders on the basis that they resided in 
the  community where the Cell was located, enjoyed good relations with other members 
of their zone, and exhibited strong interpersonal and communication skills.17 They were 
                                                        
15 Elizabeth Holzer, ‘A Case Study of Political Failure in a Refugee Camp’ (2012) 25(2) Journal of 
Refugee Studies 257, 258, 263. 
16 Interview with Moses, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 29 May 2013). 
17 PCO, above n 6, 12. 
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expected to lead by example, by ‘demonstrating peaceful ways of life in [their] 
community: non-tribalistic, impartial, friendly.’18 There was an expectation that Peace 
Cell leaders were not just conduits of teaching material; but rather, they had to be able to 
generate an atmosphere where those in the meeting feel comfortable to discuss sensitive 
and complex subjects. To aid this goal, PCO provided Peace Cell leaders with training to 
enable them to effectively facilitate discussions, mediate conflict, and respond to 
traumatised participants.19 
 
PCO structured its Peace Cell meetings in a way that cultivated a collegial atmosphere. 
They took place in the early evening when refugees had finished their day’s work and 
would habitually gather to talk and share news, and were held in a communal space within 
each zone. PCO staff stressed that choosing an appropriate physical space was paramount, 
since creating a safe environment where participants felt comfortable would encourage 
people to talk, rather than act as mere spectators. 20  Each meeting began with an 
opportunity for informal greetings. Then, participants would sit in a circle, in order to 
demonstrate that the input of all participants was equally welcome.21 The Peace Cell 
Leader would welcome participants and encourage people to talk openly throughout the 
meeting, rather than ‘feeling that they had to bottle up their anger or bitterness.’ Each 
person would then formally introduce him or herself, in order to encourage people in the 
community to build relationships, and to discourage people from claiming anonymity or 
setting themselves outside the group.22 Finally, the substantive aspects of the meeting 
would begin.  
 
                                                        
18 PCO, above n 5, 1. 
19 Interview with Evon, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 7 May 2013). 
20 PCO, above n 5, 2. 
21 Ibid, 3.  
22 Interview with Albert Pennue, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 31 May 2013).  
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Similarly, the primary focus of the Tribal Leaders’ Forum was to build personal 
relationships between different tribal leaders. As one tribal leader described, the aim was 
‘to learn how to trust each other again.’23 Given Liberia’s history of animosity between 
tribes, culminating in civil war, PCO considered the issue of trust key to the possibility 
for reconciliation. The way in which the Tribal Leaders’ Forum aimed to build trust, and 
relationships between tribal leaders more generally, was by facilitating regular contact 
between the tribal leaders. As people ate together and started to interact together in the 
meetings, it became more natural for a relationship to continue outside the Forum. Then, 
if one tribe had an event or meeting, they would invite people from some of the other 
tribes. In this way, relations between different tribes started to improve, which made it 
easier to discuss the difficult topic of how tribes had committed atrocities against each 
other during the war, and how people might be able to overcome that history.24  
 
Liberian refugees placed high value on witnessing examples of trust between tribal 
leaders. At the end of the first year of Forum meetings, the Tribal Leader’s Forum held a 
reconciliation ceremony, where they brought a cow, killed it, and everyone ate together.25 
Participants considered this as an essential element of the reconciliation process, as it 
symbolised that the elders had achieved a level of reconciliation, and gave them an 
opportunity to celebrate together the progress that they had made both personally, and on 
behalf of their tribes. 26  Interviewees stressed that witnessing this symbolic act 
demonstrated that relationships can change over time, as the result of sustained 
interaction, and that it was this ‘knowing each other, and doing things together’ that 
formed the basis of reconciliation.27 
                                                        
23 Interview with Samuel Kollie, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 25 April 2013). 
24 Interview with Fitz, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 6 June 2013).  
25 Interview with Elder Gee, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 29 May 2013). 
26 Ibid.  
27 Interview with Franklin, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 3 June 2013).  
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In addition to building relationships between tribal leaders, the Tribal Leaders’ Forum 
relied upon the relationship between each leader and their respective tribal group to 
pursue the goal of reconciliation. In the view of PCO staff, ‘leaders have a very big 
influence on their people, so if the leaders were reconciled, then this could also influence 
their people [to reconcile].’28  
 
5.4 Creating Social Truth through Dialogue  
 
Both Peace Cells and the Tribal Leaders’ Forum assumed that reconciliation is a gradual 
process, best pursued through dialogue.29 They involved people sitting down and talking 
together, discovering the root cause of the conflict, and then coming up with their own 
solutions.30 Although neither the Peace Cells nor the Tribal Leaders’ Forum explicitly 
aimed to construct a particular ‘truth’ about the past conflict, both engaged in regular 
discussions concerning what had happened during the war. In doing so, they generated a 
form of social truth, being the ‘truth of experience that is established through interaction, 
discussion and debate.’31 While forensic truth, such as that pursued by the Liberian TRC, 
aims to establish the minutiae of what happened, when and how, social truth takes the 
personalised truth of an individual and places it within a broader social context. This, in 
turn, highlights the way in which truth is generated not only by a single person, but in 
response to the perspectives and actions of a group.32  
 
                                                        
28 Interview with Fred Barlue, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 27 March 2013).  
29 PCO, above n 5, 1. 
30 Interview with Fitz, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 6 June 2013).  
31 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, Report (1999) vol 1, 113. 
32 Claire Moon, Narrating Political Reconciliation: South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(Lexington Books, 2008) 110.  
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The most essential aspect of social truth is the process by which it is generated. According 
to the South African TRC, the fundamental properties of social truth are ‘participation,’ 
and ‘transparency.’ Its Report stated: 
 
The process whereby the truth was reached was itself important because it was 
through this process that the essential norms of social relations between people 
were reflected. It was, furthermore, through dialogue and respect that a means of 
promoting transparency, democracy, and participation in society was suggested 
as a basis for affirming human dignity and integrity.33 
 
This conception of social truth, then, recognises that testimony and recording are part of 
a process of re-establishing social reality. The arbiter of social truth – being the TRC, in 
the case of South Africa, or the PCO forums in the case of refugees in Buduburam refugee 
settlement – aims to weave these various group perspectives together through an open 
and public process of negotiation, with the aim of generating a healing truth explicitly 
directed towards the process of national reconciliation.34 In view of this, this section 
examines the process of the Peace Cells and Tribal Leaders’ Forum, in order to 
understand the way in which they constructed a version of social truth. 
 
The dialogue generated in Peace Cell meetings was structured according to a number of 
conventions put in place by PCO. Peace Cell leaders would pose a discussion question 
but provided no ‘answers,’ since the purpose was not to educate people about a specific 
view or elicit a particular response, but rather to generate discussion regarding past events 
and then allow participants to negotiate the outcome themselves. 35  Members were 
encouraged to engage in ‘open communication,’ which meant they were free to express 
                                                        
33 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, above n 31, vol 1, 114. 
34 Claire Moon, above n 32, 110. 
35 Interview with Morris, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 16 April 2013). 
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anger, for instance, or to speak about past events on terms that reflected their own needs. 
However, the corollary was that participants were expected to hear things from others 
that were difficult to accept, such as grievances between tribes, for instance, or 
justification for why someone might have committed crimes. 36  Equally, open 
communication was not limitless, and participants were censured if they attempted to 
provide details deemed counterproductive to the goal of generating dialogue.  
 
The way in which Peace Cells generated social truth by way of dialogue is best 
demonstrated through its engagement with perpetrators. All kinds of people attended 
Peace Cells. There were those who self-identified as victims, and others who admitted to 
having taken part in atrocities during the war through their membership in rebel groups. 
However, many refugees stressed that the difference between ‘victim’ and ‘perpetrator’ 
was far from clear-cut. Refugees frequently recognised that those who had, in fact, 
committed atrocities often had their own stories of victimhood.37 In addition, refugees 
often held competing views regarding the idea of collective guilt and innocent. Some 
camp residents would define all persons from the Krahn tribe as perpetrators, for instance, 
attributing committed by others in that tribe to all its members, regardless that the 
individual Krahn person had not personally committed any violent act or was in fact a 
victim of violence themselves. As a result, and quite unlike the TRC, Peace Cell 
participants explained that they avoided labelling people as either victim or perpetrator, 
allowing people to identify in whichever way they preferred.38 
 
                                                        
36 PCO, ‘Guided Discussions: A Skills Training Workshop for Peace Cell Leaders’ (Paper presented at 
PCO Community Peace Cell Leaders’ Workshop, Buduburam refugee settlement, June 2004) 3. 
37 Interview with Gus, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 13 May 2013); Interview with Kaba, Liberian 
returned refugee (Monrovia, 13 May 2013); Interview with Moses, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee 
settlement, 29 May 2013).  
38 Interview with Zinnah Fawson, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 25 April 2013). 
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One key objective of Peace Cell meetings was to provide a forum for those who had 
committed atrocities during the war to disclose their experiences. This did not take place 
in the form of a confession or public statement, but as dialogue, the intention being to 
involve ex-combatants in the conversation about Liberia’s history rather than simply 
accusing or judging them for their past crimes.39 It was during these discussions that a 
kind of social truth emerged, mediated by the participants and conventions of the Peace 
Cells. Perpetrators were supported to talk in general terms about atrocities they had 
committed and, even more importantly, why they had done so.40 Those who had been 
affected by violence during the civil war often questioned perpetrators as to their motives, 
to which those who had committed the atrocities then had the opportunity to respond. 
Perpetrators were not allowed to give explicit details of the acts they committed, and 
Peace Cell members would censor people who tried to explain how they killed somebody, 
or even on occasion from revealing the exact identity of the person they had killed, on the 
basis that this was detrimental to ongoing dialogue. 
 
One refugee compared how the Peace Cells and TRC would deal with the same scenario:  
 
At the TRC, the perpetrator stands up and speaks. But in the Peace Cells what was 
important was dialogue. Plus the ex-combatants can explain their actions. For 
example, there was a boy who attended a Peace Cell meeting and explained that 
he had killed some people. He said I’m sorry, I was under the influence, I was 
forced, it was not my willing mind. People got angry. But then the way we dealt 
with it, later, is that we were able to take the issue and make it into a topic. We 
would talk about this issue in general terms, and we asked people in the 
community: If you come across a perpetrator, how should you deal with it? Then 
together we brainstorm how to solve it, and the difficulties with the situation. But 
                                                        
39 Interview with Morris, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 16 April 2013); Interview with Esther, 
Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 4 June 2013).  
40 Interview with Zinnah Fawson, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 25 April 2013). 
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the TRC would have stopped with the perpetrator saying I killed these people, I 
did it like this.41 
 
The convention of speaking in general terms, rather than about specific details of past 
atrocities, was also appealing to many who identified as victims. One Peace Cell leader 
observed that many people wished to speak about ‘their own hurt and bitterness, without 
accusing others of crimes.’42 One refugee explained why this perspective meant he was 
willing to participate in the Peace Cells but not in the TRC:  
 
I didn’t want to participate in the TRC because I don’t want to know who killed 
my brother. If I see exactly who killed him, then I will jump on him, I couldn’t 
stop myself. And I never want to hear someone explain why they killed my 
brother, there is no reason that he should have been killed. But if I went to the 
Peace Cells, we would talk more generally about what perpetrators did, and hear 
what they say. Someone would say I burned this village, but they wouldn’t talk 
about specific people, or how they killed them. And so for me this was fine.43 
 
Set discussion questions both stimulated and structured dialogue between those who had 
committed atrocities, and those who identified as victims.44 Questions were framed in a 
way that permitted the expression of a range of different views, and encouraged debate 
between participants. So, for instance, rather than asking ‘What happened to you during 
the war?’ questions would more typically ask: ‘What causes people to commit crimes 
against each other?’ and ‘Can people who committed crimes change?’45  Peace Cell 
leaders would encourage people to build upon each other’s views, or challenge views they 
disagreed with, on the basis that ‘people could learn the history of Liberia by learning 
                                                        
41 Interview with Pastor Zulu, Liberian returned refugee (Ganta, 27 June 2013).  
42 Interview with Esther, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 29 May 2013). 
43 Interview with Morris, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 7 May 2013). 
44 Interview with Morris, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 16 April 2013).  
45 PCO, above n 6, 12-13. 
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about each other’s experiences,’ and ‘understand this person as your brother or sister.’46 
The understanding of ‘truth’ in this context, then, was not singular, but rather reflected a 
range of different personal experiences, each of which the other participants were free to 
accept or reject.  
 
The Tribal Leaders’ Forum was also focused on generating dialogue. The aim was to 
provide an open space for tribal leaders resident in Buduburam settlement to talk about 
the causes of the war, how Liberia’s history and recent conflict had created disunity 
between the different tribes, and how tribal leaders should respond.47 This was not an 
easy task. In their daily lives the different tribal leaders rarely had extended personal 
contact, and often held strong views against each other for their tribe’s (perceived) actions 
during the conflict. At the first meeting of the Tribal Leaders’ Forum, a physical fight 
broke out between the leaders of two tribes that opposed each other during the war, who 
accused other’s tribe of having committed atrocities during the war.48 This interaction 
indicated the depth of animosity that continued to exist between a number of the tribal 
leaders. 
 
The response of the Tribal Leaders’ Forum was gradual. One Forum leader explained that 
for the first several months, it was difficult to talk about the causes and history of the war 
since emotions between the participants remained high. As such, at first the Forum 
meetings focused on simply providing a space for tribal leaders to be together, in order 
to gradually build rapport.49 As developed a sense of familiarity and trust between each 
other, and an increased commitment to the objectives of the Forum, they became able to 
speak more calmly. Only then did PCO introduce discussions regarding what the different 
                                                        
46 Interview with Evon, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 7 May 2013). 
47 Interview with Fred Barlue, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 26 March 2013). 
48 Interview with Elder Gee, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 29 May 2013). 
49 Ibid. 
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tribes experienced during the war, and the tribal leaders’ views on the causes, and 
responsibilities.50  
 
As with the Peace Cells, these discussions were constrained by a number of conventions. 
PCO actively steered discussions away from determining a factual account regarding the 
war, particularly one that would indicate that a particular tribe was ‘right or wrong, or 
innocent or guilty.’51 Tribal leaders were discouraged from providing specific details 
regarding how, or exactly who from their tribe was killed, as this tended to fuel 
accusations between tribes regarding their responsibility. Instead, PCO urged tribal 
leaders to talk in more general terms about what had happened, and what they believed 
were the causes.52 If a tribal leader made a comment apportioning blame upon another 
tribe, the rest of the group would signal its disapproval, thus reducing the frequency of 
inflammatory remarks.53 
 
One subject discussed at length at the Tribal Leaders’ Forum was that of cultural practices 
and ethnic identity. This was directly linked to the perceived causes of the conflict, since, 
as one refugee explained:  
 
[i]t’s generally thought the war came from tribal marginalisation and nepotism. 
There was an element of stereotypes, that some [tribes] are violent and warlike, 
while others were traitors. These stereotypes mean that in [Buduburam] camp, 
refugees did not feel free to say the tribe they’re from, because they didn’t want 
to be linked to the conflict through their tribe.54 
 
                                                        
50 Interview with Elder Gee, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 4 June 2013). 
51 Interview with Samuel Kollie, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 25 April 2013); Interview with 
Pastor Zulu, Liberian returned refugee (Ganta, 27 June 2013). 
52 Interview with Elder Gee, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 4 June 2013). 
53 Tribal Leaders’ Forum, Monthly Report (Tribal Leaders’ Forum, March 2007) 2. 
54 Interview with Ebenezer, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 1 June 2013).  
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The TRC’s approach to this issue was to criminalise the act of identifying someone as 
belonging to a particular tribe or ethnicity. It asserted that outlawing ‘all symbols and 
cleavages of disunity and segregation’ would strengthen national unity and help to 
establish a ‘common identity.’55 The Tribal Leaders’ Forum and Peace Cells, on the other 
hand, tackled the issue of tribal reconciliation by building relationships between tribal 
members who retained their respective ethnic identities. Through structured discussion 
questions, tribal leaders discussed subjects such as the origins of stereotypes, negotiating 
what constitutes ‘Liberian culture,’ and what tribal identity should look like after an 
ethnic-based civil war.56 There were no ‘correct answers’ to these questions, but rather 
tribal leaders presented a range of views that were debated and mediated by other 
participants. In doing so, the intention in the Tribal Leaders’ Forum was not to rid each 
person of their tribal affiliation, but rather to encourage people from one tribe to include 
people from other tribes in their own ethnic celebrations or events. Rather than stopping 
people from talking about ethnicity, the meetings encouraged people to talk about ethnic 
identity, and different cultural practices, based on the belief that gradual interaction would 
build friendships, and understanding, and that this might slowly create understanding 
(and, eventually, reconciliation) both on a personal and tribal level. 
 
By considering these issues, refugees described the Tribal Leaders’ Forum as taking a 
more ‘holistic’ approach to truth-telling. Rather than focusing on creating a forensic 
account of ‘who did what to whom’ during the war, the Forum – and, equally, the Peace 
Cells – took a much broader approach to what happened during the war. Looking beyond 
a purely factual account, they attempted to address the full human experience: an 
individual’s ethnic identity, cultural practices, the social and relationship aspects of their 
personhood, why or how they came to find themselves in the position of a victim or 
                                                        
55 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, Consolidated Final Report (2009) vol 2, 401. 
56 Interview with Ebenezer, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 1 June 2013). 
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perpetrator, and how they might move forward.57 Through the use of dialogue, they 
created an understanding of ‘truth,’ or, more appropriately, ‘truths’ as multivarious and 
personalised and which, even when accumulated, did not constitute a grand account of 
the war.  
 
Truth commissions frequently fall short of creating the type of social dialogue necessary 
to restore social relations, due to the structural framework of the narrative process. They 
typically shy away from exploring the motivations behind violent actions, they 
essentialise victims’ and perpetrators’ voices in order to fit the collective narrative the 
commission is attempting to construct, and they elevate the voice of victims over those 
of perpetrators.58 This was the case with the Liberian TRC, whose focus on creating 
‘forensic truth’ capable of upholding recommendations for prosecution created a highly 
structured narrative process that many refugees found exclusionary.  
 
An alternative to the structured narrative process of a truth commission is to focus on 
personal narratives over grand narratives, de-essentialise the victim and the perpetrator, 
and place victims’ and perpetrators’ narratives on equal footing with respect to the 
collective memory project.59 The Peace Cells and Tribal Leaders’ Forum demonstrated 
one way this might be embodied. By providing a platform to create dialogue between 
individuals, divesting people of the need to identify as either perpetrator or victim, and 
providing a framework for a more holistic conception of what happened in the past, the 
refugee-led, PCO forums generated a distinct kind of social truth.  
 
  
                                                        
57 Interview with Morris, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 7 April 2014).  
58 Nneoma Nwogu, ‘When and Why It Started: Deconstructing Victim-Centred Truth Commission in the 
Context of Ethnicity-Based Conflict’ (2010) 4 International Journal of Transitional Justice 275, 276.  
59 Ibid, 284.  
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5.5      Different Concepts of Accountability and Reconciliation  
 
From beginning to end, the TRC and refugee-led forums employed markedly different 
methodologies. One refugee who participated in both the TRC and Peace Cells provided 
a vivid comparison:  
 
The TRC sent people from Liberia and America. They put up posters and had 
questionnaires. You had to sign a document and show your ID card. For the Peace 
Cells, we did not put up posters, it was only word of mouth, and we did not require 
people to sign anything, or to record what they said. It didn’t matter if you had an 
ID card or no ID card. We just discussed issues. The TRC was not sharing cookies 
or juice with people, but the Peace Cells did. Eating and drinking together was 
about cultivating friendship. For the TRC, people would tell stories in order to get 
a benefit like resettlement. But there was no benefit to telling stories at the Peace 
Cells. Peace Cells were there to talk about what happened and what that meant to 
your life, and how to overcome it. This was the benefit, being able to talk and 
learning how to heal, and get over your past strife.60 
 
Underpinning these methodologies were very different conceptions of accountability and 
reconciliation. These, in turn, were grounded in diverse cultural and social practices. 
While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine in detail the cultural framework 
informing Liberians conceptions of accountability and reconciliation, an instructive 
comparison is found in Tim Kelsell’s ethnographic study of the interaction between the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone and the local Sierra Leonean community. Kelsell 
demonstrates that because Sierra Leoneans held different ideas of ‘social space and time, 
causation, agency, responsibility, evidence and truth telling’ from those employed by the 
international Special Court, misunderstandings between the two groups were common, 
                                                        
60 Interview with Moses, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 29 May 2013). 
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and as a result the application of international justice became ‘a fraught affair.’61 This 
suggests that a difference in methodology is not simply a technical matter, but is often 
driven by a particular cultural framework that informs the understanding of justice. With 
this in mind, this section examines how the different forums understood the concepts of 
accountability, and reconciliation, and the effect this had on the respective 
methodologies.  
 
According to the TRC Report, reconciliation ‘begins with individual forgiveness, and 
requires the involvement of all Liberians.’ It is to be achieved, according to the TRC, 
through the pursuit of ‘justice,’ which the TRC equates with the full implementation of 
its recommendations for the prosecution of accused war criminals. 62  In the TRC’s 
conception, then, criminal accountability was fundamental to reconciliation. If the 
Liberian government were to eschew the TRC’s recommendations for prosecution, then 
the society would not be able to reconcile. This vision of reconciliation depended upon 
formalised institutions such as criminal courts, and was encapsulated by a single event: 
that of a criminal trial.  
 
The refugee-led forums, by contrast, understood reconciliation as a gradual process, 
concerned foremost with the rebuilding of individual relationships.63 It depended upon 
recurrent interaction between people, involving ‘daily talking, knowing each other, 
understanding each other.’64 As opposed to the institutionalised format of the TRC, which 
focused on asking questions and ‘didn’t allow people to interact,’65 Peace Cells and the 
                                                        
61 Tim Kelsell, Culture Under Cross-Examination: International Justice and the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 17. 
62 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, above n 55, vol 2, 22. 
63 Interview with Ebenezer, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 1 June 2013); Interview with 
Esther, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 29 May 2013); Interview with Evon, Liberian 
returned refugee (Monrovia, 7 May 2013); Interview with Elder Gee, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee 
settlement, 4 June 2013).  
64 Interview with Mr. Doe, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 30 May 2013). 
65 Interview with Esther, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 4 June 2013). 
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Tribal Leaders’ Forum were designed to bring people together and ‘find common ground, 
build relationships, [allow people to] laugh and joke together.’66 In this way, the PCO 
forums reflect what feminist scholars have argued truth commissions might ordinarily 
provide, that is, a space ‘to move beyond the rather masculine discourse of crime and 
punishment towards a notion of repairing relationships.’67 
 
While the TRC implied that reconciliation concerned individual perpetrators and their 
victims, the refugee-led forums held a much broader understanding of those involved in 
reconciliation. For instance, the Tribal Leaders’ Forum highlighted the need for 
reconciliation not only between the different tribes, but also between the tribal leaders 
and their own members. During the war, the traditional leadership had lost credibility 
with a large portion of the population for their perceived failure to stop, or, in some cases, 
their perceived contributions towards, the civil war. 68  Furthermore, for the younger 
generation that had grown up in exile, traditional leadership structures had lost much of 
their strength. The younger generations had little exposure to engaging elders to mediate 
conflict, for instance, and as a result they often perceived the traditional way of 
responding to social problems as irrelevant.69  
 
Understanding reconciliation in terms of the relationship between tribal leaders and their 
membership generated an alternative understanding of both harm, and the affected 
parties. While the TRC defined harm according to a catalogue of human rights violations, 
the refugee-led forums recognised a collective, social form of harm: that of the loss of 
trust in tribal leadership, and a breakdown in social relations. This harm was suffered not 
                                                        
66 Interview with Elder Gee, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 4 June 2013). 
67 Christine Bell and Catherine O’Rourke, ‘Does Feminism Need a Theory of Transitional Justice?’ 
(2007) 1 International Journal of International Justice 23, 40.  
68 Interview with Elder Gee, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 4 June 2013).  
69 Interview with Ebenezer, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 1 June 2013).  
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only by individual tribal leaders and individual tribal members, but also by the community 
as a whole. By recognising harm in community terms, the PCO forums moved away from 
the dichotomy of victim and perpetrator employed by the TRC, and implicated both tribal 
leaders and ordinary Liberians in the need for reconciliation without assigning them an 
essentialised identity.   
 
PCO also conceived of the process of reconciliation between tribal leaders and their 
membership quite differently from the prosecutorial approach of the TRC. Rather than 
focusing on admissions of past wrongs, PCO focused on repairing social relations by 
increasing the relevance of the tribal leadership to the everyday lives of refugees in 
Buduburam settlement. 70  One primary way it pursued this aim was by contracting 
Mediators Without Borders to provide training to the tribal leaders. Mediators Without 
Borders is a private organisation, based in the US, which provides training in mediation, 
arbitration and conflict resolution. PCO employed the organisation on the assumption that 
by combining traditional structures and methods of reconciliation with the ‘more modern, 
Western methods’ of Mediators Without Borders, they could create ‘a middle way’ of 
forging reconciliation in the context of Buduburam settlement.71 Training focused not on 
highly visible moments of conflict such as protests or personal attacks, but on the 
minutiae that formed the lived reality of life in Buduburam: neighbourhood disputes, for 
instance, which would habitually start over small matters but then descend into fights that 
vilified each person’s ethnic identity.72 
 
 
                                                        
70 Interview with Elder Gee, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 29 May 2013).  
71 Interview with Ebenezer, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 1 June 2013).  
72 Interview with Morris, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 10 May 2013). 
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The need for reconciliation, from the perspective of Peace Cell practice, also extended to 
the Ghanaian host community. The relationship between refugees and their Ghanaian 
neighbours had grown increasingly strained over years of unresolved displacement, and 
trust between the two communities was low. PCO staff encouraged Peace Cell members 
to discuss the problems they experienced with local Ghanaians in meetings, on the basis 
that ‘reconciliation affects everyone around you, it’s not just about [highly visible 
perpetrators such as] Prince Johnson, the conflict affects all your relationships.’73 In 
discussing these issues, PCO attempted to dispel the idea of refugees as victims, and, 
equally, of Ghanaians as perpetrators. Instead, the focus was on rebuilding social 
relationships on a personal, daily level. In support of this conception of reconciliation, 
PCO staff kept records of Peace Cell and Tribal Leaders’ Forum meetings and 
periodically shared them with the government-led Ghana Refugee Board.  
 
The TRC and PCO forums not only held different conceptions of reconciliation, but also 
of accountability. The TRC was mandated to ‘ensure accountability, political or 
otherwise’ for violations committed during the war. 74  It was instructed to pursue 
accountability according to a framework of international human rights law, international 
humanitarian law, international criminal law and Liberian domestic criminal statutes,75 
and then recommend individuals to face prosecution through the Extraordinary Criminal 
Court For Liberia.76 In the TRC’s view, then, the concept of accountability was limited 
to criminal accountability. It depended upon an institutionalised mechanism, the court, 
and associated accountability with a single judgment made by the court.  
 
                                                        
73 Interview with Liona, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 1 May 2013).   
74 Liberia: An Act to Establish the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia 2005 (Liberia) 10 June 
2005, Art VIII, s 26.  
75 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, above n 55, vol 2, 19.  
76 Ibid, 349. 
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The refugee-led forums, by contrast, relied on sustained dialogue to create accountability. 
Peace Cells did not proactively seek out individuals who had committed atrocities, as did 
the TRC, but nonetheless they regularly dealt with individuals who readily admitted to 
the commission of crimes during the civil war. When this happened, Peace Cells did not 
attempt to judge the individual for their act, but rather to create dialogue around why they 
had acted in a certain way, and what were the long-lasting repercussions for the 
community.77 In the view of many who attended Peace Cells, this functioned as a system 
of accountability, in that it allowed people who had suffered during the war to express 
anger or bitterness, and emphasise the far-reaching implications of the harm caused by 
those who committed atrocities.78 Rather than the institutionalised format of the TRC that 
focused on achieving accountability of an individual perpetrator for identifiable atrocities, 
Peace Cells were about generating social dialogue concerning harm, and personal 
responsibility. Rarely were the victims of an individual perpetrator’s acts present in the 
same meeting; but rather, those who spoke did so on a general level, highlighting the 
implications of all violent acts taking place during the war.  
 
Similarly, the Tribal Leaders’ Forum used dialogue to generate tribal accountability for 
the war. Tribal leaders were invited to reflect on the role their own tribe played in 
advancing the war and committing atrocities. By requiring each individual to reflect on 
their own tribe’s responsibility, PCO aimed to create a space where tribal leaders could 
discuss the war without getting stuck in a cycle of blaming each other’s tribe.79  
 
These reflections are not intended to suggest that the conception of reconciliation and 
accountability practiced by the TRC or the PCO forums was superior to the other. Instead, 
                                                        
77 Interview with John Travers, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 11 June 2013); Interview 
with Zinnah Fawson, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 25 April 2013). 
78 Ibid.  
79 Interview with Elder Gee, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 4 June 2013).  
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they reflect what Das and Kleinman describe as a ‘double movement,’ a two-tiered 
approach to transitional justice essential to meet the whole needs of a community. 
According to Das and Kleinman, what is required at the macro level is the creation of a 
public space that gives recognition to the suffering of survivors and restores some faith 
in a state’s legitimacy, while at the micro levels of community what is required is 
opportunities for everyday life to be resumed. 80  The TRC, with its emphases on 
institutionalised, state-led reconciliation and accountability offered a way for the new 
Liberian government to demonstrate its commitment to ‘peace, security, unity and 
reconciliation.’81 
 
The Peace Cells and Tribal Leaders’ Forum, on the other hand, offered an embodiment 
of localised and ordinary practices that allow a community to recover from collective 
violence. This process of rebuilding ‘everyday’ relationships and social ties occurs at the 
levels of the family, friends, neighbourhood and community, and focuses on how the 
every day work of survival takes place. As opposed to the ‘grand narrative of forgiveness 
and redemption’ the TRC produced, the refugee-led forums offer example of ‘small local 
stories’ which illuminate how communities are ‘experimenting with ways of inhabiting 
the world together.’82  
 
5.6 Contesting ‘Transition’  
 
The Peace Cells and Tribal Leaders’ Forum did not aim to create a national narrative 
about the war, or Liberia’s transition to peace. Nonetheless, within the practices of both 
forums an understanding of transition emerged. Transition was generally understood as a 
                                                        
80 Veena Das and Arthur Kleinman, ‘Introduction’ in Arthur Kleinman et al (eds), Remaking a World: 
Violence, Social Suffering and Recovery (University of California Press, 2001) 19. 
81 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, above n 55, vol 2, xxiii. 
82 Veena Das and Arthur Kleinman, above n 80, 16. 
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long and gradual process, and one that always retained an element of the past in the 
present. This had both negative and positive connotations: some refugees contested the 
suggestion that Liberia had gone through a transition since they continued to live the 
affects of the war in their daily lives in Buduburam, and also faced challenging conditions 
should they return to Liberia. For others, the interaction between past and present was 
more positive, and they argued that the experience of asylum could contribute positively 
to their reintegration to Liberia. This section examines these perspectives, and how they 
compared to the conventional transitional justice understanding of transition.  
 
While the TRC divided history into time-bound segments – what happened, before, 
during, and after the war – Peace Cells treated history as fluid and interconnected. Instead 
of suggesting that the conflict was past, refugees frequently spoke of its ongoing presence 
in people’s daily lives. As one Peace Cell leader noted:  
 
Problems from before would spill over and the conflict would continue in people’s 
daily lives. It looks like it’s a problem from today, but actually it’s related to 
ethnicity and stereotypes, and that relates to the war. So this became a focus of 
the Peace Cells: how the past relates to our lives now.83 
 
As a result, in both refugee-led forums violations were not spoken of in exclusively past 
terms, but frequently engaged the language of the present.  
 
Repatriation to Liberia presented the clearest challenge to the idea of transition. The TRC 
focused on violations of a civil and political nature, most of which were related to the 
conflict and, therefore, situated clearly in the past. The refugee-led forums, by contrast, 
focused on the ongoing violation of economic and social rights, since it was these 
                                                        
83 Interview with Moses, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 29 May 2013). 
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violations that were of highest concern to refugees considering repatriation. Peace Cells 
structured their discussions about violations of economic and social rights, and conditions 
in the ‘new’ Liberia, around what they termed ‘structural violence.’84 Structural violence 
was conceived as a social institution or practice that harms people, and was conceived in 
terms of four different strands: bureaucracy, class, gender, and financial status. The 
concept of structural violence provided a way to recognise and discuss violations that 
were not as obvious as killing or rape, but which prevented Liberians from achieving an 
adequate standard of living.  
 
The framework of structural violence provided a way for refugees to discuss how 
discrimination that took place before the war related to violence that continued to take 
place in post-civil war Liberia. On the subject of access to education, for instance, 
refugees discussed the way that Americo-Liberians had historically restricted the access 
of indigenous Liberians to education, and how, although the new government had 
overturned the historic laws and practices, in reality many indigenous Liberians continued 
to be denied access to both primary and secondary education. This led to the recognition 
of other injustices: the way girls were still educated to a lower level than boys, for 
example, and the difficulty for people living in rural areas to access education (as well as 
employment, health services and justice) compared to those living in urban areas of 
Liberia.85 
 
Peace Cells also drew on existing experiences in Buduburam settlement to reduce the 
sense of transition being a ‘break with the past.’86 In discussing the lived experience of 
reconciliation between Liberians, people spoke of the unique situation of Buduburam, 
                                                        
84  PCO, ‘Indicators of Peace’ (Paper presented at PCO Community Peace Cell Leaders’ Workshop, 
Buduburam refugee settlement, undated) 1. 
85 Ibid, 1-2. 
86 Interview with John Travers, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 11 June 2013).   
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where all tribes lived in very close proximity to each other and mixed marriages were far 
more common than in Liberia.87 People from different tribes often sent their children to 
the same small schools, and drew water from the same community well, whereas in 
Liberia – at least in the provinces – the tribes lived much more separately, since each 
province was populated by one, or on a rare occasion two tribes.88 
 
In a study concerning peace programs in refugee camps including Buduburam settlement, 
Lawson found that refugees considered the most valuable element of peace programs the 
opportunity it gave them to organise themselves, and build groups reflecting their 
interests.  While most refugees asserted that training regarding livelihoods did not assist 
their reintegration, the ability to organise politically enabled them to become active civil 
society participants and advocate their interests on return.89 According to one of my 
interviewees, this type of program allows refugees to contribute to the reconstruction of 
Liberia even while they remained displaced, by developing the skills they will need after 
return.90  
 
According to conventional practice, transitional justice is justice that arises within a 
bounded period spanning two regimes, and is both constituted by, and constitutive of, the 
transition. 91  Transitional justice discourse implies a ‘break with the past’, creates a 
definitive sense of ‘now’ and ‘then’, and assumes a liberal, rights-respecting future.92 As 
the perspective of refugees living in Buduburam settlement demonstrates, this raises the 
question of transition to what? When does a transition begin and when does it end? 
                                                        
87 Interview with Samuel Kollie, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 25 April 2013); Interview with 
Abednego, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 11 June 2013). 
88 Interview with Abednego, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 11 June 2013).  
89  Jane Lawson, Initiating Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Strategies in Refugee Camps (MA Thesis, 
University of Calgary, 2011) 95. 
90 Interview with Elder Gee, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 30 May 2013). 
91 Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford University Press, 2000) 5, 6.  
92 Rosemary Nagy, ‘Transitional Justice as a Global Project: Critical Reflections’ (2008) 29 Third World 
Quarterly 275, 280.  
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Scholars recognise that constructing transition as a ‘break’ with the past conceals the 
ongoing violence and exclusion that many victims experience, especially that of an 
economic and social nature.93 This has significant repercussions for refugees, since it 
undermines their claims that it is safe to return, and can conceal the many challenges they 
face following return. The practices of Peace Cells and Tribal Leaders’ Forum also 
suggested that transition was understood not only in terms of the political context and 
something that happened to refugees, but rather something that people had to create 
themselves.94 
 
5.7 Conclusion  
 
The existing scholarship on transitional justice and displacement tends to treat refugees 
as submissive recipients of transitional justice ideas and methodologies. Refugees are 
described as victims of human rights violations, for instance, or beneficiaries of property 
restitution processes, with little discussion of how they themselves engage in the ideas of 
truth, accountability or reconciliation. This not only creates a perception of refugees as 
passive victims, but also of transitional justice mechanisms and ideas as static and 
inflexible. There is little discussion of the ways in which refugees contest, adapt and 
remake the principles and practices of transitional justice; or, equally, of the ways that 
transitional justice principles are themselves malleable.  
 
The activities of Liberian refugees in Buduburam refugee camp destabilised the 
conventional understanding of the relationship between transitional justice and refugees. 
The PCO forums revealed how refugees designed their own forums to address 
reconciliation, as well as diverse methodologies to pursue truth and accountability that 
                                                        
93 Ibid, 280. 
94 Interview with Esther, Liberian refugee (Buduburam refugee settlement, 29 May 2013). 
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better reflected their own values and context. This suggested that transitional justice is 
not an inflexible set of principles delivered by states or international organisations to 
victims and communities, but a living, contested set of ideas. Through the PCO forums, 
refugees disputed both the conceptual framework and methodology of the Liberian TRC, 
and their actions challenged the idea of the state as the only actor responsible for defining 
the conceptual and practical framework for truth-telling, accountability and reconciliation 
after a civil war.  
 
The PCO forums negotiated truth through dialogue, and relied upon individual 
relationships in order to pursue accountability. This meant that unlike the TRC, which 
fashioned truth out of facts and accountability from legal rules, the PCO forums 
understood both truth and accountability as long-term processes that were firmly 
embedded in the community’s social structures. This was not simply a methodological 
choice, but a reflection of the very ends that refugees wished to achieve: the rebuilding 
of relationships, the recreation of social dialogue, and the expression of respect for each 
other.  
 
The Liberian case study as a whole, then, offered a range of alternate manifestations of 
transitional justice principles and processes. It demonstrated that a forum’s conception of 
accountability or reconciliation determines who gets to speak, and which accounts will 
be recognised. This is not to suggest that either the TRC or the PCO forums resulted in a 
more ‘accurate’ truth or a ‘better’ kind of reconciliation. Instead, it is to acknowledge that 
each forum’s distinct conceptual framework and methodology supported a different 
understanding of harm and repair, and thus a different set of justice outcomes. 
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CHAPTER 6: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN AFGHANISTAN 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Afghanistan may seem an anomalous choice for a case study in transitional justice. 
Following the 2001 American-led invasion, the political transition provided an 
opportunity for the Afghan government to address the country’s history of conflict. 
Despite this, the transitional Afghan government did not engage with conventional 
mechanisms of transitional justice. It attempted to introduce a disarmament program and 
a system for electoral vetting, but these were undermined by impunity and a lack of 
accountability.1 A politics of accommodation and a focus on short-term security took 
priority, and those in power dismissed even the least contentious transitional justice 
measures, especially those associated with truth-telling or accountability.2 In light of this, 
scholars generally consider transitional justice in Afghanistan a failure. 
 
This chapter analyses how scholars reached such an adverse assessment, by interrogating 
the boundaries of transitional justice in Afghanistan. It examines who defined the 
mechanisms considered to constitute transitional justice, and what types of activities were 
included or excluded. It identifies the limitations that exist in the conventional conception 
of transitional justice, and how this can exclude particular understandings of 
accountability, reparations and reconciliation. This forms the basis for subsequent 
chapters, which assess these boundaries of transitional justice.  
 
                                                        
1 Patricia Gossman, ‘Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Afghanistan’ (Report, International Centre 
for Transitional Justice, June 2009) 32. 
2 Patricia Gossman and Sari Kouvo, ‘Tell Us How This Ends: Transitional Justice and Prospects for Peace 
in Afghanistan’ (Report, Afghanistan Analysts Network, 30 June 2013) 2.  
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The chapter begins by providing a brief description of the history of conflict and 
displacement in Afghanistan. It describes how the imperatives of state-building came to 
dominate attempts to implement mechanisms of transitional justice measures. It then 
turns to what most scholars have dubbed Afghanistan largest success in terms of 
transitional justice: the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission’s report into 
national perceptions of transitional justice, A Call For Justice. This offered a more 
nuanced approach to accountability and reconciliation than the peace-versus-justice 
rhetoric of the state-building mission, and also incorporated the views of Afghan refugees.  
 
6.2 Afghanistan and its Cycles of Conflict  
 
The modern state of Afghanistan was formed in 1747, when Ahmad Shah Abdali 
established a monarchical kingdom, replacing shifting interventions by different regional 
empires. The monarchy prevailed from 1747 until 1973, when the last king, Mohammad 
Zahir Shah, was overthrown by his cousin, Mohammad Daoud, who declared 
Afghanistan a republic and himself its first president. During Mohammad Daoud’s 
presidency, divisions emerged amongst the political elite in Kabul in response to the 
educational and social reforms he implemented, all of which were aimed at modernising 
Afghanistan. These divisions paved the way for a communist coup in April 1978, which 
marked the beginning of Afghanistan’s continuous years of conflict. This conflict took 
place in four phases: the 1978 coup and subsequent Soviet occupation (1979-1989), the 
mujahedin civil wars (1992-1996), the period of the Taliban (1996-2001) and the current 
conflict, which began with US military attacks against the Taliban in 2001. Each period 
is characterised by its own set of human rights abuses, and a shifting set of actors 
responsible for those atrocities.  
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The 1978 coup brought to power the Marxist-Leninist People’s Democratic Party of 
Afghanistan, which pursued radical land and social reforms and then suppressed the 
widespread popular dissent that arose in response. 3  The Marxist-Leninist Party was 
responsible for the executions, torture and enforced disappearances of intellectuals, 
competing leftists, royalists, religious elites, landowners and anyone else perceived to be 
a potential opponent of the new regime. During the 20 months it was in power, as many 
as 100 000 people disappeared, one of the largest instances of forced disappearance in the 
twentieth century.4 
 
As the Afghan resistance to the Marxist-Leninist Party grew, the Soviet Union became 
anxious that the Party – and, by extension, the Soviet Union’s proxy government – would 
lose power. Aiming to safeguard a communist government in Afghanistan, in late 
December 1979 the Soviet Union army invaded and occupied the major cities across 
Afghanistan. Over the next ten years, the Soviet Union spent the equivalent of billions of 
(US) dollars in military action, and at the peak of the conflict, more than 100 000 Soviet 
soldiers were fighting in the country.5 In the countryside, Soviet aerial bombardments 
became routine and indiscriminate, leading to mass refugee flows into Pakistan and Iran.6 
In Pakistan, a militarised resistance developed, organised into political groups known as 
the mujahedin. Domiciled Afghans who supported the mujahedin were targeted by the 
secret police, and were subject to summary executions, detentions and torture.7  
 
                                                        
3 William Maley, The Afghanistan Wars (Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) 25–27. 
4 Oliver Roy, Islam and Resistance (Cambridge University Press, 1990) 95-97.  
5 Alexander Alexiev, ‘Inside the Soviet Army in Afghanistan’ (Report, The RAND Corporation, May 1988) 
21. 
6 Jeri Laber and Barnett Rubin, ‘Tears, Blood, and Cries: Human Rights in Afghanistan Since the Invasion, 
1979–1984’ (Report, Helsinki Watch, December 1984), 26-29. 
7 Ibid, 130. 
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The Soviet Union withdrew its occupying force from Afghanistan in 1989, leaving in 
place its ally, Dr. Mohammad Najibullah Ahmadzai, as President. Under President 
Najibullah, arrests of dissidents and the bombing of resistance strongholds in the 
countryside decreased, but did not stop. In an attempt to shore up his power base, he 
expanded the mujahedin forces that were active in Afghanistan, and allowed them to 
operate with virtual autonomy throughout the countryside. 8  By 1991, when Soviet 
financial assistance to President Najibullah’s government ended, the mujahedin leaders 
had become de facto authorities in the areas they operated, undermining the authority of 
the central government.9  
 
In April 1992, the Najibullah government collapsed, and Kabul became engulfed in civil 
war between the different mujahedin factions. This period of mujahedin fighting was to 
last four years, during which time all major factions engaged in widespread atrocities 
against civilians. Conflict between different mujahedin parties led to Kabul being 
bombarded with rockets and shelling, causing the deaths of at least 50 000 civilians. 
During this period, mass rape also emerged as a tactic of conflict.10 Despite this violence, 
the end of the Soviet occupation triggered large-scale refugee repatriation, and in 1992 
alone approximately 1.57 million Afghan refugees returned to Afghanistan from Pakistan 
and Iran.11  
 
The period of anarchy caused by mujahedin fighting provided the opportunity for military 
intervention by a group known as the Taliban. In 1994 the Taliban entered Afghanistan, 
taking control of Kabul by September 1996 and capturing most of the remainder of 
Afghanistan by late 2001. During its time in power the Taliban was responsible for 
                                                        
8 Patricia Gossman and Sari Kouvo, above n 2, 8. 
9  Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 UNHCR, ‘UNHCR Afghan Refugee Statistics’ (Report, UNHCR 10 September 2001.)  
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indiscriminate shelling, massacres of local civilians who opposed its rule, the destruction 
of rural areas, rendering them uninhabitable, and the imposition of repressive restrictions 
on women and girls.12  
 
The final phase of conflict, which continues until the present day, began in October 2001. 
Following the terrorist attacks upon the US on 11 September 2001, US President George 
W. Bush demanded that the Taliban hand over Osama bin Laden, who had claimed 
responsibility for the attacks. The Taliban asked bin Laden to leave the country, but 
declined to extradite him without evidence of his involvement in those attacks. As a 
result, on 1 October 2001, President Bush announced that the US would carry out military 
action against Afghanistan. Military attacks commenced on 7 October 2001. The 
immediate result was the collapse of the Taliban regime and its retreat from Kabul and 
other urban centres. However, the Taliban continued to wage an active insurgency that 
persists today. Throughout this period, violations of human rights took place with 
regularity, with the Taliban, Afghan intelligence and military services, militia groups and 
US forces perpetrating, to different degrees, arbitrary arrests, deaths in custody, torture 
and summary executions.13 
 
On 27 November 2001, the UN opened talks in Bonn, Germany, aimed at reconstituting 
the state of Afghanistan. Four Afghan parties took part in the negotiations in Bonn. This 
included one Afghan-based group, known as the Northern Alliance, a Rome-based 
delegation of the former King Zahir Shah, a Cyprus grouping of exiled intellectuals 
supported by Iran, and a Pakistan-based group, which had its base among the Pashtun 
refugees living in Peshawar. 14  On 5 December 2001, the four parties signed the 
                                                        
12 Patricia Gossman and Sari Kouvo, above n 2, 9. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Barnett Rubin, ‘Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistan’ (2004) 15(3) Journal of Democracy 5, 6. 
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‘Agreement on Provisional Arrangement in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of 
Permanent Government Institutions,’ known as the Bonn Agreement. It stated that the 
goal of the transition was to ‘end the tragic conflict in Afghanistan,’ and create a ‘political 
future in accordance with the principles of Islam, democracy, pluralism and social 
justice.’ 15  The Bonn Agreement also provided for an Interim Authority to govern 
Afghanistan,16 headed by Hamid Karzai.  
 
Decades of conflict have destroyed much of Afghanistan’s infrastructure and resources, 
as well as the economy. As at 2014, the World Bank estimates that Afghanistan had a per 
capita GDP of approximately USD1946, ranking it 160 of the 185 countries in its ranking 
system.17 Other indicators suggest an even bleaker reality for Afghans: 36 per cent of the 
population lives below the poverty line, and unemployment is at 35 per cent,18 and the 
average life expectancy of an Afghan citizen is 59 years.19 Corruption and ethnic tensions 
remain high. Conflict is still active, with the main reported drivers of conflict or insecurity 
assessed as poor governance, corruption and predatory officials. 20  According to 
UNHCR’s most recent statistics, as at 31 December 2014 there were approximately 1.5 
million Afghan refugees resident in Pakistan, and almost 1 million Afghan refugees 
resident in Iran.21 
 
  
                                                        
15 Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent 
Government Institutions, UN Doc S/2001/1154 (5 December 2001) Preamble. 
16 Ibid, Annex 4.  
17 The World Bank, GDP Per Capita < http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD>. 
18 The World Bank, Data, Afghanistan <http://data.worldbank.org/country/afghanistan> 
19  The World Bank, Life Expectancy At Birth  
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.MA.IN> 
20 Paul Fishstein and Andrew Wilder, ‘Winning Hearts and Minds: Examining the Relationship Between 
Aid and Security in Afghanistan’ (Report, Feinstein International Center, January 2012), 2. 
21 UNHCR, UNHCR Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2014 (UNHCR, 18 June 2015) 12. 
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6.3 Refugees and ‘Dealing With The Past’  
 
The history of conflict in Afghanistan, as well as the country’s recovery from that conflict, 
is in large part a story about migration and refugees. Migration has long been, and 
continues to be, an integral part of the Afghan social and cultural landscape. Scholars 
have identified a wide range of causes to explain the extremely high rates of Afghan 
migration, including seasonal movements, coping strategies during instability, state 
failure, medical need, economic necessity and war. 22  Although the motivation for 
migration varies, three decades of conflict in Afghanistan did dramatically increase 
movements within and out of the country. The highest period of migration was during the 
1980s, when approximately 6.2 million Afghan nationals fled to neighbouring countries, 
out of a pre-war population of barely 13 million.23 
 
Refugees have been implicated in each phase of the conflict in Afghanistan. Following 
the communist coup in 1973, about 1000 politically radical Afghan refugees, who had 
established links with the Muslim Brotherhood, fled the coup for Pakistan. The Pakistani 
government welcomed them, seeking a potential asset against what they deemed a 
troublesome neighbour in Afghanistan.24 The group was still in Pakistan in the 1980’s, 
when the Soviet invasion led to the displacement of millions of Afghans to Pakistan. 
Resistance to the Soviet occupation quickly arose amongst the refugee population in 
Pakistan, and by 1980, over twenty resistance parties were active in Peshawar and Quetta. 
The Pakistani government recognised seven of these, each of which consisted of a 
political party with an associated armed militia. These seven groups, and specifically their 
                                                        
22 Alessandro Monsutti, ‘Afghan Migratory Strategies and the Three Solutions to the Refugee Problem’ 
(2008) 27(1) Refugee Survey Quarterly 58, 60. 
23 Rupert Colville, ‘The Biggest Caseload in the World’ (1997) 108 Refugees 3, 3. 
24 Oliver Roy, above n 4, 74-79. 
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leaders, became known as the mujahedin.25 
 
In order to counter the Soviet occupation, the US provided assistance to the mujahedin 
resistance groups resident in Pakistan through the form of ‘refugee relief,’ consisting of 
aid, weapons and training.26 Thirty million dollars was allocated to the mujahedin in 
1980, and by this sum grew to 630 million by 1987.27 Funds from Saudi Arabic to the 
Afghan resistance closely matched those given by the US, such that, by the late 1980s, 
combined aid from the US and Saudi Arabia had reached about one billion dollars a 
year.28 In order to maximise its influence over this international assistance, the Pakistani 
government required refugees to live in designated camps, each of which was controlled 
by one of the seven mujahedin political parties. For their part, each of the parties tried to 
register as many members among the refugees as possible, to increase their power and 
their basis of negotiation for more supplies from the Pakistani authorities and the Western 
powers, 29  thus turning camp structures into important tools of influence over the 
refugees.30  
 
Not only did the refugee camps in Pakistan produce the mujahedin parties, but they also 
provided an environment in which the Taliban could develop and grow. Throughout the 
1980s and early 1990s, many Afghan refugees living in camps in Pakistan attended the 
Islamic-run madrassah education system, which allegedly received financial backing 
from Saudi Arabia. Some of these refugee-scholars became radicalised and formed the 
                                                        
25 Sarah Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian 
Aid (Cornell University Press, 2005) 51. 
26 Stephen Castles and Mark Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the 
Modern World (Macmillan, 1998) 158. 
27 Barnett Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International 
System (Yale University Press, 1995) 180. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Fiona Terry, Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action (Cornell University Press, 
2006) 67. 
30 Rudiger Schoch, ‘Afghan Refugees in Pakistan During the 1980s: Cold War Politics and Registration 
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fundamentalist Taliban movement.31 The Pakistani government played a pivotal role in 
the emergence of the Taliban, providing its support and access to sanctuary.32 Even after 
the American military intervention, post-2001 Taliban mobilisation was firmly grounded 
in communities of refugees living in Pakistan.33 
 
As a result of these experiences in the camps in Pakistan, Afghan refugees have become 
known as the archetypal ‘refugee warriors.’34 Refugee warriors are those who possess a 
political leadership structure and armed sections engaged in warfare for a political 
objective, be it to recapture the homeland, change the regime, or secure a separate state.35 
Refugee warriors subvert traditional accounts of refugees as non-political.36 At the same 
time, their use of violent political agency usually causes them to be either not classified, 
or declassified, as refugees by UNHCR and other organisations.37 The refugee warrior is 
a confusing concept because it eschews the division between refugee and activist and 
confers upon the refugee warrior community a bimodal status as both victim and 
perpetrator.38  
 
The host state is a key actor in the creation and continuation of the idea of the refugee 
warrior. In order to exist, refugee warrior communities require sanctuary in a 
neighbouring country permitting military operations from its territory. With a sanctuary 
for the warriors and relief assistance for refugees, refugee-warrior communities can 
develop.39 In the case of Afghan refugees, both conditions were fulfilled by Pakistan 
                                                        
31 Sarah Lischer, above n 25, 72. 
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35 Ibid. 
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37 Howard Adelman, ‘Why Refugee Warriors are Threats’ (1998) 18(1) Journal of Conflict Studies 1, 2. 
38 Peter Nyers, above n 36, 99.  
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throughout the 1990s. The relationship between refugee warriors and the host state is not 
always positive, however, since hosting refugee warrior communities is a political act, 
and one which may have serious repercussions for the inter-state relations between the 
host and sending governments. As a result, host states may be reluctant to facilitate 
refugee political expression, due to the perceived link with militarisation and the 
emergence of refugee warrior factions.40 
 
Refugees in Iran historically have been less connected to the conflict in Afghanistan than 
refugees in Pakistan. Less than 10 per cent of Afghan refugees living in Iran resided in 
refugee camps, having been given the option to live amongst the local Iranian population. 
This meant that they were more difficult to identify and engage in political activities.41 
Refugees in Iran received considerably lower levels of aid: between 1979 and 1997, 
refugees in Iran received only USD150 million in aid, as opposed to the billions provided 
to refugees in Pakistan, in part because Iran did not allow humanitarian aid programs 
except for those provided directly by the UN.42 
 
Since Afghanistan’s conflict forced such a large percentage of the country’s population 
to seek safety abroad, the repatriation of those refugees became an essential factor in the 
country’s recovery from conflict. After the American-led invasion of 2001, there was 
cautious optimism among the international community that the collapse of the Taliban 
would trigger mass refugee repatriation, due to the anticipated peace. The initial scale of 
refugee return appeared to justify this optimism, with more than four million refugees 
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returning to Afghanistan between 2001 and 2005. A report by the US Congressional 
Research Service to the 110th Congress summed up the feeling of the international 
community, stating that:  
 
The safe and voluntary return of refugees to Afghanistan is not only a major part 
of the US reconstruction effort in Afghanistan, but also an important indicator of 
its success. To the extent that refugees continue to return, it can be seen that 
Afghans are taking part in the future of their country.43  
 
The Afghan government supported this narrative, and in June 2002 the Government 
issued a Decree on Dignified Return, which stated that the Government of Afghanistan 
‘warmly welcomes Afghan nationals who were compelled to leave the country and 
assures them of non-discrimination, freedom from persecution and protection by the 
state.’44 In addition, asylum countries in the West began pushing for the return of Afghan 
refugees from their territory, on the basis that the grounds for refugee status no longer 
existed.45  
 
However, significant questions have been raised about the voluntary nature of refugee 
repatriation. Scholars have argued that the need to legitimise the military intervention, 
the subsequent peace process and the fledgling Afghan government outweighed more 
careful considerations of the feasibility of return.46 Moreover, return from neighbouring 
Pakistan and Iran often took place in less than ideal conditions. Both Pakistan and Iran 
went through periods of relative openness to Afghan refugees when it was domestically 
expedient to do so, but both subsequently turned on their refugee populations as social 
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opinion towards refugees soured and the political landscape therefore changed.47 This is 
demonstrated most clearly by the changing social and linguistic articulation of the Afghan 
in Pakistan and Iran, which, between 1979 and 2009, transformed from ‘refugee’ to 
‘migrant,’ and finally to ‘terrorist.’48 Afghan refugees went from being welcomed, to 
being reviled as something to be excised from the national body, blamed for introducing 
a host of ills into society: terrorism, arms proliferation, drugs, environmental degradation, 
polio, high unemployment, and conflict.49 A drop in international assistance for refugees 
compounded the hostility towards refugees, and led to increasing pressure from the 
governments of both Pakistan and Iran towards Afghan refugees to repatriate.50 
 
The imperative to integrate refugees into a national program for reconciliation and 
reparation is underscored by the challenging conditions to which most refugees return. 
Many returned refugees have found it extremely difficult to survive in their home areas, 
and a combination of insecurity, lack of resources and widespread poverty has forced 
many refugees to move to urban areas.51 Largely as the result of refugee return, Kabul 
doubled in size between 2001 and 2010, contributing to widespread inflation, 
homelessness and crime. 52  This, in turn, has damaged the relationship between the 
receiving communities and their returning compatriots. Struggling to cope in 
Afghanistan, a number of former refugees have returned back to their country of asylum 
or became internally displaced.53  
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6.4 Defining the Boundaries of Transitional Justice in Afghanistan  
 
The mainstream account of transitional justice in Afghanistan declares it a failed venture. 
This section seeks to understand this claim. Rather than focusing on how or why 
mechanisms for accountability or truth-telling were unsuccessful, I examine which 
mechanisms were included within the ambit of transitional justice, who defined these 
boundaries, and what the boundaries excluded. I aim to bring a more nuanced 
understanding to the state of transitional justice in Afghanistan, and the role of ordinary 
Afghans – and particularly Afghan refugees – played in determining what the field entails.   
 
The 2001 Bonn Agreement provided a clear moment to address Afghanistan’s history of 
conflict through transitional justice. The Agreement itself claimed that the goal of the 
transition was to ‘promote national reconciliation, lasting peace, stability and respect for 
human rights in the country.’54 This language suggested that the new government was 
positioned – or perhaps even obligated – to take steps to deal with the decades of 
violations committed against citizens. However, in practice, this did not materialise.  
 
Scholars generally understand the government’s failure to address the history of conflict 
through a framework of ‘peace versus justice.’ At the time of the Bonn Agreement, the 
international community was foremost concerned with establishing a secure, pro-Western 
state. As a result, it turned a blind eye to the presence of former mujahedin leaders, many 
of whom had committed gross violations of human rights during the previous conflict, on 
the basis that their support was important to US efforts to eliminate Al Qaeda.55 The result 
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that mujahedin leaders were ‘lionized after Bonn, made into heroes…Nothing was done 
to punish them for past atrocities.’ 56  President Karzai summed up the widely held 
conviction that accountability and stability were incompatible by explaining that: ‘Justice 
becomes a luxury for now. We must not lose peace for that.’57 Civil society did little to 
dispute this position, with Special Advisor to the UN, Barnett Rubin, recalling that during 
negotiations for the Bonn Agreement, not one major human rights organisation called for 
the establishment of a tribunal to try war criminals. It appeared that all organisations 
‘accept that the situation is too complex and currently too fragile for such measures.’58 
 
The failure of transitional justice, then, is both attributed to, and understood from the 
perspective of, the state. The aim of those negotiating the Bonn Agreement was to create 
external security, with little regard to the question of domestic legitimacy. 59  The 
understanding of transitional justice reflects this bias, with scholars confining their 
discussions to the Afghan government’s failure to implement the visible markers 
recognised by the international community as mechanisms of accountability and truth-
telling, such as criminal trials or a truth commission. There is little scholarship discussing 
grassroots reconciliation activities, for instance, or ways that ordinary Afghans engaged 
in truth-telling or reparative action outside of a state-sanctioned forum.  
 
The 2001 Bonn Agreement set out a ‘Roadmap’ concerning how the Interim Authority, 
headed by President Karzai, was to reestablish permanent institutions of government. The 
first step in the Roadmap required the Interim Authority to hold an Emergency Loya Jirga 
within six months. The Jirga tradition, understood through its roots as a Pashto practice, 
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is about solving a problem through the direct participation of parties on different sides of 
a conflict, and then restoring relationships among those parties through reparation and 
reconciliation.60 A Loya Jirga is a particular type of Jirga, one that operates at the national 
level and is chaired by the Head of State. It comprises a national assembly of Afghan 
tribal leaders, elders, and elected representatives, called in order to discuss an issue vital 
to the nation, and to reach a collective decision.61 
 
The Emergency Loya Jirga was mandated to establish a Transitional Authority that would 
lead Afghanistan until the Afghan people elected a representative government. It was 
responsible for electing a Head of State for the Transitional Administration and approving 
the structure for and key personnel of the Transitional Administration.62 In theory, then, 
it should have provided a way for the Afghan people to choose their new leaders in a 
representative manner. Moreover, it could have provided a way to implement a 
conventional process associated with transitional justice: the vetting of war criminals.  
 
In reality, however, the Emergency Loya Jirga was significantly undermined by the 
presence of warlords. Officially, those who had been involved in the abuse of human 
rights and war crimes were banned from attending.63 However, numerous mujahedin 
leaders coerced their constituencies into electing them as representatives, and the 
Government was unable to enforce the eligibility standards that would have disqualified 
them from participating.64 In addition, shortly before the start of official proceedings, the 
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Emergency Loya Jirga Commission granted an additional fifty seats specifically to 
mujahedin leaders, outside the standard election procedures.65  
 
The inclusion of mujahedin leaders in the Emergency Loya Jirga had far-reaching 
implications for transitional justice. Firstly, it allowed the mujahedin leaders to claim the 
political legitimisation of the international community.66 Secondly, it institutionalised the 
presence of former war criminals in the new government, thus undermining attempts at 
vetting or institutional reform. Several mujahedin leaders known for their involvement in 
war crimes and other violent acts received cabinet posts in the Transitional 
Administration appointed through the Loya Jirga process.67 These mujahedin leaders 
were then able to select their own people for senior positions within the municipality and 
police at the provincial and local levels.68  
 
While the co-optation of mujahedin leaders through offers of cabinet positions or other 
government appointments replaced the outright violence of previous periods, the 
avoidance of violence also meant forgoing any discussion of accountability for the 
human-rights violations that took place during the civil war.69 This demonstrated the 
ongoing conviction of the Afghan government and international community that 
accountability of war criminals constituted a threat to national security, rather than a 
necessary component of dealing with insecurity.70 The Special Representative of the 
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Secretary General of the United Nations, Lakhdar Brahimi, for instance, asserted that the 
inclusion of the unelected mujahedin leaders had been necessary in order for ‘peace’ to 
be able to take precedence over ‘justice.’71  
 
Notwithstanding the value of this critique, it demonstrates the narrow view taken by 
scholars concerning the boundaries of transitional justice. Scholars interpret its impact 
solely in terms of a failure to achieve criminal accountability or to adequately vet future 
government officials. However, by focusing only on the visible instances of transitional 
justice (and, by corollary, their absences) scholars obscure the less obvious ways that the 
government and society have engaged with issues of justice, accountability and 
reparation. This includes, for instance, different aspects of institutional reform, as well as 
community engagement with the discourse and ideas of transitional justice. 
 
6.5 Beyond Peace Versus Justice  
 
 The government of Afghanistan took a limited number of steps to address the country’s 
past history of violence and human rights abuse. The 2001 Bonn Agreement created three 
institutions to oversee legal reform: the Constitution Commission, the Judicial Reform 
Commission, and the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC).72 The 
Bonn Agreement mandated the AIHRC to investigate human rights violations throughout 
Afghanistan, and develop a national strategy for transitional justice.73 Subsequently, the 
AIHRC declared that it would pursue its mandate by investigating, recording and 
publishing the ‘truth’ about Afghanistan’s history of conflict, and by pursuing 
                                                        
71 Lucy Morgan Edwards, ‘State-building in Afghanistan: A Case Showing the Limits?’ (2010) 92(880) 
International Review of the Red Cross 1, 11.  
72 Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent 
Government Institutions, UN Doc S/2001/1154 (5 December 2001) arts I(6), II(2), III(C)(6). 
73 Ibid, section 3C(6). 
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accountability for past crimes in accordance with international law, Islamic principles and 
Afghan tradition.74  
 
In March 2002, a Presidential decree mandated the AIHRC to undertake national 
consultations concerning popular attitudes towards accountability and reconciliation, and 
propose a national strategy for ‘transitional justice and for addressing the abuses of the 
past.’75 The AIHRC’s mandate covered only those violations taking place from 1979 until 
2001, which means that it could not undertake investigations or discussion of abuse or 
violence taking place during the US-led intervention. Nonetheless, from January 2004 
until August 2004, the AIHRC carried out consultations with Afghans in 32 of 
Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, as well as with refugee populations living in Pakistan and 
Iran. The AIHRC published the results of its public consultations in a report, A Call For 
Justice. This report demonstrated a range of views held by Afghans that extended beyond 
the peace versus justice dichotomy expressed by political leaders.   
 
Community consultations for A Call For Justice followed a two-step process. First, the 
AIHRC distributed a survey in order to capture quantitative data and test for preferences 
with respect to transitional justice. 4,151 surveys were completed, of which 
approximately 10 per cent came from the refugee populations in Pakistan and Iran. 
Secondly, the AIHRC convened a series of focus group discussions in order to capture 
qualitative data, and test for perceptions of transitional justice. It held over 200 focus 
groups with over 2,000 participants,76 including some 400 Afghan refugees in Pakistan, 
                                                        
74 Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, Peace, Reconciliation and Justice in Afghanistan: 
Action Plan of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Afghanistan Independent Human 
Rights Commission, 2005) 7, 10. 
75 Decree of 2002 of the Presidency of the Interim Administration of Afghanistan on the Establishment of 
an Afghan Indpendent Human Rights Commission (6 June 2002).  
76 Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, A Call for Justice: A National Consultation on 
Past Human Rights Abuses in Afghanistan (Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, 2005) 5. 
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resident in Pesahwar and Quetta, and some 330 refugees in Iran, resident in Mashad and 
Tehran.77 Throughout the consultation process, the AIHRC made no distinction between 
displaced and non-displaced Afghan nationals, using exactly the same survey form and 
focus group discussion format for both the domiciled and displaced populations. 
 
A Call For Justice demonstrated that most Afghans consider that reconciliation and 
justice are interconnected. The majority of Afghans indicated that they are victims of 
human rights violations or war crimes, and that they expect perpetrators to be prosecuted 
or removed from power. 78  Contrary to the beliefs of many policymakers, an 
overwhelming 79.1 per cent of the Afghan population felt that by bringing war criminals 
to justice, security would be substantially improved. Only 10 per cent felt that stability 
and security would decrease as a result.79 The desire for criminal justice outweighed all 
other transitional justice options, with almost 40 per cent of all respondents suggesting 
that criminal prosecution was an integral part of justice,80 and 85 per cent asserting that a 
judicial process would help reconciliation. These views stand in sharp contrast to those 
of the political leaders of the new government and broader international community, who 
consistently asserted that peace and justice were incompatible.  
 
A Call For Justice produced few findings specific to displacement. This is despite the fact 
that the scale of conflict-related displacement in Afghanistan is extremely high: more 
Afghans have lived as refugees than any other population in the world’s recent history.81 
A Call For Justice recognises the scale of displacement in its introduction, noting that, 
due to conflict, more then seven million Afghans were forced to leave their villages and 
                                                        
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid, 8, 18. 
79 Ibid, 17. 
80 Ibid, 18.  
81 Daniel Kronenfeld, ‘Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Not All Refugees, Not Always in Pakistan, Not 
Necessarily Afghan?’ (2008) 21(1) Journal of Refugee Studies 43, 57.  
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towns and take refuge in Iran and Pakistan due to conflict.82 Moreover, displacement is 
listed as the fourth most reported violation experienced by Afghans during the mandated 
period. However, there is no description of the lived experience of displacement, or any 
discussion of the violations refugees experienced while in asylum. One reason for this 
shortcoming was that the AIHRC incorporated refugees as if they were part of the non-
displaced population. That is, the report categorises domiciled Afghans by province of 
residence, and then adds two additional places of residence: Pakistan and Iran. In this 
way, it as if Pakistan and Iran are simply two additional provinces of Afghanistan.  
 
One clear finding to come out of A Call for Justice is that it is not possible to make 
generalisations concerning ‘refugee views on transitional justice.’ There are almost no 
consistencies between the views of refugees resident in Pakistan, and those resident in 
Iran. Instead, on almost every issue, the two refugee populations hold divergent views 
that sometimes align with those of non-displaced Afghan nationals, and sometimes do 
not. Equally, there is little consistency between the province of origin of Afghan refugees, 
and their views on transitional justice. For instance, most Afghans resident in Eastern 
Afghanistan fled to Pakistan. However, the findings of A Call for Justice show that 
Afghan refugees living in Pakistan do not hold views that are consistent with Afghans 
living in Eastern Afghanistan. This highlights the multi-faceted and complex views held 
by refugee populations towards transitional justice, and the danger in making 
generalisations regarding how refugees wish to engage with, and what they hope to obtain 
from, transitional justice mechanisms.  
 
A Call For Justice also suggests that the experience of asylum has a tangible affect on 
refugee views towards transitional justice. The experience of asylum was markedly 
                                                        
82 Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, above n 76, 4.  
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different for refugees living in Pakistan versus those living in Iran. In the 1980s, refugee 
camps in Pakistan were active grounds for the development of mujahedin forces, 
supported by Pakistan, the US and Saudi Arabia.83 This was in sharp contrast to Iran, 
where refugees were largely integrated into Iranian communities, received little 
international attention and did not become militarised. These different experiences are 
reflected in refugee perceptions of the conflict documented in A Call For Justice. The 
majority of Afghan refugees residing in Pakistan believed that other countries were 
responsible for war in Afghanistan, a perspective that aligns with the highly politicised 
refugee context in that country of asylum.84 Refugees in Iran, by contrast, were much less 
likely to characterise the decades of conflict as an imported war, with 60 per cent of 
Afghan refugees suggesting the conflict resembled a civil war.  
 
Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran also held noticeably different views about 
accountability and reconciliation. Afghan refugees residing in Iran showed a higher 
preference than the national average towards punishing former war criminal,85 while 
Afghan refugees residing in Pakistan showed a higher than average support for 
amnesties.86 AIHRC did not explore the reasons for these discrepancies. However, it 
seems plausible that the presence and influence of mujahedin parties and fighters 
amoungst the refugee community in Pakistan – but not Iran – may account for the 
difference in opinion towards accountability. In terms of reparations, too, Afghan 
refugees in Pakistan and Iran held markedly different views. Refugees living in Pakistan 
were against reparations for those who had been victims of war crimes at a much higher 
                                                        
83 Peter Nyers, above n 36, 101.  
84 Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, above n 76, 13. 
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rate than the national average, 87  while refugees in Iran were heavily in favour of 
reparations for victims, at more than twice the national average.88  
 
After publishing A Call To Justice, the AIHRC, together with the UN and the government 
of Afghanistan, drafted an Action Plan to implement its recommendations concerning 
transitional justice processes.89 Despite the high level of support for accountability, the 
Action Plan did not specify that the government pursue prosecution as a strategy for 
accountability. Instead, the AIHRC recommended five key actions, including that the 
Afghan government acknowledge the suffering of the Afghan people; ensure credible and 
accountable state institutions; undertake truth seeking and documentation; promote 
reconciliation and the improvement of national unity; and establish effective and 
reasonable accountability mechanisms.90 
 
The Action Plan received a mixed response from the Afghan government. In December 
2005, it went before Cabinet, which approved with relative ease the measures for 
acknowledging the suffering of victims, truth seeking and institutional reform, but nearly 
rejected the plan’s emphasis on accountability.91 Subsequently, and despite the formal 
acceptance of the Action Plan by Cabinet, the Government has taken virtually no steps to 
implement any of its recommendations. Cabinet approved the Action Plan for only four 
years, and since its expiration in 2009, it has not been resurrected. A further blow to the 
goals of transitional justice came in March 2007, when the Afghan Parliament adopted 
the National Reconciliation, General Amnesty and National Stability Law, which 
                                                        
87  Ibid, 3. Respondents from three provinces (Jawzjan, Faryab and Helmand) also answered at a 
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provided a broad amnesty, without any reciprocal obligations, for those who have 
committed war crimes or crimes against humanity. The Amnesty became law with its 
publication in the Official Gazette in December 2008, bringing an end to the possibility 
of legal accountability for war criminals within the Afghan legal system. 
 
The Action Plan begins with a discussion of the category of transitional justice.92 It 
explains that the term ‘transitional justice’ is often misunderstood as addressing only 
questions of criminal responsibility, and clarifies that, in fact, transitional justice 
encompasses a much broader range of measures that extends beyond the ideas of ‘the 
court, prison and revenge.’93 The Action Plan asserts that the aim of transitional justice 
in Afghanistan is ‘to realise peace and national reconciliation, restore co-existence and 
co-operation, heal the wounds and pains of victims, and reintegrate citizens peacefully 
into society.’94 On the one hand, drawing attention away from criminal prosecution suited 
the Afghan government’s decisions to prioritise ‘peace over justice,’ and its failure to 
enact measures of accountability for former mujahedin leaders. However, at the same 
time, this description of transitional justice raises a question around the boundaries of 
transitional justice, and who defines those boundaries. 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
Theoretically, transitional justice encompasses all judicial and non-judicial measures 
aimed at redressing a past legacy of human rights violations.95 However, there are certain 
measures that transitional justice routinely recognises, and others it does not. The 
                                                        
92 Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, above n 76, 2. 
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95 U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies, 
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emphasis within both scholarship and practice falls upon the highly visible mechanisms 
of criminal prosecutions, truth commissions and reparations programs. On the other hand, 
very little attention is given to the reform of institutions, particularly when those 
institutions are not directly related to security or justice. It is also rare for scholars to 
consider ways of repairing past damage that do not involve financial or material 
compensation. 
 
In making their assessments of transitional justice in Afghanistan, scholars and 
practitioners focused on its most visible, institutionalised embodiment. This meant that 
they directed their attention to the lack of criminal accountability, the failure to establish 
a truth commission or other investigative machinery, and the Government’s abandonment 
of the Action Plan. As a result, they assess transitional justice as an almost complete 
failure. What each of these mechanisms had in common is that they were all state-driven 
processes. By focusing on these mechanisms, then, scholars suggested that the state is the 
actor primarily responsible for defining what constitutes transitional justice. Moreover, 
the success or failure of transitional justice is placed in the hands of the state, since it is 
only by the state’s own actions that a recognised mechanism, and thus a recognised 
practice of transitional justice, can materialise.  
 
There is a growing call from critical scholars to question the boundaries of transitional 
justice, and who defines those boundaries. Sharp, for instance, argues that transitional 
justice needs to democratise and pluralise its approaches, beginning with a ‘rigorous 
interrogation of those items traditionally placed at the periphery of mainstream 
transitional justice concern.’96 Gready and Robins, also, advocate for a more holistic 
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approach to transitional justice, one which seeks to understand the broader justice 
priorities among the target population, and which extends to include societal and social 
responses.97 This suggests that it is not sufficient to limit concept of transitional justice to 
the standard mechanisms of criminal trials, truth commissions and reparations. Instead, 
there are also rich expressions of transitional justice principles to be found in local, 
traditional or simply non-conventional social practices.  
 
The need to expand the boundaries of transitional justice is even more essential if we are 
to seek and recognise refugee voices. One significant constraint I faced in doing so in my 
thesis was my inability to interview Afghan refugees directly. However, while my 
position as a UNHCR Protection Officer prevented me from engaging with refugees 
directly as a PhD student, it did provide me with regular contact with Afghan refugee 
representatives, and exposure to their advocacy strategies and priorities. Through this 
contact, I came to understand the importance of mechanisms such as the Loya Jirga, out-
of-country voting, and the National Solidarity Program to the Afghan refugee community. 
The following two chapters attempt to discover and understand refugee perspectives on 
transitional justice by examining these mechanisms. Although this approach is in no way 
a substitute for the direct inclusion of Afghan voices, it aims to expand the boundaries of 
transitional justice and open up spaces that might align more closely with the justice 
preferences of refugees.   
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CHAPTER 7: DRAFTING A NEW CONSTITUTION IN AFGHANISTAN 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter aims understand how Afghan refugees used forums other than those 
conventionally associated with transitional justice to repair the harm they had suffered as 
a result of the conflict. It considers a mechanism on the fringe of conventional practice: 
that of drafting a constitution. Scholarship concerning the process of drafting a 
constitution during a political transition is most commonly located within the broader 
rubric of state-building, or peace-building. However, there is a small body of work 
acknowledging that a constitution and the process of its drafting can, in certain 
circumstances, function as a mechanism of transitional justice. This chapter discusses 
what those circumstances might be, whether they existed in Afghanistan, and how 
refugees responded to them. It also considers whether there are other, alternate ways that 
a constitution and its drafting might further the objectives ordinarily associated with 
transitional justice.  
 
For Afghanistan, drafting a constitution was not a straightforward venture. By the time 
of the 2001 Bonn Agreement, Afghanistan had five previous constitutions, each of which 
had failed to take hold due to a combined lack of state enforcement and domestic 
legitimacy.1 Nonetheless, the drafters of the Bonn Agreement remained optimistic, and 
envisioned that the constitution, coupled with elections, might slowly draw sovereign 
authority back to the government and people, and diminish the rule of the gun.2 Further 
complicating the drafting process was the continued exile of some 2 million Afghan 
                                                        
1  International Crisis Group, ‘Afghanistan: The Constitutional Loya Jirga’ (Afghanistan Briefing, 
International Crisis Group, 12 December 2003) 10. 
2 J. Alexander Thier, ‘The Making of a Constitution in Afghanistan’ (2006/2007) 51 New York Law School 
Law Review 558, 559.  
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refugees, resident mainly in neighbouring Pakistan and Iran. 3  Although the Bonn 
Agreement did not require it, the Transitional Government took steps to ensure that 
refugees living in Pakistan and Iran were able to participate in the process of drafting the 
constitution, incorporating them into the pre-drafting consultations as well as the 
Constitutional Loya Jirga.  
 
This chapter examines refugee involvement in the constitution drafting process. It begins 
by considering how refugee involvement in drafting a constitution can contribute to the 
aims of transitional justice. It argues that by employing an inclusive drafting process, 
incorporating substantive provisions to protect refugee rights, and constructing refugees 
as equal citizens, a constitution can support the objectives of transitional justice. It 
considers the two dominant models of citizenship: liberal, and civic republican, and how 
each conception frames the interaction between state and citizens. Rather than advocating 
one model of citizenship over the other, the chapter aims to understand the different way 
each model interprets and values the process of drafting a constitution.  
 
The chapter then applies this framework to the ways in which the Afghan government 
engaged refugees in the drafting of the 2004 Constitution. It analyses the inclusivity of 
the process, the way that it constructed citizenship, and whether the substantive provisions 
of the Constitution contributed to the protection of refugee rights. Overall, it concludes 
that the constitution and its drafting did contribute to the objectives of transitional justice, 
including in some unexpected ways.  
 
 
 
                                                        
3 Field Information and Coordination Support Centre, UNHCR Global Refugee Trends 2005 (UNHCR, 9 
June 2006) 2. 
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7.2 Addressing the Past through a National Constitution  
 
During a period of political transition, a national constitution and the mechanisms of 
transitional justice provide alternate techniques for a new government to symbolise a 
break with its discredited past, and a commitment to govern without abuse or 
discrimination. They do this in different ways. Typically, the process of drafting a 
constitution is expected to develop a document that creates the foundation of the state, by 
developing a framework for governance.4 As such, the emphasis is usually on developing 
the rule of law, and establishing strong institutions that will uphold the principles of good 
governance.5 Transitional justice, by contrast, aims to assist a society to come to terms 
with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice 
and achieve reconciliation. 6  This requires the state to look backwards, in order to 
acknowledge the past harms committed against its citizens, and forwards, in order to 
prevent future violations of their rights.7  
 
Constitutions are conventionally thought of as forward-looking documents, responsible 
for establishing founding ideals to govern future behaviour. However, drafting a 
constitution after a period of widespread violence or discrimination can provide the 
impetus for their engagement with the past. Ruti Teitel argues that during a period of 
transition, constitutions become ‘simultaneously backward- and forward-looking’ 
documents that address both past behaviour and future aspirations.8 They need to do this 
in order to establish an ideal foundation for the state that permits the population to ‘put 
                                                        
4 Ruti Teitel, ‘Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation’ (2009) 106 Yale 
Law Journal 2053, 2053. 
5 Lakhdar Brahimi, ‘State Building in Crisis and Post--Conflict Countries’ (Paper presented at 7th Global 
Forum on Reinventing Government, June 26-29 2007) 4. 
6 UN Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies, 
[8], UN Doc. S/2004/616 (2004). 
7 Aeyal Gross, ‘The Constitution, Reconciliation, and Transitional Justice: Lessons from South Africa and 
Israel’ (2004) 40 Stanford Journal of International Law 47, 49. 
8 Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford University Press, 2000) 191. 
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the past behind and move to a brighter future.’9 In transitional justice terms, then, the 
significance of a constitution lies in its ability to address former patterns of discrimination 
and abuse, and put in place guarantees to ensure such violations do not take place again.  
 
The primary way a constitution can pursue the goals of transitional justice is through the 
use of an inclusive drafting process. Without an inclusive process, the voices of victims 
and marginalised citizens – such as refugees – will not have the chance to be heard at all, 
undermining their ability to achieve the justice outcomes they desire. By contrast, if 
victims are empowered with an influential voice in the crafting of remedies aimed at 
meeting their unique needs, then ‘justice choices might be more justice enhancing.’10 For 
refugees, this becomes particularly important when it comes to their return. A 
participatory process of constitution drafting can provide a forum through which refugees 
can engage their state in dialogue concerning questions about governmental and societal 
discrimination, restrictions on freedom of movement, denial of property rights, access to 
justice, and exclusion from governance.11 Such discussions not only contribute to the 
willingness and success of refugee repatriation, but may also contribute to social 
reconciliation by ensuring that refugees communities feel that new rules have emerged 
through a participatory process, rather than being imposed by the main power holders.12 
 
The drafting of a constitution can also support the goals of transitional justice by 
recognising marginalised nationals as citizens. In this context, two of the most common 
ways to frame citizenship are the liberal model and the civic republican model.13 These 
                                                        
9 Ruti Teitel, above n 4, 2056. 
10  John Braithwaite and Ray Nickson, ‘Deeper, Broader, Longer’ (2014) 11 European Journal of 
Criminology 445, 457. 
11  International Refugee Rights Initiative, ‘The Role of Citizenship in Addressing Refugee Crises in 
Africa’s Great Lakes Region’ (Policy Briefing Paper, International Refugee Rights Initiative, June 2014) 
2. 
12 Aeyal Gross, above n 7, 54. 
13 Engin Isin and Bryan Turner, ‘Citizenship Studies: An Introduction’ in Engin Isin and Bryan Turner 
(eds), Handbook of Citizenship Studies (SAGE Publications, 2002) 1, 3-4.  
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two models accentuate the value of different elements of the constitution-drafting 
process. The liberal model, with its emphasis on the formal protection of human rights, 
highlights the importance of a comprehensive legal framework to generating a strong 
state-citizen relationship. As such, the liberal model draws attentions to the substantive 
elements of a constitution, and whether these adequately protect the rights of marginalised 
citizens. By contrast, the republican model is concerned with the ability of citizens to 
participate in the institutions that govern them, and therefore emphasises the process by 
which the constitution comes into being. Under the republican model, then, an inclusive 
drafting process is essential to restoring the state-citizen relationship.  
 
A new constitution offers the opportunity not only to engage marginalised citizens in the 
drafting process, but also to establish citizenship criteria based on, and reflective of, equal 
membership in the polity. 14  This is particularly important for refugees, since 
discriminatory state practices, or discriminatory state protection against abusive practices 
are often responsible for forcing refugees into displacement in the first place. By creating 
a new relationship of rights and duties between the state and its returning citizens, a 
constitution can contribute towards better refugee integration, whereby returned refugees 
are placed on equal footing with their non-displaced compatriots and receive equal, 
effective protection of their human rights, and accountability for any abuses of these 
rights.  
 
One final way that drafting a constitution can pursue the aims of transitional justice is 
through the substantive content of the final document. The process of rewriting a 
constitution provides the opportunity to give constitutional status to the protection of key 
issues such as women’s and men’s equal access to land, property, education, health care, 
                                                        
14 Aeyal Gross, above n 7, 64. 
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work, and politics.15 Potentially, a constitution can pursue the goals of transitional justice 
by formally protecting social and economic rights, and facilitating a more egalitarian 
distribution of resources.16 Moreover, by enacting provisions concerning such rights, the 
drafting process and resulting document can de-legitimise past injustices and draw new 
boundaries for what behavior is permissible.17  
 
7.3 Refugees, the Constitution and the Goals of Transitional Justice  
 
The 2001 Bonn Agreement set out a process of reconstruction, rather than a detailed 
settlement of major political issues. This was an unusual approach to a postwar 
agreement, and reflected the time pressure under which it was forged. 18  The Bonn 
Agreement set out a two-step process for the drafting of a new constitution. The first step 
was for the Constitution Commission to prepare a draft constitution, in consultation with 
the Afghan people, which would then be debated, amended and agreed upon by what 
constituted the second step, a Constitutional Loya Jirga. 19  Both steps involved the 
inclusion of a wide range of marginalised groups, including refugees. This section 
examines the engagement of refugees in light of the synergies with transitional justice 
objectives discussed above.  
 
The language of the Constitution evoked a strong sense of citizenship. Its Preamble 
opened with ‘We the people of Afghanistan,’ followed by an articulation of the 
document’s objective to ‘establish an order based on the peoples’ will and democracy.’20 
                                                        
15 Tsjeard Bouta, Gerg Frerks and Ian Bannon, Gender, Conflict, and Development (The World Bank, 2005) 
77. 
16 Aeyal Gross, above n 7, 91. 
17 Ruti Teitel, above n 4, 2053.  
18 Barnett Rubin, ‘Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistan’ (2004) 15(3) Journal of Democracy 5, 6. 
19 Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent 
Government Institutions, UN Doc S/2001/1154 (5 December 2001) s 1.  
20 The Constitution of Afghanistan 2004 (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) Preamble. 
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The new Afghan government reinforced the national legitimacy of the Constitution 
through its public assertions that the document was agreed upon by delegates 
‘representing Afghan men and women’21 By including refugees in the drafting process, 
then, the government of Afghanistan acknowledged their status as citizens of 
Afghanistan, and equal members in the national polity.  
 
Before examining how, exactly, Afghans were recognised as citizens, it is important to 
note that Afghan refugees were not seeking a collective right to self-governance, or 
recognition from the state of their identity as a stand-alone collective. Unlike some 
refugee populations, Afghan refugees are not characterized by a single, shared ethnic, 
religious or political identity that has caused their state to cut them out of the polity. 
Rather, Afghan refugees fled for a range of different reasons over the last three decades 
of conflict, and their prolonged displacement – and consequent exclusion from the 
national polity – was usually due to a mix of conflict, poverty and the pursuit of 
livelihoods. 22  As a result, they were not seeking constitutional recognition of their 
difference, but rather equal recognition of their rights.  
 
The first step in the constitution-drafting process was public outreach. A Presidential 
decree tasked the Constitution Commission with an assertive program of public education 
and consultation that covered both the domiciled and displaced populations. The 
Commission established teams in eight regions of Afghanistan, as well as in Islamabad, 
Quetta and Peshawar in Pakistan, and Tehran and Mashad in Iran.23 In early 2003, the 
Commission distributed approximately 460 000 questionnaires across Afghanistan, 
                                                        
21 Ibid. 
22  Elca Stigter and Alessandro Monsutti, ‘Transnational Networks: Recognising a Regional Reality’ 
(Briefing Paper, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, April 2005) 2. 
23 The Secretariat of the Constitutional Commission of Afghanistan, The Constitution-Making Process in 
Afghanistan (10 March 2003) 8.  
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Pakistan and Iran, designed to obtain the views of the Afghan population in relation to 
Constitutional reform. An identical questionnaire was used for the domiciled and 
displaced populations, comprised of 33 questions split into ten different themes: religion, 
the rights and duties of the people, system of governance, structure of Parliament, the use 
of the Loya Jirga, the structure of government administration, the judiciary, citizenship, 
and national language. The Secretariat received between 80 000 and 100 000 completed 
questionnaires back, which were then placed in an electronic data system.  
 
After the surveys were completed, the Constitution Commission opened a period of 
public consultations. The Commission spent several months travelling around the 
different refugee communities in Pakistan and Iran. In Pakistan, Commission staff held 
discussion groups in refugee settlements and urban areas in Islamabad, as well as camps 
and urban areas in Peshawar, Quetta and throughout Balochistan and the North-West 
Frontier Province.24 In Iran, Commission staff held discussion groups in twelve major 
Iranian cities where refugee communities lived, as well as in the five main refugee 
camps. 25  In total, approximately 1 500 refugees gave suggestions in person at 
consultation meetings, constituting 10 per cent of the total respondents.26 A range of 
security concerns meant that the teams could not hold meetings that were open to the 
public at large. However, they tried to make the consultations as inclusive as possible by 
targeting a wide demographic, including women, religious leaders, farmers, youth, and 
village elders.27 In order to understand the perspective of refugees they also interviewed 
                                                        
24 South Asia Bureau, ‘Body Formed for New Afghan Constitution’ Dawn News (online) 17 May 2003 
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27 Ibid. 
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staff of the Afghan Embassies and representatives who had attended the 2002 Emergency 
Loya Jirga on behalf of the refugee population.28  
 
The consultation process provided a platform through which Afghan refugees could 
engage in dialogue with their government, as citizens. Refugees appeared to hold high 
levels of interest in participating in this dialogue. The Commission received back many 
more surveys than it had anticipated, particularly in light of the low rate of literacy among 
Afghan refugees.29 For some, there was a sense that the Commission was genuinely 
committed to including refugee voices. Members of the Afghan Teachers Association in 
Pakistan, for instance, noted that the Constitution Commission had consulted them while 
preparing the questionnaire. When the Association provided feedback as to how a number 
of questions should be amended, the Commission accepted their advice and adjusted the 
questions.30  
 
At the same time, dialogue between refugee citizens and their government was impeded 
by a number of factors. The first was the complicated language the Constitution 
Commission employed in its surveys. The AIHRC asserted that the high-level of language 
used in the surveys rendered them ill-designed and inadequate for collecting popular 
input.31  This criticism was reinforced by another civil society group, the ‘Kandahar 
Women’s Law Group,’ which argued that few ordinary Afghans could understanding the 
questions, and fewer still were able to provide the Commission with substantive 
feedback.32 Both the AIHRC and the Kandahar Women’s Law Group complained that 
                                                        
28 UNHCR, ‘Return Information Update: 15-31 July 2003’ (Return Information Update, Issue No. 38, 
UNHCR 1 August 2003) 12. 
29 Ibid, 13. 
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the questionnaire and consultations only discussed vague principles,33 and lacked the 
specificity required to create a definition of the precise duties and responsibilities of the 
various branches of government.34  
 
A second impediment to dialogue between refugee citizens and their government was the 
way that the incumbent government hindered citizenship engagement with the document. 
Although it originally promised to release a copy of the draft constitution in time for the 
public consultations, the Afghan government failed to do this in time, making it difficult 
for Afghan citizens to engage with its provisions.35 Moreover, the feedback the public did 
provide appears to have been discarded by the President and his office. After the 
Constitution Commission finished its public consultations in late July 2003, it spent three 
months incorporating the feedback it received through the questionnaire and public 
consultations into the draft constitution. It submitted the draft constitution to President 
Karzai in late September 2003. After receiving the document, the President and his office 
made extensive textual revisions.36 While the original draft proposed a semi-Presidential 
system, designed to promote ethnic power-sharing, and a constitutional court, designed 
to limit the power of the President, the revised version created a completely centralised 
state with no political or administrative authority devolved to the provinces,37 and a much 
greater concentration of power in the presidency.38 
 
                                                        
33 J. Alexander Thier, ‘Big Tent, Small Tent: The Making of a Constitution in Afghanistan’ in Laurel Miller 
(ed), Framing the State in Times of Transition (United States Institute for Peace, 2010) 535, 546. 
34 Rangina Hamidi and Sarah Chayes, above n 32, 2. 
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France-Presse (online) (7 September 2003) <http://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/afghan-president-
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36 International Crisis Group, above n 1, 2. 
37 J. Alexander Thier, above n 2, 574. 
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The draft’s unchecked concentration of power in the presidency prompted wide criticism 
in Afghanistan from across the political spectrum. 39  Civil society representatives 
complained that many Afghans felt that the views they expressed during the consultations 
held by the Constitution Commission were not taken seriously,40 while scholars argued 
that while the public consultations and Constitutional Loya Jirga gave the illusion of 
inclusivity, in fact the public had no ability to affect the substance of the Constitution.41 
President Karzai only released the draft to the public five weeks before the Constitutional 
Loya Jirga that was mandated to debate and authorise its final form.42 This further limited 
the extent to which the Afghan public was able to engage with its provisions.  
 
The Constitutional Loya Jirga provided the second platform through which Afghan 
refugee citizens could engage in dialogue with their government. The Loya Jirga featured 
prominently in the crafting of each of Afghanistan’s five previous constitutions, in 1923, 
1931, 1964, 1977, and 1987 respectively. In the case of the 2004 constitution, the Afghan 
government framed the Constitutional Loya Jirga as a mechanism to obtain the views of 
the Afghan people, and make decisions in a collective way. It aimed to build consensus 
on vital national issues related to the constitution, and address any controversies that had 
arisen during the public consultations.43 In order to facilitate more intensive dialogue and 
debate, the government took the additional step of breaking the Loya Jirga delegates into 
ten sub-committees, each of which elected a representative to attend the central 
committee where they shared the views of their own sub-committee, debated with other 
representatives, and decided upon the final text of the constitution.  
 
                                                        
39 Ibid, 4. 
40 Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, above n 31, 11. 
41 J. Alexander Thier, above n 33, 546. 
42 International Crisis Group, above n 1, 2. 
43 The Secretariat of the Constitutional Commission of Afghanistan, The Constitution-Making Process in 
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The Afghan government sought the participation of refugee representatives from Pakistan 
and Iran at each of the five Loya Jirga between 2002 and 2014. The first of these, the 
Emergency Loya Jirga, established the formal framework for refugee inclusion. The 
Procedures for the Election of the Members of the Emergency Loya Jirga mandated the 
Special Independent Commission to adopt measures to include refugees and internally 
displaced persons in the Emergency Loya Jirga, and to appoint their own 
representatives.44 This prompted the Special Independent Commission to send two staff 
members to refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran, in order to meet with Afghan refugees. 
During the consultations, which were attended by thousands of refugees, the Special 
Independent Commission explained the process of the Emergency Loya Jirga, and 
established a mechanism for refugees to elect their own representatives.45  
 
For the Constitutional Loya Jirga, a similar process was followed. Refugees in Iran and 
Pakistan elected 24 representatives to attend the Constitutional Loya Jirga,46 15 per cent 
of which were required to be women.47 Again, members of the Constitution Commission 
travelled to refugee communities in Pakistan and Iran to hold elections for refugee 
representatives. In Pakistan, UNHCR assisted the Constitution Commission by providing 
information regarding the distribution of refugees throughout more than 200 camps.48 On 
the basis of population figures provided by UNHCR, the Constitution Commission then 
divided Pakistan into 13 electorates, each of which was to elect one refugee representative 
from within their own community. Of the 13 representatives from Pakistan, seven were 
elected from the North West Frontier Province and Federally Administered Tribal Areas, 
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four from Balochistan, and one each from the provinces of Sind and Punjab. In the end, 
only one position was reserved for a woman, falling well below the mandated 15 per 
cent.49  
 
On 14 December 2003, the Constitutional Loya Jirga opened. It was a much more orderly 
affair than the Emergency Loya Jirga, due to a much lower number of delegates, and an 
emphasis on literacy in the selection process.50 Of the 500 invited delegates, 24 were 
refugees from Iran and Pakistan. The Loya Jirga debated the various provisions of the 
constitution for 37 days. Finally, on 4 January 2004, the Loya Jirga put the constitution 
to the delegates for a vote. In the absence of clear rules of procedure on ratification, the 
Loya Jirga Chairperson asked the delegates to stand if they supported the new 
constitution. Most in the tent stood, and the Chairperson declared the document ratified.51 
President Karzai then signed the constitution into law on 26 January 2004.  
 
Although the Loya Jirga aimed to create dialogue between the state and citizens, it was 
hampered by a number of factors, dominant amongst which was the inclusion of 
mujahedin leaders. While those who were guilty of human rights violations were 
officially barred from becoming delegates, mujahedin leaders managed to retain their 
status as participants through their previous involvement in the Emergency Loya Jirga. 
During the Loya Jirga, mujahedin leaders exerted significant influence over the debates 
and decisions of each sub-committee,52 and other delegates complained that the influence 
exerted by mujahedin leaders prevented them from making their proposals and 
                                                        
49 Bureau correspondent, ‘Displaced Persons to Elect Representatives’ Dawn News (online) 4 November 
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50 J. Alexander Thier, above n 33, 547. 
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52 J. Alexander Thier, above n 33, 547. 
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advocating for their amendments.53 In addition, the American and UN envoys were both 
frequently seen negotiating with former mujahedin leaders in the VIP tents outside of the 
official Loya Jirga. These side negotiations perpetuated the dominance of Afghan politics 
by a few (usually armed) power holders, rather than by a majority of the Afghan 
population, or even a majority of the Constitutional Loya Jirga delegates.54 A widely held 
perspective was that the Loya Jirga is ‘in reality, nothing but going through the motions. 
Everything is dictated, whatever anyone says is of no consequence, and the voice of the 
people is not heard.’55  
 
In practice, then, the Loya Jirga functioned as a tool to bolster the government’s 
legitimacy rather than to generate dialogue between the state and its citizens. This reflects 
a broader historical habit on the part of the Afghan state to use the Loya Jirga as an attempt 
to bridge the perceived gap between ‘state and tribe, between periphery and centre.’56 
Throughout the twentieth century, when the state has found itself unable to resolve 
political or social problems, it has fallen back on the concept of the Loya Jirga in order 
to manufacture the semblance of a nationwide consensus, when no such consensus in fact 
exists.57 Acknowledging the limitations of the Loya Jirga challenges the idea of the Loya 
Jirga as a historical practice aimed at solving a political crisis through public 
engagement.58 
 
The consultation process and Constitutional Loya Jirga generated a level of dialogue 
between the state and refugee citizens. Traveling to the camps in Pakistan and Iran in 
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order to carry out outreach activities in person gave Constitution Commission staff the 
opportunity to see firsthand the conditions in which refugees lived in Pakistan and Iran. 
Concerned that the central office of the Constitution Commission should hear refugee 
voices directly, Commission staff members also recorded some of the discussions and 
sent the recordings to the Commission’s headquarters in Kabul.59 Participants were eager 
to meet with the Commissioners and often traveled great distances to give their views, at 
significant personal risk. In addition, for the first time in 24 years, the Loya Jirga opened 
up a channel of communication between the different segments of Afghan society, and 
provided a forum where the previously silent victims of the conflict were able to express 
themselves.60 Another scholar noted that the consultations exposed the Commissioners 
and other staff of the Constitution Commission, most of whom consisted of the Kabul 
and foreign-based Afghan elite, to the opinions of ordinary Afghans around the country 
and in refugee communities in Pakistan and Iran. Several Commission members 
acknowledged the benefit of these meetings, explaining with surprise that ordinary 
Afghans living in the provinces were more inclined towards accommodation and 
tolerance than were Afghans in elite political circles in Kabul.61 
 
One major factor that constrained dialogue between Afghan refugees and the Afghan 
government was that throughout the constitution-drafting process refugees were treated 
in exactly the same way as non-displaced citizens. In part, this reflected the fact that 
displacement was an incredibly common experience of conflict: up to two-thirds of the 
Afghan population became refugees during the Soviet occupation alone.62 At the same 
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time, in Afghanistan in particular being a refugee does not equate with being a victim, or 
a greater level of vulnerability compared to the rest of the population. Migration has 
historically functioned as an essential survival tool, and amongst certain (privileged) 
segments of the refugee population, the experience of displacement has resulted in 
significant advantages. Of the 30-member cabinet selected at the Emergency Loya Jirga, 
for instance, three-quarters were members of the Afghan diaspora, including President 
Hamid Karzai, who had lived and been active in Pakistan and the US at different times 
over the preceding years. Overall, this means that treating refugees as an anomaly, or 
equating the experience of displacement with victimhood is inaccurate.  
 
Nonetheless, there are a number of issues specific to refugees that warranted discussion 
during both the constitution-drafting process and the Loya Jirga. Foremost of these was 
the issue of repatriation. The Afghan government explicitly linked refugee participation 
in the constitution drafting process with the anticipated return of refugees, suggesting 
that: ‘refugees should play their role in the reconstruction and rehabilitation process of 
Afghanistan.’63 Despite this, refugees were given virtually no opportunities to discuss 
their concerns regarding return. Approximately 40 per cent of refugees returning to 
Afghanistan experience difficulties reintegrating into their communities of origin, due to 
insecurity, lack of resources of livelihoods, or the isolated nature of their village of 
origin.64 Compounding these problems is the fact that most refugees spent their decades 
in asylum in an urban area, and approximately half of all returning refugees were born 
and raised outside of Afghanistan. After living for several decades outside of Afghanistan 
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in an urban environment, returning to a rural village where they have few if any 
connections poses significant problems for citizen formation.65  
 
UNHCR also actively supported the Constitution Commission’s activities among the 
refugee populations in Pakistan and Iran. It provided refugees living in Pakistan and Iran 
with information on the Loya Jirga process through its bi-monthly ‘Return Information 
Update,’ a newsletter created in order to assist refugees to make an informed decision 
whether or not to return to Afghanistan.  In July 2003, for instance, the Return Update 
provided detailed information, broken down by each region of Afghanistan, of the 
responses by the Afghan population to the questions asked by the Constitution 
Commission. It also provided information on the Constitutional Loya Jirga, describing 
for each region of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, the number of representatives elected, 
the kind of public awareness activities that the Constitution Commission had undertaken, 
the problems faced by the Constitution Commission, and the views held by the Afghan 
public towards the new constitution and the Constitution Commission’s activities.66 
 
One specific issue that merited discussion was access to land and property. In 2003, 
UNHCR figures indicate that large numbers of returnees were homeless and landless (up 
to 86 per cent in some provinces).67 A primary reason for the lack of access to land and 
property was the high levels of land grabbing that took place in the years before and after 
the Bonn Agreement. The new government took no action to curb this epidemic due to a 
mix of corruption, political protection, weak bureaucracy, fear of reprisal, and the 
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difficulty of challenging strongmen.68 During the constitution drafting process, a number 
of constitutional advisors suggested that the new constitution could lay the foundation for 
a thorough, although not radical, reform of land tenure and land governance.69 However, 
the Constitution Commission rejected this possibility, and did not address landlessness, 
land-grabbing, or unequal access to land in any of its deliberations.70 With no questions 
directing their attention to this matter, refugees were also unable to discuss their concerns 
around access to land and property during the Constitution Commission consultations.  
 
A second issue of importance to refugees, and which might have been the subject of 
dialogue during the constitution drafting process, is the issue of economic and social 
rights. Many returning refugees have found it difficult to integrate into Afghan life due 
to problems in accessing not only land and shelter, but also services and livelihoods.71 
While inadequate access to water, food, healthcare, education and livelihoods undermine 
the ability of the majority Afghans to achieve an adequate standard of living, returned 
refugees are disproportionately affected by their shortfall. 72  Despite this, matters of 
economic and social rights received virtually no attention during the consultations and 
Loya Jirga discussions.  
 
While the Afghan government claimed to pursue reconciliation through the Jirga 
tradition, it failed to engage in a concerted discussion of justice with victims of past 
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atrocities, including refugees.73 This indicates that engaging with local mechanisms does 
not automatically lead to more representative outcomes. Engaging with the ‘local’ is 
complex, and can result in merely symbolic or even futile actions, especially if the main 
goal is to fit the local into a pre-existing standard.74 For refugees, this means that an 
invitation to participate in the Loya Jirga consultations did not equate with their voices 
being heard, or having the ability to influence the outcome of the constitution drafting 
process. 
 
In the end, the drafting process generated a differentiated citizenship that suggested 
different treatment for different categories of person. The inclusion of mujahedin leaders 
and their ability to dominate discussions at the Loya Jirga meant that short-term interests 
prioritising the consolidation of authority won out over long-term considerations of how 
to share power in a multi-ethnic, divided society.75 By ignoring victims and endorsing 
mujahedin leaders, the constitution suggests a preferential citizenship, whereby the state 
ignores the demands for accountability from victims but recognises the ‘sacrifices’ of 
those who fought, despite the violations they committed. In addition, the lack of 
opportunities for refugees to discuss with their state issues of importance to them, such 
as access to land and property or the issue of economic and social rights, suggested that 
citizenship does not entail making claims against the state. This undermined the ability 
of the drafting process to drive forward the goals of transitional justice. 
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7.4 Substantive Provisions of the Constitution 
 
The 2004 Constitution was based upon the previous constitution of 1964. The 1964 
Constitution was the most liberal of Afghanistan’s previous constitutions, as it turned 
Afghanistan into a constitutional monarchy and attempted to usher in an era of greater 
citizen participation and more representative and accountable government.76 It provided 
for a popularly elected parliament, elected city councils, an independent legislature, and 
guarantees of public liberty unprecedented in Afghanistan’s history.77 By referencing the 
1964 Constitution, the parties to the Bonn Agreement intended ‘to connect the peace 
process with memories of a more stable Afghanistan.’78  
 
Some states pursue transitional justice objectives explicitly in their constitution, but this 
was not the case in Afghanistan. The only reference the Constitution of Afghanistan 
makes to its troubled history is in its Preamble, whose beginning statements acknowledge 
the ‘previous injustices, miseries and innumerable disasters which have befallen our 
country.’79  There are no provisions relating to the accountability for war criminals, 
although the Constitution does prohibit a president, vice-president, minister, national 
assembly member, or Supreme Court Justice who has been convicted of a crime against 
humanity from being elected or appointed.80 To date, however, Afghanistan has not 
prosecuted any person accused of committing crimes, and the appointment of mujahedin 
leaders to positions as Ministers, Governors, and Parliamentarians has undermined the 
integrity of the provision.81  
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Overall, the Afghan Constitution presents a mixed picture of rights protection. It is the 
first time in Afghanistan’s history that the constitution acknowledges both the ethnic 
pluralism and the political unity of Afghanistan.82 The constitution recognises religious 
rights for non-Muslims, subordinates customary and religious law to positive legislative 
statutes, and prohibits gender-based discrimination. 83  It also commits the Afghan 
government to respecting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other 
international human rights conventions Afghanistan had ratified, 84  which, in theory, 
assures all Afghan citizens a wide range of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural 
rights. Tempering this, the 2004 Constitution gives greater official recognition to the 
application of shari’a law than existed in the 1964 Constitution.85 Originally, Islamists 
argued that the Constitution should cite Islam or shari’a as limits on Afghanistan’s 
international human rights obligations. However, they agreed finally to the provision that 
the Afghan government observe, without qualification, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights,86 and permitted the inclusion of Article 22, which declares the legal 
equality of men and women, without any of the qualifications found in shari’a.87  
 
No provision in the Constitution expressly mentions refugees. However, a number of 
provisions deal with issues of concern to refugees. Although discussions during the 
drafting consultations and the Loya Jirga did not address the issues of land and property 
rights, or economic and social rights, both topics are the subject of limited provisions in 
the 2004 Constitution. The Constitution did not attempt to reform land ownership. 
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However, it did establish a number of related protections relevant to the situation of 
returning refugees. Lacking affordable housing options, refugees who have returned to 
Afghanistan often occupy private and public land without permission, which exposes 
them to precarious living conditions and a constant risk of forced eviction.88 Here, the 
Constitution provides some limited protection. Article 40(4) of the Constitution provides 
that: “nobody’s property shall be confiscated without the provisions of law and the order 
of an authorized court,” while Article 38 states that: “no one, including the state, shall 
have the right to enter a personal residence […] without the owner’s permission or by 
order of an authoritative court, except in situations and methods delineated by law.” 
Article 14 then requires that: “the state shall adopt necessary measures for provision of 
housing and distribution of public estates to deserving citizens in accordance with the 
provisions of law and within financial possibilities.”89 The Constitution also guarantees 
freedom of movement and residency, which is relevant for refugees as they often become 
displaced from their place of origin upon return, and then face harassment as internally 
displaced persons who have no security of tenure. 
 
The potential for the Constitution to create more egalitarian access to land, in a way that 
remedies past injustice, has not been realised in Afghanistan.90 The government has made 
some limited attempts to enact domestic legislation to carry out the principles enshrined 
in the constitution. Working in conjunction with the provisions of the 2004 Constitution, 
a 2003 Presidential decree created an independent Special Property Disputes Resolution 
Court to deal with property disputes concerning returnees.91 The Court was subject to 
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widespread criticism, and collapsed several years later due to lack of enforcement ability, 
corruption and inaccessibility.92 The constitutional provisions on forced eviction have 
been equally unsuccessful in protecting returned refugees. Evictions are regularly carried 
out without the authorisation of a court order, despite the legal requirement that those 
doing the eviction obtain such an order.93 Evictions are planned and carried out with no 
genuine consultation, inadequate notice, no due process and without compensation. 
Furthermore, in the vast majority of cases, evicted refugee families have no prospect of 
being relocated to adequate alternative housing.94 
 
Despite these provisions, many returning refugees continue to suffer from an inability to 
fulfill their economic and social rights and obtain an adequate standard of living. One 
major reason for this is the failure of constitutional provisions to result in domestic 
legislation. As the AIHRC found in its research on the Afghan drafting process, one 
challenge is that the constitution ‘must not only guarantee rights on paper, but must 
explain how those rights will be protected.’ This requires it to ‘build in mechanisms for 
enforceability and justiciability,’ a requirement that is especially important in the context 
of moving from a transitional period to a permanent system.95 
 
The 2004 Constitution makes multiple references to the principles of economic and social 
rights. Article 6 asserts that the state is “obliged to create a prosperous and progressive 
society based on social justice, protection of human dignity, protection of human rights, 
realisation of democracy and to ensure national unity and equality among all ethnic 
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groups and tribes and to provide for balanced development in all areas of the country.”96 
Article 7 of the Constitution states that everyone has the right to a standard of living for 
the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing, 
medical care, social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, 
sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances 
beyond his control. The Constitution also provides for the protection of labor rights,97 
right to social security, 98  protection of the family, 99  health, 100  and the right to 
education.101  
 
However, the economic and social rights protections enshrined in the 2004 Constitution 
have generated very little follow through, and in practice are poorly enforced. The rights 
proclamations are not accompanied by administrative instructions or other means for 
implementation, which has limited the effectiveness of rights protection, prevention of 
violations, and law enforcement in general.102 The constitution locates responsibility for 
the pursuit of economic and social rights with local government in very general terms. It 
states that the Afghan government, while preserving the principle of centralism, is to 
delegate certain authorities to local administration units for the purpose of expediting and 
promoting economic, social, and cultural affairs, and increasing the participation of 
people in the development of the nation.103 What this might mean in practice, and exactly 
how central government authority might extend into the provinces and interact with local-
level governance mechanisms, was not addressed in any substantial form during the 
constitution drafting discussions. 
                                                        
96 The Constitution of Afghanistan 2004 (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) art 6. 
97 Ibid, arts 48 and 49. 
98 Ibid, art 53.  
99 Ibid, art 54.  
100 Ibid, art 52.  
101 Ibid, arts 43 and 44.  
102 Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, above n 72, 7. 
103 The Constitution of Afghanistan 2004 (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) art 137.  
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7.5 Conclusion  
 
A constitution can further the objectives of transitional justice by addressing former 
patterns of discrimination and abuse, and putting in place guarantees to ensure such 
violations do not take place again. A legal reading of the 2004 Constitution of 
Afghanistan suggests that it made small steps towards this goal. It recognised religious 
rights for non-Muslims, subordinated customary and religious law to positive legislative 
statutes, prohibited gender-based discrimination, and embraced the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. From the liberal perspective of citizenship, these provisions 
strengthened the quality of citizenship by formally protecting the rights of citizens, and 
indicating the state’s intention to safeguard those rights.  
 
Another way in which the Constitution furthered the objectives of transitional justice was 
through its inclusive drafting process. Both the Constitution Commission and the 
Constitutional Loya Jirga targeted groups that were habitually marginalised, including 
Afghan refugees living in Pakistan and Iran. In doing so, the Afghan government formally 
recognised Afghan refugees as rights-bearers and citizens, and opened a limited channel 
of dialogue between the state and its refugee population. From a civic republican 
perspective, the ability of citizens to influence the way they were governed, and engage 
in dialogue directly with their own government, also strengthened the quality of 
citizenship.  
 
Notwithstanding these positives, a closer examination of the constitution-drafting process 
as experienced by refugees generates a more circumspect assessment. The Constitution 
recognised only a limited set of rights. For refugees, the constitution was largely 
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irrelevant to the repair of ongoing harm, such as an ongoing lack of access to land, 
housing, food and water. It also failed to address the loss or appropriation of land and 
property, or to put in place appropriate reparative measures. This did not necessarily have 
to be the case – potentially, a constitution offers an opportunity to formally protect the 
economic and social rights of marginalised groups, and to facilitate a more egalitarian 
distribution of resources.104 From the refugee perspective, then, the Constitution did not 
secure adequate rights protection, thus undermining its contribution to liberal citizenship.  
 
In addition, the formal constitution-drafting process only acknowledged only a select 
number of voices. While refugees were invited to engage in dialogue with their 
government, the topics of that dialogue were heavily circumscribed and excluded many 
issues of importance to them. However, refugees identified valuable opportunities in the 
margins of the official process that allowed them to contribute their voices to the national 
narrative. This took place by way of building relationships and connections with 
government officials, such as when the Constitutional Commission traveled to the refugee 
camps in Pakistan and Iran for instance, and then recorded Afghan voices and sent them 
back to Kabul. In this way, personal connections were forged between refugees and 
officials from their home country that may have influenced the perspective of power 
brokers in Kabul. These unofficial channels appeared to contribute to a stronger sense of 
citizenship, in the civic republican sense, on the part of Afghan refugees.  
 
The next chapter explores other unconventional forums and methodologies by which 
Afghan refugees pursued the objectives of transitional justice.  
 
                                                        
104 Aeyal Gross, above n 7, 91. 
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CHAPTER 8: BEYOND CONVENTIONAL TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
IN AFGHANISTAN 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter challenges the standard boundaries of transitional justice. It suggests that 
while the Afghan government may have failed to implement conventional mechanisms 
such as criminal trials or a truth commission, both Afghan nationals and the Afghan 
government pursued the objectives of transitional justice in a number of alternate forums. 
This chapter examines two of these forums. The first is the enfranchisement of Afghan 
refugees in the 2004 Presidential elections, through an out-of-country voting program. 
The second is the National Solidarity Program, a state-led community development 
program that operated from 2003 until 2014. The chapter questions how Afghan refugees 
pursued their claims for justice in these two forums, the ways in which the Afghan 
government used these forums to repair its relationship with its citizens, and what 
contribution these forums made to the overall objectives of transitional justice.  
 
The chapter begins by considering the existing scholarship on refugee enfranchisement 
as a mechanism of transitional justice. It then suggests that in the case of Afghanistan, 
refugees considered their enfranchisement in relation to the 2004 Presidential elections 
an expression of their citizenship and a method of justice; equally, they considered their 
lack of enfranchisement in subsequent elections a blow to both justice and their status as 
citizens. The chapter identifies a number of unexpected methods of justice and repair 
associated with out-of-country voting, and argues that overall, refugee enfranchisement 
in Afghanistan contributed in a range of ways to the objectives of transitional justice.  
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The chapter then turns to the National Solidarity Program. It examines how the objectives 
of transitional justice and development overlap, and in what circumstances development 
might contribute to the goals of transitional justice. It then considers the NSP’s 
engagement of returned refugees, and how this engagement contributed to reconciliation 
between refugees and their state, as well as between refugees and the domiciled 
communities to which they returned. I argue that refugee perspectives on the NSP shift 
the understanding of what constitutes transitional justice, and how actors such as the state, 
citizens and victims themselves define the boundaries of transitional justice. 
 
8.2 Out-of-Country Voting  
 
Refugee enfranchisement does not ordinarily engage the language of transitional justice. 
One reason for this is that transitional justice imagines itself through a discourse of human 
rights and international law, and struggles to conceive of harms, or remedies, which fall 
outside the human rights framework. This impedes refugee enfranchisement because the 
right of a non-domiciled national to vote in national elections is not clearly established 
under international law. Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights extends the right to political participation, including the right to vote in elections, 
to ‘every citizen.’1 However, this right is limited by Article 2, which clarifies that each 
state party undertakes ‘to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and 
subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant.’ 2 This limits the 
right to vote to domiciled citizens, and denies any clear legal obligation upon states to 
ensure that citizens residing outside of the country can vote in national elections. 
 
                                                        
1 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 
171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) art 25.  
2 Ibid, art 2.  
 211 
 
This limitation reflects a pragmatic approach to enfranchisement. In order to enfranchise 
those members of the polity that live outside the nation, the state must set up out-of-
country voting apparatus. The resources that this requires can be demanding. States may 
not have the resources available to support out-of-country voting; or, alternatively, may 
have the capacity to enfranchise some but not all of its citizens living abroad, especially 
if they are widely dispersed or their location entails security or political concerns. 
Acknowledging these challenges, international standards allow for electoral participation 
to be contingent upon reasonable restrictions pertaining to residency in the country of 
origin.3  
 
Refugee enfranchisement is commonly discussed within the literature on peace-building 
and state-building.4 These fields approach out-of-country voting from the perspective of 
the state, and tend to focus on the impact refugee enfranchisement has on the state’s 
legitimacy or its method of governance. For instance, scholars argue that free and fair 
elections can provide legitimacy to new political institutions and leaders, promote 
accountability and good governance, and kick-start sustainable democratic transitions, 
thereby contributing to national stability.5 The enfranchisement of external populations, 
in particular, is often identified as an important element of a post-conflict transition to 
democracy, and has been implemented in countries as diverse as Eritrea, Namibia, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Timor-Leste, Afghanistan, and Iraq.6 
 
 
 
                                                        
3  Jeremy Grace and Erin Mooney, ‘Peacebuilding Through the Electoral Participation of Displaced 
Populations’ (2009) 28(1) Refugee Survey Quarterly 95, 98-99. 
4 Ibid, 121. 
5 Ibid, 97. 
6 Jeremy Grace and Jeff Fischer, ‘Enfranchising Conflict Forced Migrants: Issues, Standards, and Best 
Practices’ (Discussion Paper No. 2, International Organisation for Migration, September 29 2003) 4. 
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An alternative to the state-based approach is to consider the enfranchisement of refugees 
as a matter of personal reparative justice. Under international law, reparations are 
intended to, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-
establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been 
committed.7 While it is impossible for the state to repair all forms of harm, there are 
numerous instances where restitution is possible. Cherif Bassiouni, for instance, argues 
that:  
 
Restitution involves the situation where something has been taken from the 
victim, which either the State or the individual violator has the ability to return, 
such as cultural property, objects d’art, or confiscated lands. It would also include 
such intangibles as the restoration of the right to vote, or own property.8 
 
The loss of the right to vote is caused either directly or indirectly by the state: directly, in 
instances where the state itself was responsible for the refugee’s forcible migration; and 
indirectly, in cases where the state was willing but unable to protect the refugee from the 
harm which forced her to flee. Since refugees would have been citizens with voting rights 
had the state protected them from violence as it should, restoring the refugee’s citizenship 
rights by way of enfranchisement becomes a matter of rectificatory justice.9 
 
It is not just the loss of the right to vote that compels refugee enfranchisement as a matter 
of justice. Individuals whose circumstances of life link their future well-being to the 
flourishing of a particular polity are stakeholders in that polity. As stakeholders, they have 
a claim to participate in collective decision-making processes that shape the shared future 
                                                        
7 Factory at Chorzów (Germany v Poland) (Merits) [1928] PCIJ (ser A) No 17, 47.  
8 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Post-Conflict Justice (Transnational Publishers, 2002) 267. 
9  Rainer Bauböck, ‘Stakeholder Citizenship and Transnational Political Participation: A Normative 
Evaluation of External Voting’ (2007) 75 Fordham Law Review 2393, 2436. 
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of that political community. 10  Refugees face the prospect of voluntary, or, often, 
involuntary return following the end of conflict. Out-of-country voting has significance 
as a justice measure because it offers national authorities a way to guarantee, both in law 
and in official practice, that displaced populations have a say in the political and economic 
decisions which either do, or will, have a significant affect on their lives.11 The inclusion 
of refugees can serve as a powerful symbol of their (re)admission to the political 
community as equal citizens,12 and indicate that the conflict has ended or is likely to be 
resolved soon and, consequently, that repatriation is either imminent or forthcoming.13 
This also means that out-of-country voting is not necessarily reparative in nature. There 
have been instances in which states of asylum have withdrawn their protection 
prematurely and pressured refugees to return, on the basis that elections signaled the end 
of conflict.14  
 
The following section examines the enfranchisement of Afghan refugees, and their 
subsequent loss of the ability to vote. It intentionally takes the perspective of refugees, in 
order to understand, if, and in what ways, out-of-country voting functioned as a measure 
of justice, and how it might contribute towards the objectives of transitional justice.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
10 Ibid, 2422. 
11 Jeremy Grace and Erin Mooney, above n 3, 95. 
12 Katy Long, Voting With Their Feet: A Review of Refugee Participation and the Role of UNHCR in 
Country of Origin Elections and other Political Process (UNHCR, 2010) 47.  
13 Reuven Ziegler, ‘Out-of-Country Voting: The Predicament of the Recognised 1951 Convention 
Refugee’ in Jean-Pierre Gauci, Mariagiulia Giuffre and Evangelia Tsourdi (eds), Exploring the 
Boundaries of Refugee Law: Current Protection Challenges (Brill Nijhoff, 2015) 298, 219.  
14 Ibid, 221. 
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8.3 Presidential Elections in Afghanistan: State and Refugee Perspectives   
 
In 2004, in accordance with the roadmap set out in the Bonn Agreement, the Transitional 
Government of Afghanistan held Presidential elections. A key part of this process was 
the enfranchisement of Afghan refugees living in Pakistan and Iran, who were provided 
with the opportunity to vote concomitantly with voters in Afghanistan. Overall, 846 776 
refugees cast their vote: 590 732 in Pakistan, and 256 044 in Iran. Female turnout was 29 
per cent in Pakistan and 40 per cent in Iran.  
 
From the beginning, political considerations drove refugee enfranchisement. The Joint 
Electoral Management Body (JEMB) was responsible for all aspects of the elections, 
including out-of-country voting. The JEMB, together with the IAEC and UNAMA, 
started discussions about incorporating an external voting program in January 2004, and 
on 12 April 2004 the JEMB made a first favourable decision to extend enfranchisement 
to refugees living in Pakistan and Iran. Shortly thereafter, operational challenges 
including a lack of funds, difficult negotiations with Pakistan regarding the scope of the 
program, and concern on the part of JEMB and UNAMA on the short timeframe, led 
JEMB and UNAMA to discard the idea, and declare out-of-country voting infeasible.15  
 
Despite the decision to abandon the out-of-country voting program, two months later, the 
issue of refugee enfranchisement reappeared on the political agenda. Interim President 
Karzai’s popularity was waning, which concerned the intervening international 
community since Karzai was their preferred candidate.16 Seeking addition voter support, 
the attention of the international community and the incumbent government turned to the 
                                                        
15 Catinca Slavu, ‘External Voting for Afghanistan’s 2004 Presidential Election’ in Martine Van Biljert and 
Sari Kouvo (eds), Snapshots of an Intervention (Afghanistan Analysts Network, 2012) 27, 28. 
16 Ibid. 
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Afghan refugee populations in neighbouring Pakistan and Iran. It was widely expected 
that voter preferences would run along ethnic lines, and since the bulk of Afghan refugees 
living in Pakistan were of Pashto ethnicity, they were expected to vote for Karzai. 
Refugees in Iran were mainly of Tajik and Hazara ethnicity, so they were anticipated to 
vote for one of the opposing candidates.17 However, given that there were far fewer 
refugees in Iran than in Pakistan, overall the Pashto constituency within the refugee 
populations was expected to be higher. Conscious of this, on 23 June 2004, Interim 
President Karzai requested that JEMB include Afghans in Iran and Pakistan in the 
Presidential Election. Notwithstanding its concerns surrounding the technical and 
operational challenges, the JEMB agreed to Karzai’s proposal. It issued a statement on 
30 May 2004 confirming the enfranchisement of the refugee populations in Pakistan and 
Iran, acknowledging that: ‘[t]he decision to proceed with out-of-country registration and 
voting is based on political concerns rather than technical considerations.’18  
 
In July 2004, the government of Afghanistan signed MoUs with the governments of Iran 
and Pakistan regarding out-of-country voting, and contracted IOM as the operational 
partner responsible for implementing voter registration and polling. The international 
community threw their support behind this initiative, making funding available for voter 
registration and polling through the voluntary donation project budget, and donors 
imposed few budgetary constraints upon the process.19  
 
A complex regulatory framework administered the right to vote. According to the legal 
framework enacted by the government of Afghanistan, Afghan nationals living in 
                                                        
17  Jeff Fischer, ‘The Political Rights of Refugees and Displaced Persons: Enfranchisement and 
Participation’ in Andrew Ellis et al (eds), Voting From Abroad: The International IDA Handbook 
(International IDEA, 2007) 151, 159. 
18 Catinca Slavu, above n 15, 28. 
19 Jeff Fischer, above n 17, 161. 
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Pakistan and Iran who were 18 years or older and could prove their nationality were 
eligible to vote. However, in addition to this, the governments of Pakistan and Iran 
demanded their own separate amendments before they would agree to permit out-of-
country voting within their respective jurisdictions. The Iranian government stipulated 
that only those who had legal residence in Iran were eligible to vote, a requirement that 
covered approximately 50 per cent of the refugee population. The Iranian government 
also provided JEMB with a refugee database of all Afghan refugees legally resident in 
Iran to use as a voter registration role.20 The Pakistani government, by contrast, asserted 
that voter eligibility extended to all Afghan nationals who had arrived in Pakistan after 
1979. This covered virtually the entire refugee population. The government of Pakistan 
did not have a refugee database commensurate with that of Iran, and as a result IOM had 
to carry out voter registration in Pakistan prior to the election, in order to develop an 
election roll.  
 
On 29 October 2004, refugees in both Pakistan and Iran voted in the Presidential election. 
Karzai was successful by a narrow margin, winning 55.6 per cent of the total vote. The 
enfranchisement of refugees proved critical to his success. He received the majority of 
the refugee votes in both Pakistan and Iran, constituting 80 per cent of the refugee vote 
in Pakistan, and 44.4 per cent of the refugee vote in Iran. Together, the refugee vote 
accounted for around 11 percent of all the votes Karzai received, thus ensuring his 
success.21  
 
Since 2004, Afghanistan has held two subsequent Presidential elections, one in 2009 and 
the most recent in 2014. In both of these elections, refugees living in Pakistan and Iran 
                                                        
20 Ibid, 159. 
21 Malaiz Daud, ‘Afghanistan’s Flawed Elections: Not All Karzai’s Fault’ The Diplomat (online) 28 March 
2014, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/afghanistans-flawed-elections-not-all-karzais-fault/>. 
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were not provided with the opportunity to vote. This was despite large populations of 
Afghans still living in asylum: in 2009, UNHCR estimated that approximately 1.7 million 
Afghan refugees remained living in Pakistan, and almost 1.1 million in Iran,22 while in 
2014, estimations of the refugee population stood at 1.5 million Afghan refugees in 
Pakistan and almost 1 million in Iran.23 In these subsequent elections, no steps were taken 
by either the Afghan government or the international community to make arrangements 
to enfranchise Afghan refugees,24 leading to criticisms that the Afghan government and 
international community ‘seems to have forgotten about the right of franchise for 
displaced people.’25 
 
The decision not to enfranchise refugees drew sharp criticism from the Governments of 
Pakistan and Iran. In internal discussions, both governments accused the Afghan 
Government, and to a lesser extent UNAMA and UNHCR, of not genuinely wanting 
Afghan refugees to return to Afghanistan. The perception of the two governments was 
that if the Afghan Government was genuinely committed to the return of Afghan refugees, 
then they would take whatever steps were necessary to ensure refugee enfranchisement.26 
Pakistani authorities also voiced their discontent in public. For instance, Shah Farman, 
the information minister of Pakistan's northwestern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province 
claimed it was a ‘mere excuse’ that it was not logistically possible to allow Afghan 
refugees to vote, since the Pakistani authorities were in fact willing to make all the 
necessary arrangements.27   
                                                        
22 Division of Program Support and Management, 2009 Global Trends (UNHCR, 15 June 2010) 7. 
23 UNHCR, UNHCR Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2014 (UNHCR, 18 June 2015) 12. 
24 Unnamed Correspondent, ‘Pakistan Seals Borders for Afghan Polls’ The Express Tribune (online) 5 April 
2014, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/691629/pakistan-seals-borders-for-afghan-polls/> 
25 Bidhayak Das et al, ‘Afghanistan Elections 2010: Democratic Transition, The Challenges Ahead’ (Report 
of the Asian Network for Free and Fair Elections Foundation, 2011) 75. 
26 Interview with UNHCR official (Kabul, 10 December 2013). 
27 Shamil Shams and Faridullah Khan, ‘Afghan Refugees Barred From Voting in Presidential Elections’ 
Deutsche Welle (online) 3 April 2014, <http://www.dw.de/afghan-refugees-barred-from-voting-in-
presidential-elections/a-17541772>.   
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The Afghan Government publically stated that the lack of refugee enfranchisement 
stemmed from factors beyond its control. Officially, Article 5 of the 2013 Election Law 
asserts that voting in the Presidential election is a right for Afghan refugees living outside 
the country. However, more than six months before the election was due to take place, 
the AIEC announced that out-of-country voting would not be available due to financial 
and logistical constraints.28 On a number of occasions, the IEC shifted the responsibility 
for the lack of enfranchisement to the failure of the international community to fund the 
venture. For instance, IEC Secretary Ziaul Haq Amarkhel noted that the IEC had provided 
the government and the international community with a preliminary plan for how to 
enable overseas Afghans to vote, but the required funds – estimated at USD50 million, 
had not been forthcoming.29 
 
Scholars tend to assess the enfranchisement of Afghan refugees from the perspective of 
the state. This perspective means that even when refugees were enfranchised, because 
refugee enfranchisement was spurred largely by political considerations, scholars are 
critical that such enfranchisement contributed to justice or a genuinely inclusive political 
process. Instead, since the decision to enfranchise refugee in 2004 was based on the 
intention to influence favourably the political standing of President Karzai, the external 
voting process failed to enhance, or even compromised, the legitimacy of the presidential 
election.30 Others argue that the enfranchisement of Afghan refugees undermined the 
state-building intervention, and was detrimental to Afghanistan’s long-term democratic 
                                                        
28 Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan. ‘Frequently Asked Questions: Voting in the 2014 
Elections’ (Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan, undated) <http://iec.org.af/pdf/factsheets-
014/eng/faq_voting.pdf>. 
29 Meer Agha Nasrat Samimi, ‘Overseas Afghans May Not Vote in 2014 Polls’ World Affairs Jounral 
(online) 31 October 2013 <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/content/afghans-overseas-will-not-be-able-
vote-2014-elections> 
30 Catinca Slavu, above n 15, 33. 
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development.31 
 
The perspective of refugees tells quite a different story to that of the state-centred 
scholarship. Notwithstanding the political imperatives, refugee enfranchisement signified 
the Afghan Government’s formal recognition of refugees as citizens, with political rights 
equal to those of their compatriots. This meant that when refugees were unable to vote, it 
indicated their exclusion from the national polity. In 2009 and 2014, refugees regularly 
complained that their lack of enfranchisement negated their identity as citizens. Some 
argued that ‘by denying Afghan refugees the right to vote from Iran and Pakistan, the 
Afghan government made them feel politically vulnerable and alienated.’32 From the 
perspective of others, not being able to vote ‘means that we are neither citizens of 
Afghanistan nor Pakistan,’ or that ‘we don’t have voting rights, which means it’s the end 
of our [Afghan] identity.’33 
 
Media coverage of the 2014 Presidential elections regularly referred to the 
‘disenfranchisement’ of refugees, implying or sometimes even explicitly accusing the 
Government of Afghanistan, and the international community more broadly, of 
intentionally denying refugees the right to vote. In doing so, most articles painted a picture 
of Afghan refugees as stakeholders in the future of Afghanistan, people with vested 
interests in the way its political future was decided. Media articles charged that the 
Afghan government did not sufficiently value the ways that the refugee population was 
engaged with the domestic population, and failed to appreciate the contribution that 
refugees made to Afghanistan, for instance through remittances earned in Pakistan and 
                                                        
31 Malaiz Daud, above n 21. 
32 Nasreen Ghufran, ‘Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Current Situation and Future Scenario’ (2005) 3(2) 
Policy Perspectives 1, 13. 
33 Ashfaq Yusufzai, ‘For Refugees, Polls are Far and Near’ InterPress Service News Agency (online) 20 
September 2010, 
<http://www.ipsnews.net/2010/09/politics-afghanistan-for-refugees-polls-are-far-and-near/>. 
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Iran.34 Another article noted that refugees are unhappy about their inability to vote, and 
think that their participation in the poll could have strengthened Afghanistan and the next 
government.35  
 
A number of media articles highlighted that the loss of the ability to vote affected those 
of Pashtun ethnicity more than any other ethnic group. This was because more than 90 
per cent of the Afghan refugee population resided in Pakistan, and, within Pakistan, the 
majority of Afghan refugees were of Pashtu ethnicity. The language used by media 
reports was often accusatory. One article, for instance, reported that: ‘the denial of voting 
right to refugees in Pakistan…means that a significant number of ethnic Pashtun voters 
have been disenfranchised.’36 Another charged that: ‘There is no peace in the Pashtun 
majority areas of Afghanistan, and now the Afghan refugees, the majority of whom are 
also ethnic Pashtuns, won't have any say in these elections. This means that the new 
Afghan president won't represent the majority of Afghans.’37 
 
Going beyond their symbolic inclusion in the national polity, the enfranchisement of 
refugees was valuable to refugee because it suddenly imbued them with political 
relevance. Throughout the lead up to the 2004 elections, Afghan political parties 
campaigning for the different Presidential candidates were active amongst the refugee 
communities in both Pakistan and Iran, although more so in the former than the latter. In 
Pakistan, a primary election observer group, the Asian Network for Free Elections 
(ANFREL) noted the presence of numerous political party agents in the refugee camps 
promoting the out-of-country voting program, even arranging transportation to bring the 
                                                        
34 Shamil Shams and Faridullah Khan, above n 27. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Jehangir Khattak, ‘What Next After Historic Afghan Vote?’ Views Week (online) 7 April 2014  
<http://viewsweek.com/viewsweek-exclusive/what-next-after-historic-afghan-vote/>.  
37 Shamil Shams and Faridullah Khan, above n 27. 
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people to registration facilities.38 ANFREL was of the view that this was ‘very positive’ 
and enhanced the number of registered Afghan voters in Pakistan, as well as their 
knowledge concerning the different candidates.39  
 
In Iran, campaigning by political parties was more limited. ANFREL observers 
interviewed eligible Afghan votes in several refugee communities, and found that voters 
lacked information on who the candidates were and what they stood for, which made it 
difficult for them to compare the political agendas of different candidates. Instead, 
refugee voters in Iran had to rely on information about candidates from the radio stations 
(which broadcasted news on Afghanistan Election) and the international news. 
Campaigning from the candidates was almost non-existent, and Afghan refugees 
complained that their ability to choose between candidates was constrained by their lack 
of knowledge concerning each candidate.40 
 
This alternate account of out-of-country voting suggests that the reparative value of 
refugee enfranchisement should not only be assessed from the perspective of the state. 
The perspective of refugees – those who are the subject of the enfranchisement – indicates 
a different understanding of what constitutes justice, as well as the reparative value of 
out-of-country voting. The experience of Afghan refugees suggests that out-of-country 
voting should be understood as a holistic process, involving not only the legal act of 
casting a vote, but also all the activities that take place in the margins, such as political 
mobilisation and the building of relationships between the displaced and political leaders. 
This suggest that even if the state perspective suggests that out-of-country voting 
undermines the goals of state-building, the process of imbuing refugees with political 
                                                        
38 Herizal Hazri, ‘Afghanistan Presidential Election 2004’ (Report of International Observation Mission, 
Asian Network for Free Elections, September-October 2004) 78. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
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relevance renders out-of-country voting with reparative value.  
 
In order to create the possibility for justice outcomes to become more widely accepted by 
people with opposing rationales for that acceptance, it is necessary to take a ‘broader, 
deeper and longer’ view of transitional justice can.41 Cass Sunstein describes a situation 
commonly experienced by domestic courts, where a wide range of people will accept one 
of its decisions for incompatible ethical reasons. There might be consensus that the court 
got the decision right, but those who agree on the decision do so for theoretically 
conflicting reasons. Sunstein argues that it is a good thing that legal agreements are 
incompletely theorised, since it results in a greater percentage of the population accepting 
the court’s decisions as legitimate.42 For transitional justice, this suggests that accepting 
competing rationales for different interventions might allow people to agree, for 
competing reasons, to work together towards that outcome.43 Some scholars might argue 
that out-of-country voting is valuable because it can contribute to the legitimacy of the 
state, whereas others might recognise the reparative value of including refugees in the 
national policy, and imbuing refugee lives with political relevance. By acknowledging 
the perspective of different actors, and allowing those perspectives to expand the 
boundaries of transitional justice, scholars and practitioners might be better equipped to 
achieve the goals of justice and reconciliation.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
41  John Braithwaite and Ray Nickson, ‘Deeper, Broader, Longer Transitional Justice’ (2014) 11(4) 
European Journal of Criminology 445, 449.  
42 Cass Sunstein, ‘Incompletely Theorized Agreements’ (1995) 108(7) Harvard Law Review 1733, 1733-
1772, quoted in John Braithwaite and Ray Nickson, above n 41, 449.  
43 John Braithwaite and Ray Nickson, above n 41, 449.  
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8.4 Development Programs and Transitional Justice  
 
A second space where Afghan refugees – and Afghan citizens generally – seemed to be 
engaged in activities related to reconciliation and justice was in the national development 
program known as the NSP. The NSP is Afghanistan’s largest community development 
program. It was launched in 2003 in 5,000 rural communities, and, since then, it has 
brought its programs to 32,000 villages, across 361 districts in all of Afghanistan’s 34 
provinces.44 The NSP is not a transitional justice mechanism in any conventional sense. 
However, the government of Afghanistan linked its activities and processes to broader 
goals related to national unity and social repair, and in this way mirrored some of the 
concerns of transitional justice processes. The following two sections examine if, and 
how, the NSP contributed to reconciliation between returned refugees and their state, and 
between returned refugees and the communities to which they returned. 
 
Transitional justice has not typically been concerned with development. Development, in 
its most general sense, refers to processes intended to improve the socioeconomic 
conditions of people. 45  The United Nations Development Program describes 
development as a process of enlarging people’s choices, the most critical of which relate 
to an individual’s ability to lead a long and healthy life, to be educated, and to enjoy a 
decent standard of living.46  In contrast to this focus on economic and social rights, 
transitional justice tends to favour civil and political rights. Instead of intervening through 
social processes, as is the case of development, transitional justice is conventionally 
                                                        
44 Andrew Beath, Fotini Christia, Ruben Enikolopov, ‘Randomized Impact Evaluation of Afghanistan’s 
National Solidarity Programme’ (Final Report, World Bank, 1 July 2013) viii. 
45  Roger Duthie, ‘Introduction’ in Pablo de Greiff and Roger Duthie (eds), Transitional Justice and 
Development: Making Connections (Social Science Research Council, 2009) 17, 18.  
46 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report (New York: UNDP, 
1990), 10. This relates closely to Amartya Sen’s capability approach, or the idea that development is about 
expanding citizens’ capabilities. See: Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Knopf, 1999). 
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expressed through a limited number of legal, institutionalised mechanisms, such as trials, 
truth commissions and reparations. As such, the two fields have only in recent years 
begun to interact more systematically. 
 
There are a range of reasons for a more systematic interaction between transitional justice 
and development. To begin with, the two fields share a number of complementary and 
overlapping aims. Both aim to create reconciliation amongst post-conflict populations, 
and are concerned to some extent with the renewal of civic trust and confidence between 
the state and citizens.47 The two fields often work more effectively in tandem, since 
reconciliation without economic justice – which might be achieved through development 
programs – is likely to be viewed as ‘cheap and spurious.’48 In addition to the shared 
pursuit of reconciliation, there is also widespread acknowledgement that transitional 
justice measures are likely to be most significant when part of a broader program of 
structural reform and development.49 Simply dealing with individual, past human rights 
violations is likely to be inadequate; instead, what is needed are reforms that address 
structural problems and injustices such as institutional incapacity, gender discrimination, 
poverty, and land insecurity.50 
 
In many instances, development programs provide the same assistance as transitional 
justice reparations. Any benefit that can be used to repair victims’ lives, such as 
compensation, preferential access to basic services, or allocation of land and housing, 
                                                        
47 Marcus Lenzen, ‘Roads Less Traveled? Conceptual Pathways (and Stumbling Blocks) for Development 
and Transitional Justice’ in Pablo de Greiff and Roger Duthie (eds), Transitional Justice and Development: 
Making Connections (Social Science Research Council, 2009) 76, 83. 
48  Alex Boraine, A Country Unmasked: Inside South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(Oxford University Press, 2000), 357. 
49  Marina Caparini, ‘Ensuring Long-Term Protection: Justice-Sensitive Security Sector Reform and 
Displacement’ in Roger Duthie (ed), Transitional Justice and Displacement (Social Science Research 
Council, 2012) 279, 279-280. 
50  Roger Duthie, ‘Contributing to Durable Solutions: Transitional Justice and the Integration and 
Reintegration of Displaced Persons’ in Roger Duthie (ed), Transitional Justice and Displacement (Social 
Science Research Council, 2012) 37, 38. 
 225 
 
can, at least in principle, also be used by actors trying to foster the economic and social 
development of communities and individuals. 51  It is not uncommon that victims 
themselves prefer reparations to take the form of specific development projects, such as 
rebuilding community structures or providing schools or health clinics.52 The distinction 
between the two fields, then, is not in the type of assistance, but in the broader political 
context: namely, whether the particular efforts are presented by the state as official 
acknowledgments of past violations, and are openly intended to provide justice for past 
suffering.53 Equally, it is important that the assistance is recognised by the community as 
atonement for past harms.54  
 
This chapter considers whether, and how, development assistance provided through the 
NSP contributed to the objectives of transitional justice. A central consideration is 
whether the NSP functioned as a tool of reconciliation. Reconciliation is a process 
through which a society moves from ‘a divided past to a shared future,’ 55  and is 
fundamentally about building relationships of trust and cohesion at multiple different 
levels, from the individual, inter-personal and communal, to the national and 
international.56  
 
For refugees, reconciliation is particularly important between those who repatriate, and 
the communities to which they return.57 Repatriation is not the end of the refugee cycle 
                                                        
51 Peter Van der Auweaert, ‘The Potential for Redress: Reparations and Large-Scale Displacement’ in 
Roger Duthie (ed), Transitional Justice and Displacement (Social Science Research Council, 2012) 139, 
167-168.  
52  Naomi Roht-Arriaza and Katharine Orlovsky, ‘A Complementary Relationship: Reparations and 
Development’ in Pablo de Greiff and Roger Duthie (eds), Transitional Justice and Development: Making 
Connections (Social Science Research Council, 2009) 170, 173. 
53 Peter Van der Auweaert, above n 51, 168.  
54  Naomi Roht-Arriaza and Katharine Orlovsky, above n 52, 173. 
55 Daniel Bar-Tal, ‘Nature, Rationale, and Effectiveness of Education for Coexistence’ 2004 60(2) Journal 
of Social Issues 253, 253-271. 
56  Joanna Quinn, ‘Introduction’ in Joanna Quinn (ed), Reconciliation(s): Transitional Justice in 
Postconflict Societies (Queen’s University Press, 2009) 1, 5.  
57 United Nations Secretary General, Decision No. 2011/20: Durable Solutions: Follow up to the Secretary-
General’s 2009 Report on Peacebuilding (4 October 2011) para 12. 
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but the beginning of a new cycle, and entails the social, political, and economic 
reintegration into the person’s home country. 58  The economic conditions to which 
refugees return directly affect the possibility of reconciliation, and a weak economy can 
aggravate divisions. In response to this challenge, throughout the 1990s UNHCR 
implemented a range of ‘co-existence’ projects in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Rwanda, 
intended to foster social reconciliation between returned refugees and their non-displaced 
compatriots. These projects relied upon income-generating, psychosocial, sports-related, 
educational and cultural initiatives to improve the environment for return and 
reintegration, and achieved a range of successes in repairing social relationships, 
addressing poverty and strengthening communities.59  
 
Restoring the relationship between refugees and their home state is an equally important 
element of reconciliation.60 After a period of violence or human rights abuse, citizens 
often have little trust in the institutions of government to protect them, or ensure their 
interests. In order to restore the relationship between citizens and state, it is necessary to 
renew civic trust and confidence between the two.61 Here, the interests of development 
and transitional justice converge: both are concerned to some extent with contributing to 
the development of institutions and their capacities to ensure the conditions for peaceful 
coexistence, to protect the rights of citizens, and to restore the state-citizen relationship.62 
Scholars suggest that human rights law offers a way to frame this interaction, since it 
draws attention to the relationship between a state and its citizens, and how the state can 
                                                        
58  Tania Ghanem, ‘When Forced Migrants Return ‘Home’: The Psychosocial Difficulties Returnees 
Encounter in the Reintegration Process’ (Working Paper No. 16, Refugee Studies Centre, University of 
Oxford, October 2003), 12. 
59  Huma Haider, ‘(Re)Imagining Coexistence: Striving for Sustainable Return, Reintegration and 
Reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (2009) 3 The International Journal of Transitional Justice  91, 
91–113. 
60 Pablo de Greiff, ‘Justice and Reparations’ in Pablo de Greiff (ed), The Handbook of Reparations (Oxford 
University Press, 2006) 451, 460-462.  
61 Marcus Lenzen, above n 47, 83. 
62 Ibid.  
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meet its obligations to provide long-term guarantees for citizen well-being, particularly 
for the most vulnerable and marginalised in society.63  
 
Development assistance is often a determining factor in the ability of refugees to 
reintegrate after their return.64 The process of reintegration is long-term, and requires the 
existence of adequate infrastructure to enable residents to exercise their rights, including 
their right to a basic livelihood.65 In communities composed of returned refugees, efforts 
to increase security, reconstruct infrastructure, generate employment opportunities, and 
strengthen equitably accessible social services have made a more significant contribution 
to enabling reconciliation than conventional mechanisms of transitional justice. 66 
However, scholars suggest that such interventions should not stand alone, but are more 
effective when implemented in conjunction with national development programs. 
Reflecting on UNHCR’s coexistence projects of the 1990s, for instance, scholars assert 
that they were limited in their impact and sustainability because they were planned and 
implemented in isolation from national development processes and priorities.67 
 
8.5 Afghan Refugees and the National Solidarity Program  
One of the most significant challenges facing the transitional Afghan government in 2003 
was the fractured nature of Afghanistan’s national identity, brought about by years of 
violent conflict. Mohammed Ehsan Zia, the Head of the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation 
                                                        
63 Ibid, 85. 
64 Zonke Majodina, ‘Dealing with Difficulties of Return in South Africa: The Role Of Social Support and 
Coping’ (1995) 8(2) Journal of Refugee Studies 210, 212. 
65 Department of International Protection, Guidelines on International Protection No. 3: Cessation of 
Refugee Status under Article 1C(5) and (6) of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees UN 
doc HCR/GIP/03/03 (10 February 2003) art 4.  
66  Eileen Babbitt et al, Imagine Coexistence: Assessing Refugee Reintegration Efforts in Divided 
Communities (Tufts University Center for Human Rights and Conflict Resolution, 2002); Antonia Chayes 
and Martha Minow (eds), Imagine Coexistence: Restoring Humanity after Violent Ethnic Conflict (Wiley 
Publishing, 2003); IASC Growing the Sheltering Tree: Protecting Rights through Humanitarian Action 
(UNICEF, 2002). 
67 UNHCR, ‘UNHCR’s Role in Support of the Return and Reintegration of Displaced Populations’ (Policy 
Framework and Implementation Strategy, UNHCR, August 2008) paras 13, 14. 
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and Development, explained that social inclusion was the most urgent need of the country 
during this period, and the government believed that ‘the only way that we could promote 
social cohesion on a massive scale was to bring people to work together for a common 
good.’68 It was from this idea that the NSP was born. Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani 
explained that a crucial part of the NSP was to create a sense of shared national 
citizenship. The intention was ‘to create a core of solidarity around the idea that all 
Afghans were citizens of a new Afghanistan, with rights and obligations.’69 This need 
was particularly high for the younger generation, who had never lived and worked 
together as members of a shared political community, and for returning refugees who had 
spent most of their lives abroad as refugees.70  
 
A second challenge was the lack of connection most Afghans felt towards their central 
government. In Afghanistan, there has been historically little, or no, tradition of 
formalised community participation in political decision-making or development 
planning, either on a national or local level. Even in the 1960’s when the Afghan 
government aimed to introduce a more democratic state, this mostly remained a 
‘democracy from above’ that rarely engaged ordinary citizens.71 At the community level, 
and separate from the state, a customary system of self-governance exists, known as the 
Jirga system (shura in Dari). The jirga is a local council consisting of male 
representatives of all extended families of a village, and functions mainly as a local 
conflict resolution body, rather than handling day-to-day governance. 72  The jirga 
occasionally takes place on the national stage, such as the Constitutional Loya Jirga 
                                                        
68 Rushda Majeed, ‘Building Trust in Government: Afghanistan’s National Solidarity Program, 2002-2013’ 
(Working Paper, Princeton University, May 2014) 2-3. 
69  Yama Torabi, ‘Assessing the National Solidarity Program: The Role of Accountability in 
Reconstruction’ (Report, Integrity Watch Afghanistan, 2007) 6. 
70 Rushda Majeed, above n 68, 1. 
71  Inger Boesen, ‘From Subjects to Citizens: Local Participation in the National Solidarity Program’ 
(Working Paper, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, August 2004) 5.  
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discussed earlier in this chapter. However, the jirga system usually functions quite apart 
from the state, and is the primary system of governance for ordinary Afghans.  
 
This context prompted the new government to seek ways to extend the administrative 
reach of the state, and build representative institutions for local governance.73 As a result, 
the NSP was framed around two related village-level interventions. The first was the 
Community Development Council (CDC). The CDC was a village-level governance 
mechanism, created by the NSP in each target village, and similar in some ways to the 
jirga. It acted as the liaison point between the community and the central government 
with respect to the activities of the NSP. Members of each CDC were elected by their 
local community, using a secret-ballot election based on universal suffrage. The dearth 
of other state governance structures at the local levels meant that soon after their 
establishment, the CDCs became the main hub through which not only the NSP, but also 
other Afghan government agencies coordinated their interventions. International 
organisations and development NGOs also came to rely on the CDCs as coordination 
structures, linking Afghan communities to broader development programming.74 
 
Through the CDCs, the NSP achieved unprecedented, widespread involvement of women 
in rural Afghanistan’s community decision‐making apparatus.75 The NSP mandated that 
women must be represented on the CDC, and must participate in the development of the 
community’s development priorities.76 In light of the cultural variety within Afghanistan, 
the exact ways in which women participated varied. In some communities, women 
participated directly, on par with men. In others communities they formed a separate 
                                                        
73 Andrew Beath, Fotini Christia, Ruben Enikolopov, above n 44, 1.   
74 Jennifer Brick, ‘Investigating the Sustainability of Community Development Councils in Afghanistan’ 
(Final Report, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, February 2008) 34. 
75 Andrew Beath, Fotini Christia, Ruben Enikolopov, above n 44, 6. 
76 Sultan Barakat et al, The Study of the National Solidarity Program’s Impact on IDP/Refugee Returnee 
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female CDC committee, and, in more conservative communities, women formed an 
independent working group that played an advisory role to the CDC but was not directly 
involved with development decisions. This flexibility allowed communities to 
incorporate women into the CDC process in a way that was acceptable to the local social 
structures, while ensuring that the ideas of gender equality and female empowerment 
were mainstreamed within the community.77 
 
The second village-level intervention associated with the NSP was the disbursement of 
block grants. Block grants were intended to improve the access of rural villagers to basic 
services, including transport, water, sanitation, irrigation, power, literacy and vocational 
training.78 Each CDC was responsible for identifying the development projects needed in 
its village, in close cooperation and consultation with the community members by whom 
it was elected. Once the project was identified, the CDC was required to prepare and 
submit a proposal for that project to the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and 
Development, with a request for funding, in the form of a block grant. The CDC could 
request a block grant at a rate of $200 per household, up to a community maximum of 
300 families, or $60,000.79 If the Ministry accepted the development project proposed, 
then a block grant would be released directly from Kabul to the village CDC. Then, the 
CDC was responsible for managing the physical implementation of the project, with 
community contributions.80  
 
The NSP did make a number of provisions for returned, and returning, refugees. 
Established in 2003 when millions of Afghan refugees were repatriating from years in 
exile in Pakistan and Iran, one of the central expected outcomes of the NSP was to assist 
                                                        
77 Ibid. 
78 Andrew Beath, Fotini Christia, Ruben Enikolopov, above n 44, 3.  
79 Ibid, viii. 
80 Inger Boesen, above n 71, 42.  
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in the reintegration of displaced Afghans.81 There are few areas of Afghanistan that have 
not experienced displacement, and, therefore, few communities that do not include 
returned refugees. Areas that had, or were expected to have, particularly high levels of 
refugee returns were identified by the designers of the NSP during the initial stages of the 
roll-out, and these villages were targeted for early implementation. 
 
Rather than targeting refugees directly, the NSP aimed to strengthen local economies of 
the communities where refugees were returning, so as to benefit all those residing there.82 
This reflected a broader concern, acknowledged equally within the practice of transitional 
justice, that targeting particular groups can create divisions within the community. It is 
not uncommon for real tensions to exist between ‘those who stayed’ and ‘those who left’, 
and, in the eyes of the former, it is not always true that the latter suffered more. Indeed, 
those who did not leave may see those who left as the lucky ones, and may have little 
enthusiasm for creating specific material remedies for the displaced. 83  Certainly in 
Afghanistan, it is not the case that returning refugees are always the most vulnerable 
members of a community. While returned refugees are often disproportionately affected 
by lack of access to land, shelter, water and resources,84 displacement can also function 
as a coping strategy, providing returned refugees with access to remittances and other 
resources.85  
 
In order to benefit from the NSP and have their voices heard it was necessary for refugees 
to be incorporated into the governance structure of the CDC. However, depending upon 
                                                        
81 Sultan Barakat et al, above n 76, 9. 
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the timing of their return, this presented a number of challenges. One problem was that 
each CDC was formed during the initial stages of the NSP in that particular village. 
Shortly after the arrival of the NSP, the community would vote on which persons are to 
form their CDC, and this membership was not ordinarily open to change. This meant that 
if refugees returned to that village after the CDC members were elected, they would not 
be eligible for election; and, equally, they would not be able to vote for persons who 
represented their views. As a result, under the initial structure, the representation of 
returned refugees (and IDPs) was not completely assured.86 If the views of returned 
refugees concerning development and infrastructure conflicted with those of the elected 
CDC members, the refugee voices would be excluded.  
 
The disbursement of block grants also failed to take into account the large-scale return of 
refugees. Initially, the rules pertaining to block grant disbursements precluded an increase 
in the block grant funding once the grant cycle has started. Therefore, if a community 
applied for a grant to build a school for 100 children, and then 50 refugee families returned 
with 100 school-age children, it was not possible for the CDC to apply for additional 
funding to build a bigger school. This placed greater strain on projects that were designed 
to benefit only a set number of people, such as schools, clinics, and water supply projects, 
such that the projects underway did not have the capacity to support the additional 
numbers.87  This, in turn, had the potential to undermine the relationship between refugees 
and the receiving community. 
 
The NSP did take some steps to facilitate the inclusion of returned refugees in the CDC 
structure. It changed the rules around CDC elections, so that in communities where CDC 
elections had been completed and then a substantial number of refugees returned to the 
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area, a separate round of sub‐elections could be held, just among the returnee population, 
to ensure their representation within the CDC.88 The NSP also made some amendments 
to the disbursement of block grants. It changed the rules so that if refugee families 
returned after a block grant request had been submitted but the funds had not yet been 
disbursed, then the CDC could apply for additional money to cover the newly arrived 
families. In cases where the block grant entitlement ceiling was already determined and 
the money was already disbursed, the NSP still allowed an increase in the block grant 
entitlement of the community to include the $200 USD per family among the returnees, 
provided the total entitlement of the community would not exceed the $60,000 limit.89 
However, despite these positives changes in policy, in reality, the strict rules governing 
grant disbursements were not always flexible enough to account for an influx of returnees 
or IDPs in a community, and it was not always possible to obtain extra funding.90   
 
One factor that undermined the NSP as a tool for creating reconciliation was the lack of 
coordination with other development assistance programs. One example is the Land 
Allocation Scheme. Mandated by Presidential Decree 104 and launched in December 
2005, the Land Allocation Scheme was administered by the Ministry of Refugees and 
Repatriation. It legalised the distribution of intact and uncultivated government land to 
landless returnees and IDPs, who were expected to live there in newly created 
communities. This land was often undeveloped and lacking any supporting infrastructure 
that would have existed in other communities. As a result, today much of the land remains 
unoccupied, and only 25 percent of those who paid for plots actually live on them. The 
rate of departure of residents has been as high as 80 percent in some areas, due to lack of 
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livelihoods and inadequate basic services. 91  One significant reason why these 
communities remain under-developed is that they are not recognised by the NSP. The 
NSP has strict by-laws defining what constituted a ‘community,’ and people living on 
sites distributed under the Land Allocation Scheme did not meet this criteria due to the 
government designating the land they live on as ‘townships.’ Therefore, due to the lack 
of official status, the communities living on Land Allocation Scheme sites were not 
eligible to participate in the NSP.92 In addition, the NSP held the position that it would 
only target refugee communities when they are mixed with the local population, in order 
to support integration between the two.93 
 
Despite these limitations, overall, the NSP contributed to reconciliation between returned 
refugees and their state. The network of CDCs brought the Afghan government to its 
citizens, often for the first time. The government actively modified the CDC format, as 
well as the way in which block grants were disbursed, in order to improve the NSP’s 
engagement of the returned refugee population. There is evidence of increased public 
faith in the system of government and improved state-civil society relations.94 The NSP 
provided a tangible indication of the new government’s intention to connect with, and 
provide for, its citizens. For returning refugees, the NSP program has been able to 
alleviate short-term economic difficulties,95 and 92 per cent of returned refugees consider 
such development projects to be important to their ability to reestablish their lives, and 
those of their family, in their village.96  
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The NSP also appears to have contributed to the relationship between returned refugees 
and the receiving community. There is evidence of improved community relations as a 
result of the empowerment of CDCs.97 Moreover, the whole‐of-community approach had 
a positive impact upon returned refugees by supporting the development of the 
communities of which they were a part.98  
 
8.6 Conclusion 
 
Transitional justice scholars usually envisage the work of transitional justice being 
achieved through conventional mechanisms such as criminal trials, truth commissions, 
and reparations. However, this does not take into account the varied forums in which both 
states and citizens pursue the objectives of transitional justice. In Afghanistan, refugees 
and the Afghan government both pursued the objectives in alternate forums including 
out-of-country voting, and the National Solidarity Program. These two forums 
contributed both towards the reparation of past harm, and the repair of the relationship 
between Afghan refugees and their state.  
 
These forums also highlighted the importance of alternate methodologies. Ordinarily, 
transitional justice processes rely on an institutionalised approach, influenced heavily by 
the law. However, for Afghan refugees, a strictly legal or institutional approach appeared 
inadequate to address their claims for justice. Instead, they tended to rely on personal 
networks and relationships. The value of the out-of-country program and National 
Solidarity Program was that they provided refugees with the opportunity to forge and 
maintain such networks and relationships.  
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As a whole, the Afghan case study illuminated the disputed nature of citizenship in the 
transitional state, and the different methodologies by which state and citizen pursued their 
own concept of what it means to be an Afghan citizen. This was seen in the process of 
drafting the 2004 Constitution, for instance, when the consultant process and Loya Jirga 
focused on determining the legal framework issues such as restitution or compensation 
for land and property, or concrete remedies for economic and social rights, which were 
of key importance to ordinary Afghans and their conception of citizenship. It was also 
seen in the way that the Afghan government treated different categories of citizens. For 
instance, the government included refugees in the consultation process and Loya Jirga on 
the basis that they were ‘brothers,’ thus formally recognising their citizenship status. 
However, despite this formal recognition, refugees were largely unable to have their key 
concerns reflected in the drafting process. Mujahedin, by contrast, were recognised in the 
2004 Constitution for their sacrifices and historical struggles, and acknowledged as 
martyrs for the country’s freedom.99 This provision has enabled mujahedin leaders to 
claim support for their position as saviors of the homeland and of Islam, and thus bolster 
their claims to be rightful leaders.100 
 
For Afghan refugees, the ability to participate in national elections was also crucial to 
their sense of citizenship and identity.101 This was not limited to the act of voting, but 
encapsulated the activities by which they were recognised as political actors, such as the 
visits to refugee camps by political leaders. When the Afghan government failed to 
enfranchise refugees in subsequent elections, many refugees considered this loss of 
recognition a blow to their identity as citizens.  
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Overall, then, the Afghan case study demonstrates the contested nature of transitional 
justice, its links to citizenship, and the highly contested question of who gets to define the 
substance and boundaries of both concepts.  
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CHAPTER 9: RETHINKING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE  
AND DISPLACEMENT 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter reflects on the findings of my thesis. Through the two case studies, I aimed 
to compare the scholarly understanding of the interaction between transitional justice and 
refugees, with the lived experience of Liberian and Afghan refugees. I focused on the 
three themes that, to date, have characterised the scholarship. The first is a consistent use 
of human rights law to understand the harm refugees suffer, as well as the methods by 
which that harm might be repaired. The second is an emphasis on state-led mechanisms 
of transitional justice, with little consideration of alternate models, or of the impact that 
state dominance might have for refugees. The third is an assumption that the ultimate goal 
of the interaction between transitional justice and refugees is refugee return.  
 
In the case studies, contrary to the neat, linear approach of the scholarship, the interaction 
between transitional justice and refugees emerged as an active and multilayered site of 
conflict and negotiation. In both Liberia and Afghanistan, refugees described the harm 
associated with displacement, the justice outcomes they sought, and the methods best 
suited to pursue those justice outcomes in terms that differed considerably from those of 
human rights law and the transitional state. However, refugees were often unable to 
pursue their own understanding of justice due to the power differential between 
themselves and the state-centred transitional justice mechanism. This meant that as well 
as contesting the terms of the conventional mechanisms of transitional justice, refugees 
also turned to their own forums to pursue their own justice outcomes.  
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This chapter begins by considering how the dominance of law imposed a particular 
understanding of the harm associated with displacement, and how this restricted the ways 
that refugees were able to engage with transitional justice processes. It then examines the 
role of the transitional state, and demonstrates that the interests held by the Liberian and 
Afghan governments and their respective refugee populations towards transitional justice 
differed considerably. Given the power differential between the two, refugees were often 
unable to achieve their preferred outcomes in conventional forums of transitional justice. 
The chapter concludes by reflecting on the assumption that refugee return is the ultimate 
goal of transitional justice. It introduces an alternate understanding: that of rebuilding the 
state-citizen relationship. This approach suggests that repair of displacement may take 
place in the absence of physical return, and in forums other than those of legal, 
institutionalised transitional justice.  
 
9.2 The Limitations of Using the Law to Structure Justice Claims    
 
International law is the lingua franca of transitional justice, responsible for defining its 
standards and structuring its mechanisms. When transitional justice first began to address 
displacement, advocates focused primarily on obtaining recognition of the legal violation 
of arbitrary displacement under human rights and international criminal law. Once this 
recognition was achieved, they used the legal framework to pursue justice claims on 
behalf of displaced persons through international criminal trials,1 reparations programs,2 
and truth commissions. 3  In each of these mechanisms, international law set the 
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parameters for the harms transitional justice mechanisms recognised, as well as the 
remedies each mechanism could offer.  
 
The dominance of law within transitional justice has generated a legalistic approach 
towards justice.4 A legalistic approach means that scholars and practitioners do not just 
rely on the law as a tool or framework to deliver justice, but, more fundamentally, that 
they assert that the law offers a standard that is objective, certain, universal and rational,5 
and consider rigid adherence to legal rules the epitome of moral conduct.6 Proponents of 
legalism emphasise the use of courts of law and criminal trials in the pursuit of justice,7 
and tend to isolate law from the social context in which it exists.8 For transitional justice 
practitioners, this means that they are more likely to focus on the systematic collection of 
testimony and investigation of facts, rather than the process of engaging with victims.  
 
In both case studies, a legalistic approach to transitional justice prevented refugees from 
pursuing justice in the ways they wished. In Liberia, a legalistic understanding of justice 
was a central feature of the TRC. The ultimate aim of the TRC’s statement-taking process 
was to quantify the type and extent of past abuse, and to provide a substantiated legal 
basis for the criminal prosecution of those responsible.9 In pursuit of these objectives, the 
TRC aimed to create a forensic account of truth, which meant that its data collection 
methodology focused upon gathering factual, accurate and authenticated data in a 
consistent manner. It enforced a relatively inflexible method of giving testimony, 
                                                        
4 Kieran McEvoy, ‘Beyond Legalism: Towards a Thicker Understanding of Transitional Justice’ (2007) 
34(4) Journal of Law and Society 411, 420. 
5 Kieran McEvoy, ‘Letting Go of Legalism: Developing a ‘Thicker’ Version of Transitional Justice’ in 
Kieran McEvoy and Lorna McGregor (eds), Transitional Justice from Below: Activism and the Struggle 
for Change (Hart Publishing, 2008) 15, 20. 
6 Judith Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals and Political Trials (Harvard University Press, first published 1964, 
1986 ed) 8-12.  
7 Ibid, 1-2. 
8 Ibid, 2.  
9 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, Consolidated Final Report (2009) vol 2, 333–334.  
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structured around an international legal framework. Those giving testimony had to 
identify as either victim or perpetrator, and describe their experiences in terms of a 
recognised violation of international law. There was no possibility to reflect upon past 
harm without specifying a violation, victim, and (at the very least, an inferred) 
perpetrator.10 
 
Naming past violence as a human rights violation has a tendency to narrow and 
individualise the experience of harm.11 It forces people to reduce the complex realities of 
their lives into neat, clear-cut, legalised categories, and prevents them from relating their 
experiences in their own words.12 For Liberian refugees, the TRC’s narrow and inflexible 
understanding of what constituted harm, together with the constraints upon how they 
could speak about that harm, meant that they were frequently unable to speak about their 
experiences in the way they preferred. Refugees disputed the requirement that they 
identify as a victim, since this suggested they were passive and helpless, and silenced the 
many ways that people had negotiated their loss, rebuilt their lives, and created a new 
existence quite apart from that of victimhood. Some wished to reflect upon their own 
harm without having to attribute responsibility to another for causing it, or to speak of 
harms that fell outside the catalogue of human rights, such as damage to social structures 
and relationships. Within the TRC’s legalistic approach, however, there was no 
possibility to do so, since the TRC valued the consistent collection of factual data over 
individualised accounts.  
 
                                                        
10 This is a feature of the criminal law tradition generally: in order to conceive of an atrocity or injustice, it 
is necessary to first imagine a victim; and, equally, victims must speak as if there were an agent responsible 
for their loss. Robert Meister, ‘Human Rights and the Politics of Victimhood’ (2002) 16(2) Ethics and 
International Affairs 91, 102.   
11 Kieran McEvoy and Kirsten McConnachie, ‘Victims and Transitional Justice: Voice, Agency and Blame’ 
(2013) 22(4) Social and Legal Studies 489, 496.  
12 Richard A. Wilson: ‘Representing Human Rights Violations: Social Contexts and Subjectivities’, in 
Richard A. Wilson (ed.) Human Rights, Culture and Context: Anthropological Perspectives (Routledge, 
1997) 134, 140.  
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In contrast to the TRC’s emphasis on forensic truth, the refugee-led Peace Cells and 
Tribal Leaders’ Forum aimed to generate a narrative form of truth. Instead of determining 
the content of testimony according to a set of fixed rules, these grassroots forums urged 
participants to describe their experiences as a personalised story, describing what 
happened according to how they both experienced and interpreted it. This allowed for a 
complexity in identity, and broadened the understanding of harm well beyond recognised 
human rights violations. People often spoke about social harms, for instance, such as the 
rise in teenage pregnancy and the breakdown in traditional family structures, in terms of 
the ongoing effects of the war.   
 
A second characteristic of the grassroots forums was an emphasis on dialogic truth. 
Participants were urged to deliver a personalised narrative that reflected their own 
understanding of past events, with an expectation that they engage other members of the 
forum throughout that narrative. Participants were prompted to ask questions of each 
other, and encouraged to link personal experiences to broader issues that affected the 
whole community. This gave others in the group an opportunity to question, dispute or 
add to the subjective experience described by the narrator. This practice was most 
conspicuous when perpetrators gave testimony: other members of the forums would 
routinely press the perpetrator to explain how they came to commit such atrocities, in an 
attempt to understand why the conflict had taken place in the way it did. The end result 
of this dialogue was a multifaceted and fluid truth that took into account the perspectives 
of multiple actors.  
 
By contrast, the TRC did not provide refugees any opportunity to engage in dialogue, 
either between victims and perpetrators, or between victims themselves. Although some 
limited dialogue did take place during public hearings in Liberia, the TRC cancelled its 
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public hearings in West Africa, thus taking away the little opportunity that did exist. As 
a result, the only opportunity for refugees to participate in dialogue was during the 
narrative statement process, which involved communication between the statement taker 
and refugee, but not between refugees themselves. Due to the rigid enforcement of the 
‘who did what to whom’ methodology, interactions between the statement-taker and 
refugee were limited to clarifying the refugee’s factual account. In addition, and creating 
further distance between the two parties, The Advocates used American lawyers as 
statement-takers. This changed the nature of the interaction, since ‘there is always a truth 
that can be known only by those on the inside. Or if not a truth…then a moral significance 
to these facts that only an insider can fully appreciate.’13  
 
Eric Weilbelhaus-Brahm, a legal practitioner and volunteer statement-taker with The 
Advocates, maintained that many refugees viewed the use of American lawyers 
positively. Because American lawyers were removed from the conflict, he suggested, this 
made them appear neutral and disinterested, which facilitated the testimony collection 
process. 14  Buur made a similar assessment in relation to the South African TRC, 
observing that foreign investigators could assess victims' statements more impersonally 
than their South African counterparts due to the distance they had to the events. As a 
result, he asserted, foreign investigators were more objective in their work.15 Contesting 
this view, Liberian refugees complained that the use of American lawyers meant they 
could not discuss issues of greatest concern to them, such as those around return, since 
the American statement-takers had no lived experience of repatriation. Instead, refugees 
often identified the opportunity to speak with domiciled TRC officials as the most 
                                                        
13 Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior's Honour: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience (Penguin, 1998) 175.  
14  Eric Weibelhaus-Braum, ‘A Volunteer’s Perspective on the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission Diaspora Project’ (2010) 2(3) Journal of Human Rights Practice 386, 393.  
15 Lars Buur, A Review of How the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s Management and Structure 
Impacted Upon Reconciliation and its Outcomes (Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 
2000) 17. 
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valuable aspect of the TRC’s proceedings, since it allowed them to speak with people 
who could more easily understand their perspective, about the topics they most valued.16  
 
This raises a fundamental question about the purpose of a TRC and its statement 
collection process. If the primary objective of a TRC is to generate forensic truth, then 
appointing disinterested adjudicators who apply a strict system of rules will be a 
compatible methodology. If, however, the goal is to create dialogic truth between those 
who personally experienced the atrocities, then an arms-length, legalistic procedure 
managed by foreigners is likely to be poorly suited. This can create a tension within truth 
commissions when different parties prioritise competing objectives, and have a range of 
capacities to enforce their own perspective. In Liberia, refugees had limited capacity to 
influence the formal TRC proceedings, which meant that they were forced to deliver 
testimony in a way that supported the creation of forensic truth, even if they personally 
did not support this objective.   
 
The dominant influence of the law created similar tensions for Afghan refugees who 
participated in transitional justice mechanisms. When the Transitional Government of 
Afghanistan initiated the process of drafting the 2004 Constitution, it provided refugees 
the opportunity to participate in both the national consultations and the Constitutional 
Loya Jirga. In some ways, these processes were undermined by a complete disregard for 
legal process, such as when the President’s office changed the terms of the draft 
constitution after the completion of public consultations. However, in other ways, the law 
and legal structures acted in a restrictive manner, constraining the way in which refugees 
could engage with the respective processes and restricting their ability to attain their 
preferred justice outcomes.  
                                                        
16 Interview with TRC staff member (Monrovia, 9 April 2013). 
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The constitution-drafting process was focused almost entirely on drafting the legal 
provisions of the Constitution. The government set topics for discussion, each of which 
was concerned with a specific legal matter: the rights and duties of the people, the 
technical system of governance, the structure of Parliament and government 
administration and the judiciary, and the relationship between government and the courts. 
The public consultations took place in a highly structured manner, beginning with surveys 
and then regulated discussions. The surveys described each question in technical rather 
than conceptual terms, using complex language and often referencing specialist legal 
terms. This made it extremely difficult for ordinary Afghans – including refugees – to 
engage in genuine dialogue with their government, or each other.17 
 
Due to the emphasis on technical legal matters, the constitution-drafting process did not 
address issues of greatest importance to refugees. Many returning refugees have found it 
difficult to integrate into Afghan life due to problems in accessing not only land and 
shelter, but also services and livelihoods.18 However, the potential for the constitution to 
create more egalitarian access to land, in a way that remedied past injustices, was not 
realised, and neither the consultations nor Loya Jirga addressed landlessness, land-
grabbing, or unequal access to land in any of its deliberations.19 Discussion concerning 
economic and social rights was also noticeably absent from questions in the consultation 
process, and deliberations at the Loya Jirga. Due to the stringent survey and consultation 
structure set up by the Constitutional Commission, refugees were unable to initiate 
                                                        
17 Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, ‘Human Rights and Rule of Law: Constitutional 
and Legal Reform’ (Roundtable Report, Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, September 
2003) 11. 
18 Nassim Majidi, ‘Urban Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons in Afghanistan’ (Report, Middle East 
Institute, 25 January 2011) 1, 9. 
19 Liz Alden Wily, ‘Land Rights in Crisis: Restoring Tenure Security in Afghanistan’ (Policy Paper, 
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, March 2003) 50-51. 
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questions on their own terms, or push to have the issues about which they were most 
concerned addressed.  
 
Afghan refugees also valued the opportunity to engage on an informal basis with officials 
from their home country during the constitution-drafting consultation. The Constitutional 
Commission spent several months traveling to different refugee communities in Pakistan 
and Iran in order to witness the conditions in which refugees lived, and to allow them to 
directly hear from refugees. 20  As the Constitutional Commission staff relayed the 
refugees’ opinions back to their headquarters, it also exposed the Kabul and foreign-based 
Afghan elite to the opinions of Afghan refugees and how they imagined the reconstruction 
of Afghanistan.21 This ability to speak with Commission members outside the formalities 
of the constitution drafting process meant that refugees were able to speak in terms and 
about matters of their own choosing, without being restricted to the legal structures put 
in place by the Commission.  
 
Overall, then, in both case studies, refugees struggled to obtain the justice outcomes they 
desired, at least in part because of the influence of law upon transitional justice. In the 
existing literature, scholars make a number of claims as to why this might occur. They 
refer to a range of significant material and logistical challenges that constrain the ways in 
which refugees can negotiate their interactions with transitional justice. One is physical 
isolation, since many refugees live in areas that are distant, inaccessible, and – particularly 
with respect to urban refugees – not easily identifiable. Refugees also lack financial 
resources, which they might otherwise use to better organise themselves, advocate their 
position and influence those in charge of transitional justice programming. They also face 
                                                        
20  South Asia Bureau, ‘Body Formed For New Afghan Constitution’, Dawn (online), 17 May 2003 
<http://www.dawn.com/news/102123/peshawar-body-formed-for-new-afghan-constitution/> 
21 J. Alexander Thier, ‘The Making of a Constitution in Afghanistan’ (2006-2007) 51 New York Law School 
Law Review 557, 568. 
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weak levels of coordination within the refugee community, little experience in political 
organisation, and few individuals conversant with the world of international transitional 
justice.22  
 
The most common scholarly assertion in relation to generating more responsive 
transitional justice is to take a ‘victim-centred’ approach, which means that the needs of 
victims drive the transitional justice process.23 In order to create a more victim-centred 
response, scholars urge greater consultation and engagement with the affected individuals 
and communities,24 a process they suggest should involve ‘deliberating, constructing, 
disputing, accepting, rejecting and reconsidering’ potential responses to mass violence.25 
Engaging in this type of consultation, scholars assert, will provide an opportunity to take 
into account the particular experiences, needs, and justice claims of refugees, thus 
creating processes and outcomes more closely aligned with their expectations.26  
 
The limitation with this approach is that it situates the disconnection between the justice 
refugees want, and the justice (or lack of justice) they obtain, in their own disempowered 
position. There is seldom any acknowledgement that transitional justice mechanisms 
themselves might be the cause of exclusion. However, the two case studies demonstrate 
that even when consultation with refugees (or victims more broadly) takes place, it 
remains bound by the conventional expression of transitional justice. Consequently, 
                                                        
22 Elyda Mey, ‘Cambodian Diaspora Communities in Transitional Justice’ (Briefing Paper, International 
Center for Transitional Justice, March 2008) 4, 5. 
23 Simon Robins, ‘Towards Victim-Centred Transitional Justice: Understanding the Needs of Families of 
the Disappeared in Post-Conflict Nepal’ (2011) 5 International Journal of Transitional Justice 75, 77.  
24 UN Special Rapporteur Pinheiro, Final Report on Housing and Property Restitution in the Context of the 
Return of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/17 (28 June 2005) 
Annex: Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, 
Principle 14. 
25 Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness (Beacon Press Books, 1998) 122. 
26 Roger Duthie, ‘Introduction: Incorporating Transitional Justice into the Response to Displacement’ in 
Roger Duthie (ed), Transitional Justice and Displacement (Social Science Research Council, 2012) 11, 16 
and 19. See also: Beyond Juba Project, ‘Violence, Exile, and Transitional Justice: Perspectives of Urban 
IDPs in Kampala’ (Briefing Note No. 3, Makerere University, August 2009) 15. 
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victims are required to envisage their preferred justice outcomes through a set number of 
institutions – criminal trials, truth commissions, reparations – which are structured 
according to a legal framework. 27  Transitional justice struggles to account for 
mechanisms and approaches to justice that do not fit within this institutional, legalistic 
and individualistic framework, and generally does not allow victims to envisage their 
pursuit of justice in alternate forums.28  
 
In order to create an authentically victim-centered transitional justice practice, it is 
necessary to move beyond the limitations imposed by the legal framework. A more 
holistic approach to transitional justice would seek to understand the broader justice 
priorities among the target population, including those that find expression in societal and 
social responses.29 It is only by broadening the ambit of recognised mechanisms and 
methodologies that scholars and practitioners can genuinely democratise and pluralise the 
practice of transitional justice, and thus reflect the views of victim community.30 For 
instance, there are times when violence creates harm that is not adequately captured by 
the language of rights, but which needs to be addressed in order for the community to 
recover.31 In such cases, it may be more useful to focus on the experience and perceptions 
of violence, and what remedies the community in question considers most relevant, rather 
than forcing victims to fit their experiences into the conventional legal and institutional 
framework.32 This would also contribute to a shift from claiming rights on behalf of 
                                                        
27 Pablo de Greiff, ‘Justice and Reparations’ in Pablo de Greiff (ed), The Handbook of Reparations (Oxford 
University Press, 2006) 451, 454, 457. 
28 Stephanie Vieille, ‘Transitional Justice: A Colonizing Field?’ (2012) 4(3) Amsterdam Law Forum 58, 
60. See also: Chodosh Hiram, ‘Reforming Judicial Reforms Inspired by US Models’ (2002) 52(2) De Paul 
Law Review 351, 361. 
29 Paul Gready and Simon Robins, ‘From Transitional to Transformative Justice: A New Agenda for 
Practice’ (2014) 8 International Journal of Transitional Justice 339, 344.  
30 Dustin Sharp, ‘Interrogating the Peripheries: The Preoccupations of Fourth Generation Transitional 
Justice’ (2013) 26 Harvard Human Rights Journal 149, 152. 
31 Kieran McEvoy and Kirsten McConnachie, above n 11, 496.  
32  Moses Chrispus Okello, ‘Afterward: Elevating Transitional Local Justice or Crystallizing Global 
Governance?’ in Rosalind Shaw and Lars Waldorf (eds), Localizing Transitional Justice: Interventions and 
Priorities after Mass Violence (Stanford University Press, 2010) 281. 
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victims, which engenders a lack of agency, to allowing victims to identify and claim rights 
on their own terms.33 Grounding the idea of rights in the everyday perspectives and actual 
struggles of those who claim to be rights-bearers might then offer a way to transform the 
normative parameters of human rights and expand the range of claims that are validated 
as rights.34  
 
9.3 Transitional Justice and the Interests of States and Refugees   
 
Transitional justice is typically a state-driven process, with the government imbued with 
the responsibility for initiating the mechanism, setting its mandate, and determining its 
methodology. Within the practice of transitional justice, there are numerous examples of 
mechanisms and practices led by non-state actors. 35  However, in the scholarship 
concerning refugees, this breadth is absent, and transitional justice scholars restrict their 
attention to a limited number of state-led mechanisms. To date, scholars have not 
considered how refugees and their claims for justice might be affected by the centrality 
of the state as a transitional justice actor. This section examines the experience of Liberian 
and Afghan refugees, and argues that in both cases, state and refugee interests often came 
into conflict, and that the way in which this conflict was resolved by the particular 
mechanism of transitional justice directly affected the ability of refugees to achieve their 
preferred form of justice. 
 
                                                        
33 Paul Gready and Simon Robins, above n 29, 343. See also: Tshepo Madlingozi, ‘On Transitional Justice 
Entrepreneurs and the Production of Victims’ (2010) 2(2) Journal of Human Rights Practice 208, 213. 
34 Celestine Nyamu-Musembi, ‘Towards an Actor-Oriented Perspective on Human Rights’ (IDS Working 
Paper No. 169, Institute of Development Studies, October 2002) 1. 
35  For example, see: Kieran McEvoy and Lorna McGregor (eds), Transitional Justice from Below: 
Grassroots Activism and the Struggle for Change (Hart Publishing, 2008); Rosalind Shaw, Lars Waldorf 
and Pierra Hazan (eds), Localizing Transitional Justice (Stanford University Press, 2010); Rosalind Shaw, 
‘Rethinking Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, Lessons from Sierra Leone’ (Special Report No. 130, 
United States Institute of Peace, February 2005). 
 250 
 
One reason why an analysis of the state as an actor in transitional justice is missing from 
the existing literature is that scholars and practitioners often fail to analyse what 
transitional justice is for, and who its mechanisms are intended to serve.36 Instead of 
attributing the objectives of transitional justice to specific actors, scholars commonly 
describe its aims in terms of normative and legalistic principles, such as ‘bringing justice 
to victims,’ or ‘holding perpetrators accountable.’37 In the case of refugees, the purpose 
of the interaction is most frequently expressed as resolving displacement,38 meeting the 
long-term justice needs of displaced persons,39 or protecting refugees.40 The problem 
with this approach is that it obscures the underlying politics of transitional justice 
interventions, and suggests that objective principles, and not interests, drive each 
mechanism.41 This is compounded by the legalistic approach, which suggests that the 
applicable international legal framework is neutral and apolitical, and, therefore, that it 
offers an objective method of delivering justice.42 In reality, however, transitional justice 
mechanisms do not serve all parties equally. They tend to be top-down,43 designed by 
elites and supported by the international community, both of which are remote from local 
understandings of justice.44  
 
                                                        
36 Rosemary Nagy, ‘Transitional Justice as Global Project: Critical Reflections’ (2008) 29(2) Third World 
Quarterly 275, 275.  
37 Kieran McEvoy, above n 4, 437.  
38 Lucy Hovil, ‘The Nexus between Displacement and Transitional Justice: A Gender-Justice Dimension’ 
(Research Brief, International Center for Transitional Justice, June 2013) 1.   
39  Marina Caparini, ‘Ensuring Long-Term Protection: Justice-Sensitive Security Sector Reform and 
Displacement’ in Roger Duthie (ed), Transitional Justice and Displacement (Social Science Research 
Council, 2012) 279, 304. 
40 UNHCR, Rule of Law and Transitional Justice  <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a293daf6.html>. 
41 Patricia Lundy and Mark McGovern, ‘Whose Justice? Rethinking Transitional Justice from the Bottom 
Up’ (2008) 35(2) Journal of Law in Society 265, 273. 
42  Dustin Sharp, ‘Beyond the Post-Conflict Checklist: Linking Peacebuilding and Transitional Justice 
Through the Lens of Critique’ (2013) 14(1) Chicago Journal of International Law 165, 170. 
43 Kieran McEvoy and Lorna McGregor, ‘Transitional Justice from Below: An Agenda for Research, Policy 
and Praxis’ in Kieran McEvoy and Lorna McGregor (eds), Transitional Justice from Below: Activism and 
the Struggle for Change (Hart Publishing, 2008) 1, 5. 
44 Simon Robins, above n 23, 76.  
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In order to analyse the role of the state in transitional justice, it is necessary to first 
acknowledge that the prevailing system of nation states is in no way natural, normal, 
inevitable or uncontested. This fact is often obscured since, across virtually all disciplines, 
scholars have tended to dehistoricise and presuppose the state.45 Structuring the world 
according to nation state principles has become so routinely assumed and banal that, for 
the large part, the construction process has vanished from sight altogether.46 However, 
the state, and the system of nation states that structures international relations, is in fact 
the result of a variety of historically contingent practices.47 In addition, since the state 
exists only because of such practices, in order to sustain the nation state system and the 
idea of the state, these practices must be continually reproduced. 48  Amongst these 
practices, the two primary concepts that both define and constitute the nation state system 
are sovereignty and nationalism.49 
 
Sovereignty comprises a set of norms concerning the legitimate organisation of political 
authority.50 The modern understanding of sovereignty arose after the Second World War, 
when collective horror at the extent to which human rights had been abused led to the 
emergence of a new international legal regime. The 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, followed by a wide range of human rights instruments, established an 
obligation upon states to take (or refrain from taking) certain actions in order to protect 
the rights of their citizens.51 This shifted the concept of sovereignty. Sovereignty was no 
                                                        
45 Shahar Hameiri, Regulating Statehood: State Building and the Transformation of the Global Order 
(Palgrave, 2010) 34.  
46 Andreas Wimmer and Nina Schiller, ‘Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation-State Building, 
Migration and the Social Sciences’ (2002) 2(4) Global Networks 301, 304. 
47 Nevzat Soguk, States and Strangers: Refugees and Displacements of Statecraft (University of Minnesota 
Press, 1999) 38, Peter Nyers, Rethinking Refugees: Beyond States of Emergency (Routledge, 2006) xi.  
48 Nevzat Soguk, above n 47, 37-38.  
49 Emma Haddad, The Refugee in International Society (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 65. 
50 Christian Reus-Smit, ‘Human Rights and the Social Construction of Sovereignty’ (2001) 27(4) Review 
of International Studies 519, 526. 
51 Charter of the United Nations, arts 55 and 56; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A 
(III), UN GAOR, 3rd sess, 183rd plen mtg, UN Doc A/810 (10 December 1948); International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 
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longer understood as a purely territorial matter, but required that each state demonstrate 
its ability to protect the rights of those within its borders.52 Within this modern conception 
of sovereignty, refugees assume a constitutive role. Since a state is required to protect the 
rights of those within its territory, refugees by their very existence undermine a state’s 
claim to legitimate sovereignty. Conversely, states often point to refugee repatriation as 
evidence that the population has renewed confidence in its ability to reconstruct order, 
thus signifying its legitimate sovereignty.53  
 
The second practice central to the modern state system is nationalism. To use the words 
of Benedict Anderson, nationalism refers to the process of constructing the nation as an 
‘imagined community.’ Members of even the smallest nations will never know or meet 
all their fellow members, he explains, and yet ‘in the minds of each lives the image of 
their communion.’54 Understanding the nation state in this way implies a number of 
conditions. Nations are necessarily imagined as bordered, finite entities, since no nation 
considers itself coterminous with all of humanity.55 They are also imagined as exclusive 
communities, defining themselves not only by who is included, but also by who is 
excluded, and thus creating a distinction between the citizens, nations and communities 
within, and the enemies, others and absences without.56 
 
                                                        
23 March 1976); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 
16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976). 
52  Christian Reus-Smit, above n 50, 528; W.Michael Reisman, ‘Sovereignty and Human Rights in 
International Law’ (1990) 84(4) American Journal of International Law 866, 872; United Nations 
Development Programme, Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security (Oxford 
University Press, 1994); United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2002: 
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53 Sarah Petrin, Refugee Return and State Reconstruction: A Comparative Analysis (UNHCR New Issues 
in Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 66, 2002).  
54  Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(Verso, 1983) 15. 
55 Ibid, 16. 
56 R.B.J. Walker, ‘International Relations and the Concept of the Political’ in Ken Booth and Steve Smith 
(eds), International Relations Theory Today (Polity Press, 1995) 306, 306. 
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Today, the practices of sovereignty and nationalism find clear expression in state-building 
interventions. State-building is the paradigm for structuring international intervention 
after a period of conflict. Such interventions aim to construct a strong and legitimate 
liberal state,57 typically by fostering democratic institutions, introducing the rule of law, 
and developing a market-driven economy.58 Since the mid-2000s, almost all transitional 
justice interventions have taken place in the political context of a state-building 
intervention.59 For this reason, it is a mistake to separate the practice of transitional justice 
from questions of nation-building, legitimisation and the centralisation of state power.60 
When transitional justice is delivered within the context of state-building, it is common 
for the new government to prioritise transitional justice mechanisms that establish the 
state’s legitimate sovereignty, such as those that reinforce the power of state institutions 
and demonstrate the state’s respect for international rules and standards.61 This means 
that mechanisms such as building courts or prosecuting former leaders tend to be more 
common than longer-term, non-institutionalised processes focused on reconciliation, 
community-level justice mechanisms or redistribution.62  
 
In both Liberia and Afghanistan, transitional justice was delivered within a state-building 
mission. The UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was a peacekeeping mission established 
by the Security Council in September 2003, mandated to provide, amongst other things, 
support for human rights assistance, security reform and implementation of the peace 
                                                        
57 Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict (Cambridge University Press, 2004) 5. 
58 Michael Barnett and Christopher Zurcher, ‘The Peacebuilder’s Contract: How External Statebuilding 
Reinforces Weak Statehood’ in Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk (eds), The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: 
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59 Chandra Sriram, ‘Transitional Justice and the Liberal Peace’ in Edward Newman, Roland Paris and 
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process. This included re-establishing national authority of the transitional government, 
and rebuilding government institutions.63 Similarly, in Afghanistan, the UN Assistance 
Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was a political mission established by the Security 
Council in 2002, and mandated to lead and coordinate international civilian efforts to 
assist Afghanistan with its transition, guided by the principles of reinforcing sovereignty, 
leadership and ownership.64 
 
The Liberian TRC contributed to building the legitimacy of the transitional government 
in a range of ways. The first was in the way it dealt with transition. In its final Report, the 
Liberian TRC set up a clear dichotomy between past and present, comparing Liberia’s 
‘bitter past’ with the present-day move towards peace, reconciliation and the rebuilding 
of the Liberian state.65 It described past abuses on the part of the government in terms of 
‘poor governance and maladministration,’66 and then, in stark contrast, commended the 
new government’s ‘peace-building aspirations’67 and the reforms ‘already underway’ to 
promote a culture of respect for human rights.68 This generated a narrative that set the 
rights abuse of the former government in counterpoint to the legitimate authority of the 
new, reformed state.  
 
For a transitional government, setting up a binary between the country’s discredited 
history and the work of the present government generates a form of ‘otherness’ against 
which the new polity can define itself.69 Through this narrative, the new government 
becomes all that the previous government was not: respectful of human rights, 
                                                        
63 SC Res 1509, UN SCOR, 4830th meeting, UN Doc S/RES/1509 (19 September 2003).  
64 SC Res 1401, UN SCOR, 4501st meeting, UN Doc S/RES/1401 (28 March 2002).  
65 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, above n 9, xxi, 208.  
66 Ibid, vol 2, 323.  
67 Ibid, vol 2, 90. 
68 Ibid, vol 2, 424. 
69 Richard A. Wilson, above n 60, 16.  
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accountable to citizens, and, ultimately, legitimately sovereign. One consequence of this 
narrative, however, is that the continuities of violence and exclusion into the present are 
overlooked.70 Ongoing structural biases built on economic, social or ethnic power are 
invisible since, to use the words of Robert Meister, ‘the cost of achieving a moral 
consensus that the past was evil, is to reach a political consensus that the evil is past.’71  
 
For Liberian refugees, one consequence of the TRC’s transition narrative was to suggest 
that the violations associated with displacement were now over. In both its testimony-
gathering process and Report, the TRC focused almost exclusively on the violations of 
refugees’ civil and political rights that led to displacement, such as large-scale killing or 
rape.72 These crimes were all situated firmly in the past, having largely ceased with the 
end of the conflict, and reflected a perspective on violence that suggested harm was 
experienced by an individual, as a result of another individual’s actions. By contrast, there 
was very little discussion of the violation of economic and social rights, no discussion at 
all of violations that continued to the present, and no conception of violations that harmed 
the community as a whole.   
 
By addressing violations of civil and political rights without simultaneously addressing 
violations of an economic and social nature, the Liberian TRC drew attention away from 
the government’s responsibility to address the economic and social rights of returned 
refugees. It concealed the ongoing deficiencies of the new government, and located the 
solution to the harm it described within the state legal system. The narrative implied that 
the primary responsibility falling upon the new government was to hold the historically-
situated perpetrators responsible for their past atrocities, via the state justice system. This 
                                                        
70 Rosemary Nagy, above n 36, 280. 
71 Robert Meister, above n 10, 96.  
72 Kristen Cibelli, Jule Kruger and Amelia Hoover, ‘Descriptive Statistics from Statements to the Liberian 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ (Report, Human Rights Data Analysis Group, June 2009) 49. 
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reduced past violations to a set of technical problems concerning the functioning of the 
legal system,73 and silenced the voices of refugees who were worried about their ability 
to achieve an adequate standard of living on return.74  
 
Refugees themselves understood transition in Liberia very differently. In their Peace 
Cells and Tribal Leaders’ Forum, refugees exhibited a strong sense of interconnectedness 
between past, present and future. Harms which continued into their daily, lived 
experience were understood to be just as much a legacy of the conflict as the killing, rape 
and destruction that people had suffered years earlier. In addition, refugees did not 
distinguish between harms associated with civil and political rights, and those associated 
with economic and social rights; both categories were seen as equally damaging to the 
lives of Liberians, and their ability to return to Liberia. 
 
The context of state-building also affected the type of solutions the Liberian TRC was 
willing to consider. In any transitional state, the new government faces a strong 
imperative to demonstrate that it is safe for refugees to return, and that the violations that 
triggered their displacement no longer exist. While the TRC Report never explicitly stated 
that Liberia was safe for refugees to return, it did not provide any details explaining why 
many refugees remained unwilling to repatriate. In its Report, the TRC did urge states to 
immediately cease any activities that sought to pressure refugees to return.75 However, it 
failed to provide any reasons justifying this recommendation. This concealed the many 
fears refugees held about return, many of which related to their ability to achieve an 
adequate standard of living, and undermined their contention that return remained unsafe. 
Moreover, when describing the rights of Liberian refugees living in West Africa, the TRC 
                                                        
73 Richard A. Wilson, above n 12, 148.  
74 Interview with Evon, Liberian returned refugee (Monrovia, 7 May 2013).  
75 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia,  above n 9, vol 3, 21.   
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used generic language, with little discussion of the administrative or legal measures that 
West African governments might take to ensure the long-term protection of refugees’ 
civil, political, economic and social rights. This created the impression that asylum was 
temporary, and that refugees were not entitled to the full, politically active existence owed 
to citizens.76 Since no justification was provided as to why refugees could not return, and 
no solutions were suggested for their long-term residence outside of Liberia, the TRC 
contributed to the assumption that their displacement would be eventually solved by 
repatriation. 
 
For Liberians resident in the United States, by contrast, their displacement was considered 
permanent. The TRC recommended that the Liberian government amend its laws to allow 
for dual citizenship for Liberian nationals resident in the United States,77 and guarantee, 
under law, the right of Liberians resident in the United States to vote in Liberia’s national 
elections.78 These solutions were not extended to Liberians living in West Africa, despite 
the fact that the Economic Community of West African States Free Movement Protocols 
could have provided a platform from which to assert citizenship.79 The combination of 
all these factors meant that Liberians resident in the United States were portrayed as 
politically active citizens, for whom the resolution of displacement lay in regularised 
status in the United States. Refugees in West Africa, by contrast, were portrayed as 
politically inactive both in the country of asylum, and with respect to their own national 
political community.  
 
                                                        
76 Ibid, vol 3, 22.   
77 Ibid, vol 2, 396. 
78 Ibid, vol 2, 397. 
79 Aderanti Adepoju, Alistair Boulton and Mariah Levin, ‘Promoting Integration Through Mobility: Free 
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In Afghanistan, as in Liberia, transitional justice focused upon strengthening the 
legitimacy of state institutions. The primary aim of the 2004 Constitution was to establish 
the framework for the institutions of central government. Debate revolved around three 
fundamental issues: the separation and balance of powers of government, the power-
sharing arrangements between local and central government, and the role of Islam.80 
Therefore, the drafting process functioned as a technical forum for discussing institutions 
for law-making and governance. It curtailed any possibility for refugees to use the forum 
as a platform to engage with their government regarding the harm they had suffered, and 
the contribution constitutional change or protection might make towards the repair of that 
harm.  
 
The emphasis on establishing strong institutions of state influenced the way that the 
drafting process and, ultimately, the Constitution itself framed the issue of land and 
property rights. The 2004 Constitution provides that property shall be safe from violation, 
no one shall be forbidden from owning and acquiring property except by law, and private 
property can only be confiscated by legal order. It is silent on the authority of customary 
law, and, although constitutional advisors suggested that the new constitution could lay 
the foundation for the reform of land tenure and land governance,81 the Constitutional 
Commission did not address landlessness, land-grabbing, or unequal access to land in any 
of its deliberations.82 The overall effect, then, is not to reform land ownership but to 
strengthen central state control over lands and land allocation. This scuttled any hope 
refugees had of achieving even limited land reallocation, in support of their return.  
 
                                                        
80 J. Alexander Thier, above n 21, 561; International Crisis Group, ‘Afghanistan: The Constitutional Loya 
Jirga’ (Asia Briefing No. 29, 2003) 3. 
81  Liz Alden Wily, ‘Land and the Constitution Current Land Issues in Afghanistan’ (Policy Paper, 
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, August 2003). 
82 Liz Alden Wily, above n 19, 50-51. 
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A second issue of key importance to refugees was that of economic and social rights. 
During the drafting process, debate around constitutional protection of economic and 
social rights focused on the relationship between local and central government.83 The 
2004 Constitution recognises, in principle, the state’s obligation to uphold the social and 
economic rights of its citizens, but locates responsibility for the pursuit of economic and 
social rights with local government.84 The Constitution directs the Afghan government, 
‘while preserving the principle of centralism,’ to ‘delegate certain authorities to local 
administration units for the purpose of expediting and promoting economic, social, and 
cultural affairs, and increasing the participation of people in the development of the 
nation.’ 85  What this might mean in practice, and exactly how central government 
authority might extend into the provinces and interact with local-level governance 
mechanisms, was not addressed in any substantial form during the constitution drafting 
discussions. This compromised the ability of refugees to use the constitution-drafting 
process to address their concerns around achieving an adequate standard of living upon 
return to Afghanistan.  
 
In both Liberia and Afghanistan, the interests of the new government and the refugee 
population came into direct conflict over the objectives and expressions of transitional 
justice. Since the respective governments were responsible for determining the terms of 
transitional justice, in both cases they were able to use the mechanism to pursue their own 
aims, such as strengthening the legitimacy of central institutions, and developing a 
political narrative concerning transition. Although refugees tried to contest the state’s 
control of the mechanisms, there was little practical opportunity to do so. This highlights 
the way that an over-reliance on a legal framework can function as a smoke screen, 
                                                        
83 J. Alexander Thier, above n 21, 561; International Crisis Group, above n 80, 3. 
84 The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Afghanistan, 26 January 2004) arts 6, 7.  
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disguising the interests of the different parties involved in transitional justice and the fact 
that they do not all have equal capacities to influence the objectives, structure and 
outcomes of transitional justice mechanisms. 
 
9.4 Using Transitional Justice to Rebuild the State-Citizen Relationship  
 
This section discusses the final theme that arose in my research: What is the objective of 
refugee involvement in transitional justice? Scholars and practitioners suggest that the 
ultimate aim is to resolve refugee displacement through physical return.86 In the two case 
studies, by contrast, refugees spoke of quite different motivations behind their decision 
to engage in transitional justice processes. They often referenced their social and political 
isolation, and their desire to reconnect with, and influence, structures of power in their 
home countries. This section examines the way these different perspectives informed the 
structure of transitional justice processes, as well as the way in which refugees interacted 
with those processes. It concludes by arguing for an alternate understanding of the 
objective of refugee involvement in transitional justice: that of rebuilding the state-citizen 
relationship.  
 
Transitional justice relies upon a framework of international law to understand the 
experience of displacement. The crime at the centre of this framework is arbitrary 
displacement, the key element of which is physical dislodgment from one’s home, land, 
or place of habitual residence.87 It is this understanding of displacement, namely, physical 
removal from one’s place of origin, which frames the interaction between transitional 
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justice and refugees. International criminal trials have prosecuted the crime of arbitrary 
displacement,88 reparations programs have distributed benefits to victims of arbitrary 
displacement,89 and truth commissions have examined arbitrary displacement as a human 
rights violation.90 This means that even when transitional justice mechanisms address 
other crimes affecting displaced persons, they do so with reference to physical 
displacement. Crimes such as mass killings, arbitrary arrest, torture and rape are described 
as violations that triggered physical displacement, while others, such as forced 
conscription and sexual assault, are presented as violations that took place during 
displacement.91 Overall, this creates an understanding of physical displacement as the 
distinctive harm from which refugees suffer.  
 
The understanding that physical displacement is the primary harm suffered by refugees 
leads to an emphasis on the resolution of physical displacement as the optimum solution 
to their situation. This is seen most clearly in the way that scholars and practitioners have 
prioritised property restitution, delivered in conjunction with repatriation, as the preferred 
form of reparations.92 This reasoning is evident throughout other mechanisms as well. 
For instance, scholars claim that truth commissions can reduce social tensions between 
refugees and their non-displaced compatriots by revealing and validating the experiences 
of the two groups;93 criminal prosecutions can pursue the safety of returning refugees by 
                                                        
88  For instance: Prosecutor v Momcilo Krajisnik (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
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92 Megan Bradley, Refugee Repatriation: Justice, Responsibility and Redress (Cambridge, 2013) 83. 
93 Roger Duthie, above n 26, 24.  
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removing known perpetrators from security institutions or local communities; 94  and 
reparations can help refugees to rebuild their lives upon return.95  
 
In the two case studies, refugees described the harm associated with displacement quite 
differently. Rather than describing harm in terms of physical displacement, they most 
frequently referenced their social isolation, the inability to influence decisions being 
made by those in power, and a sense of disconnection from institutions of governance in 
their home countries. In Liberia, for instance, refugees termed their time spent living in 
asylum as ‘wasted years,’ in part because they were cut off from the political and social 
structures in Liberia,96 while in Afghanistan, refugees asserted that being unable to vote 
rendered them ‘politically vulnerable and alienated.’97 This suggested a conception of 
harm that stretched well beyond physical displacement, and encapsulated political 
exclusion and a loss of social power.  
 
These refugee perspectives suggest that displacement is not merely physical, but 
fundamentally political. This argument is made by scholars such as Arendt, who asserts 
that while the experience of being physically displaced may result in very real suffering 
for refugees, this is only a reflection of a much more significant harm: the inability of 
refugees to access citizenship rights.98 This political understanding of displacement is 
based on the idea that a refugee is someone who not only fled their own country due to 
persecution, but who, importantly, fled because they were unable to obtain the protection 
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of their own state against that harm.99 It is this lack of state protection, rather than 
persecution, that ultimately creates, and defines, the refugee. On this basis, a more 
accurate understanding of the refugee, and one which underpins the arguments made in 
this section, is someone who has been forced out of his or her own domestic political 
community, indefinitely.100  
 
Being excluded from one’s national political community generates two significant 
deprivations. Firstly, refugees are deprived of a forum through which they can claim 
rights protection.101 This is because, in our modern political system, it is the nation state 
that is responsible for protecting the rights of its citizens. Rights cannot be protected by 
well meaning movements of global cosmopolitanism, but require legitimate and 
democratic nation-states that guarantee rights as part of their constitutional architecture 
and provide clear remedies in law.102 Without any access to such architecture or remedies, 
refugees lack a forum through they can pursue the enforcement of their rights. The 
second, related, deprivation is a loss of political relevance. Under our modern political 
system, it is the citizen who constitutes the proper subject of political life.103 Without 
citizenship, refugees are denied the capacity to speak politically, and the expectation that 
they will be heard.104 This also means that the problem of how to include refugee voices 
into governance processes is a deeply political one, based on who counts as an authentic 
political subject.105   
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Scholars often describe the potential for transitional justice mechanisms to repair the 
relationship between the state and its citizens.106 They detail the way that mechanisms 
such as criminal trials, truth commissions and reparations programs can restore the 
refugee’s ability to make claims against the state, and, in doing so, reposition the refugee 
as a citizen with legal and moral entitlements equal to those of non-displaced 
compatriots.107 According to this approach, transitional justice contributes to the repair 
of the state-citizen relationship by identifying specific human rights abuses levied against 
individuals, and repairing those particular injustices through an institutionalised form of 
transitional justice. This might entail, for example, recognising the unlawful seizure of an 
individual’s property, and then remedying that harm through a restitution program.  
 
The limitation with this approach is that it struggles to address harms associated with the 
political conception of displacement. International law recognises only a narrow range of 
harms, each of which is articulated as the violation of a specific right. If refugees want to 
pursue accountability for the harms they have suffered, or obtain a remedy for the breach 
of their rights, they must describe their grievances in terms of a recognised rights 
violation. The loss of political relevance, then, must be described as a violation of their 
right to freedom of expression, for instance, or a limitation on their freedom of 
association. This strictly legal approach is often inadequate for refugees because, on the 
one hand, international law permits governments to derogate from a number of political 
rights in the case of displaced citizens. This is discussed in more detail below. However, 
the more fundamental and pervasive problem is that the loss of political relevance does 
not come from the violation of a legal right per se, but the fact that refugees exist within 
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a political framework that fixes the citizen as the appropriate subject of political action. 
For refugees, as persons cast out of the national polity and no longer considered part of 
the national citizenry, this means that they are denied a forum through which they can 
effectively claim their rights,108 and have their voices heard.109  
 
The limitations of the conventional, legal approach to transitional justice arose in the case 
of refugee enfranchisement in Afghanistan. The enfranchisement of refugees arguably 
falls within the category of rectificatory justice, since it entails the state restoring to the 
refugee something that was lost when the refugee was forced outside the national 
polity.110 Typically, scholars rely on a framework of human rights law to understand the 
harm associated with refugee disenfranchisement. Accordingly, the harm is defined as 
the inability to exercise one’s right to vote. The way to repair this harm, then, is to 
enfranchise the individual so they can once again cast a vote.111 In reality, there are a 
number of barriers to refugees claiming this right, since, under international law, the right 
to vote for non-domiciled nationals is subject to ‘reasonable restrictions,’ one of which 
includes residency requirements.112 Legally, then, there is no clear obligation upon states 
to ensure that citizens residing outside of the country can vote in national elections.113 
Moreover, a strictly legal approach fails to appreciate harms that fall outside the loss of 
the right to vote; or, equally, methods of repair that do not entail restoring that legal right.  
 
When scholars do address the political – and not just the legal – implications of 
enfranchisement, they usually do so from the perspective of the state. With respect to the 
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2004 Presidential elections, for instance, scholars suggest that the enfranchisement of 
Afghan refugees was politically motivated, and only supported by the government 
because the majority of refugees were anticipated to vote for the incumbent transitional 
President Karzai.114  Since it did not reflect a genuine intention on the part of the Afghan 
government to uphold refugee rights and include refugees in the national political 
community, refugee enfranchisement undermined, rather than upheld, the goals of state-
building.115  
 
Another example of the bias towards the perspective of the state is found in Laurie 
Brand’s research on out-of-country voting during the Arab spring. She demonstrates that 
the extension of the right to vote to include people who lived abroad redrew political 
boundaries, by including those who would otherwise have been excluded. However, she 
asserts that expanding these boundaries did not necessarily translate into more meaningful 
transnational citizenship.116 While governments often used the language of citizenship to 
support out-of-country voting, the rationale behind that language often contradicted the 
principle of inclusive citizenship and reflected a range of elite concerns, from formal 
legitimation to security monitoring of expatriate communities.117  
 
These two examples demonstrate the way that scholars typically judge the value of 
refugee enfranchisement by questioning the state’s motivation for that enfranchisement, 
and then assign value according to the state perspective. However, this fails to address 
the perspective of refugees themselves, and assumes that refugees interpret the value of 
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enfranchisement on the same terms as the state. This omits a key question: how did 
refugees themselves understand the value (if any) of their enfranchisement? 
 
In the case of Afghanistan, Afghan refugees framed the issue of their enfranchisement in 
quite different terms from those of human rights law, and state-based politics. For many, 
the reparative value of out-of-country voting went far beyond the legal act of 
enfranchisement and the ability to cast a vote. Instead, enfranchisement offered a way to 
remedy the effects of political displacement, since it gave political relevance to Afghan 
refugees and provided them with a forum through which they could speak politically, and 
be heard. Enfranchisement constituted express recognition by the Afghan government of 
the status of refugees as rights-bearers and citizens, and indicated that governmental 
institutions would strive for, and derive legitimacy from, their inclusiveness.118 This 
happened not just through the act of casting a vote, but also through the activities taking 
place in support of the voting process. Political actors and government officials travelled 
from Afghanistan to refugee communities in Pakistan in order to carry out political 
campaigning and voter education, which rendered asylum a political space, and refugees 
as political actors. These visits provided refugees with the opportunity to speak to leaders 
from their home government about issues that were important to them, in a forum that 
recognised their voices. From the perspective of refugees, then, the value of 
enfranchisement was the fact that it politicised the space of asylum. This suggests that 
even if refugee enfranchisement is motivated by reasons unrelated to refugee rights or 
inclusive citizenship, the fact that refugees are recognised as political actors, and can 
therefore access political forums by, in particular, building relationships with government 
officials, can make a valuable contribution to the repair of the state-citizen relationship.  
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For Liberian refugees, also, the conventional approach to transitional justice – expressed 
through the TRC – proved unable to address the harms associated with a political 
conception of displacement. The Chairman of the TRC asserted that the TRC included 
refugees in its proceedings because it wanted them to be heard and acknowledged on 
equal terms as other Liberians.119 In its Final Report, also, the TRC explicitly recognised 
refugees as citizens. However, it was a narrow concept of citizenship, which did not 
include the right to political participation while displaced. While the TRC recommended 
that Liberians resident in the US receive legal recognition as dual citizens and inclusion 
in national elections, these rights were denied to refugees resident in West Africa, due at 
least in part to an assumption that return was the best solution to their displacement. This 
perspective was sharply contested by Liberian refugees, who expressed strong opinions 
regarding the type of support the Liberian government should give them even as they 
resided in Ghana. This included legal assistance, education packages, and political rights, 
including the right to vote in Liberia’s national elections.120  
 
While the TRC itself often failed to guarantee the legal rights of Liberian refugees to a 
political life, it did offer informal avenues through which Liberian refugees could 
influence national political forums. As part of the TRC’s engagement with the refugee 
population, a delegation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and the Ministry of Justice visited Buduburam refugee settlement. This gave 
refugees an opportunity to discuss directly and informally with government officials their 
concerns about return, and led to a number of commitments beings made on the part of 
the government concerning services they would provide.121 In addition, refugees took the 
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opportunity to speak with domiciled TRC officials and staff about the reality of 
repatriation. Since these officials lived in Liberia themselves, they were able to speak 
with a sense of legitimacy that, in the view of refugees, non-domiciled officials or staff 
could not. Liberian refugees repeatedly asserted that exposure to Liberian officials and 
the opportunity to engage in genuine dialogue was the most valuable element of the TRC 
proceedings, on the basis that the government had to ‘build relationships’ before it could 
build peace. 122  A number of refugees asserted that by making efforts to engage in 
dialogue with refugees, the Liberian government demonstrated that it was actively trying 
to ‘reconcile with the people.’123 
 
When it came to repairing the harm associated with displacement, refugees in both 
Afghanistan and Liberia found that relationships, rather than legal institutions, often made 
a more valuable contribution. One reason for this is that the law is oriented to rules, 
whereas people will often ‘speak of their place in a network of social relations, and 
emphasise the social context of their legal problems.’124 So, while transitional justice 
mechanisms, as institutionalised legal processes, aimed to secure legal recognition of 
refugee rights, refugees themselves often turned to the more flexible forums located in 
personal relationships. Through these social interactions, refugees were able to speak on 
their own terms, about those issues of greatest importance to them. They were also able 
to receive recognition of their political relevance on terms that reflected their own 
perspectives, rather than only that of the state, or the law.  
 
Another area where refugee perspectives concerning harm and repair diverged from the 
conventional approach to transitional justice was with respect to development assistance. 
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Development and transitional justice are generally considered separate fields. However, 
they share a number of objectives, such as creating reconciliation amongst post-conflict 
populations, and renewing civic trust and confidence between the state and citizens.125 
There is some limited practice of engaging refugees in development projects as part of a 
broader strategy related to transitional justice. In the 1990s and early 2000s, UNHCR 
initiated a number of ‘co-existence’ projects, aimed at generating reconciliation between 
returned refugees and the communities to which they returned by engaging those 
communities in development projects. A number of studies demonstrated that in those 
communities, efforts to increase security, reconstruct infrastructure, generate 
employment opportunities, and strengthen equitably accessible social services made a 
more significant contribution to enabling reconciliation than conventional mechanisms of 
transitional justice. 126  Beyond these co-existence projects, however, there is little 
scholarly discussion of the potential of development projects to contribute to the 
objectives of transitional justice.  
 
In the two case studies, the ability to achieve an adequate standard of living was a serious 
concern for returned refugees, as well as those considering return. In Liberia, one of the 
most common themes amongst Liberian refugees when asked their views on transitional 
justice generally, or the TRC specifically, was the need for their government to provide 
development assistance.127 Numerous people asserted that in order to forget the past and 
                                                        
125 Marcus Lenzen, ‘Roads Less Traveled: Conceptual Pathways (and Stumbling Blocks) for Development 
and Transitional Justice’ in Pablo de Greiff and Roger Duthie (eds), Transitional Justice and Development: 
Making Connections (Social Science Research Council, 2009) 76, 83. 
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 271 
 
move on, the most important thing was for people to get access to ‘jobs and support,’ so 
that they could meet their basic needs.128 Refugees expressed scepticism towards the 
Liberian government’s claims that it sought reconciliation through the TRC, when it 
failed to provide access to education, health care, and basic infrastructure. 129  This 
supports the assertion that reconciliation without economic justice – which might be 
achieved through development programs – is likely to appear ‘cheap and spurious.’130 
 
The Afghan NSP provided one example of how development assistance might engage 
displaced persons and, in doing so, pursue the objectives of transitional justice. The NSP 
was a state-led, community development program, intended to deliver critical 
development services to the rural population. It had widespread coverage, reaching nearly 
70 per cent of rural communities in Afghanistan, making it the largest provider of the 
development projects that benefitted returning refugees.131 According to scholars, the 
NSP’s local governance structure and investment in development projects allowed 
communities to develop their economies and expand their income‐generating 
opportunities, which positively impacted the integration of returnees and IDPs.132 It also 
achieved unprecedented, widespread involvement of women in rural Afghanistan’s 
community decision‐making apparatus, including refugee women.133  
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The NSP supported the aims of transitional justice in a number of different ways. Firstly, 
it contributed directly to the process of returned refugees rebuilding their state-citizenship 
relationship. The NSP explicitly aimed to extend the administrative reach of the state to 
the provinces, and build representative institutions for local governance through the 
Community Development Councils (CDCs) it established in each participating village.134 
Through its CDCs, the NSP provided tangible evidence of the state’s protection in areas 
of refugee return, meeting the basic needs of refugees such as water, sanitation, health 
and education. It also opened up a direct channel of communication between rural 
communities and the central government, something that had not existed previously.  
 
The NSP also contributed to reconciliation between displaced and non-displaced 
Afghans.135 The CDCs provided a framework through which Afghan refugees could 
rebuild their ties with their local community in a practical way, by engaging in discussion 
around the development activities the community should prioritise. By targeting the 
community as a whole, the NSP mitigated sources of conflict that could have arisen if 
specific groups, such as returning refugees, were the sole beneficiaries of development 
projects and support.136 
 
One limitation of the NSP, from the perspective of its contribution to transitional justice 
objectives, was that only returned refugees were eligible to participate. Until they 
physically moved back to the village in Afghanistan where they intended to live, Afghan 
refugees were not incorporated into the CDCs – and, for the overwhelming majority, they 
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would not even hear about the NSP until after their return.137 Grant disbursements from 
the government to the CDCs were not flexible enough to account for an influx of returnees 
or IDPs in a community, which meant that projects such as schools, clinics and water 
facilities were often rendered insufficient.138 Involving refugees in CDC discussions prior 
to their return – through remote means – might be one way to counter this shortcoming. 
There may also be value in engaging refugees while still displaced so that they can begin 
to repair their relationship with their state, and community, prior to their physical return, 
thus supporting the transition.  
 
The experiences described throughout this section highlight markedly different 
perspectives towards the meaning of citizenship. Conventional mechanisms of 
transitional justice, such as the Liberian TRC, take a liberal approach to citizenship. This 
means that the citizen is conceived of as an individual who requires protection both by 
the state against violent others, and from the excessive powers of the state itself. Under 
the liberal model of citizenship, the state guarantees such protection through its formal 
recognition of its citizens’ fundamental rights.139 The liberal understanding of citizenship 
informed much of the Liberian TRC’s work. The TRC asserted the state’s protection of 
its citizens by establishing a legal framework through which to pursue justice for victims. 
In addition, it attempted to protect minorities by recommending the criminalization of 
any mention of ethnic differences, or offensive language. It also emphasised the legal 
rights of Liberians living in the United States and West Africa.  
 
From the perspective of Liberian refugees, the legal approach to protecting their rights – 
and the liberal model of citizenship which underpinned that approach – often proved 
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138 Ibid, 59.  
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inadequate, and did not lead to the practical realisation of the rights they most valued, or 
to the justice outcomes they preferred. The human rights framework stymied their ability 
to speak in the way they wished, and did not provide any protection of their economic 
and social rights. While the TRC Report recognised specific rights associated with 
citizenship for Liberians resident in the United States, including dual citizenship and the 
right to vote, it omitted these same rights for refugees resident in West Africa.  
 
Afghan refugees had a similar experience with respect to the 2004 constitution. On paper, 
the constitution protected a range of citizenship rights, which supported a liberal approach 
to citizenship. However, those rights most important to Afghan refugees, such as the 
ability to claim or access land, and to achieve an adequate standard of living, were absent 
from the constitution and its process of drafting. As such, the constitution contributed 
little to the practical realisation of rights most important to refugees. 
 
By contrast, unconventional mechanisms and methods of transitional justice in both 
Liberia and Afghanistan reflected a civic republican approach to citizenship. While the 
liberal model accentuates the importance of legal protection of citizens’ rights, the civic 
republican model focuses on political community. It asserts that each individual has an 
equal role in the collective decision-making of the polity,140 and holds that the protection 
of citizens is achieved through their active membership in the self-governing polity.141 
The ability to build relationships and communicate directly with government officials, 
for instance, is one way that transitional justice processes contributed to a civic republican 
conception of citizenship. Out-of-country voting in Afghanistan, for instance, did not 
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result in the irrevocable recognition of the right of refugees to vote, but did allow refugees 
to have their voices heard by officials in their home country. Refugees were able to 
directly communicate their own interpretation of harm and repair, emphasise the rights 
or justice outcomes most important to them, and potentially influence the way in which 
their government engaged with them. Equally, the NSP did not formalise rights 
protection, but did set up a systematic channel of communication between returned 
refugees and the Afghan government.  
 
Refugee perspectives in the two case studies demonstrated that displacement is not merely 
physical, but fundamentally political. Their exclusion from the national polity means that 
refugees are deprived of a forum through which they can claim rights protection,142 and 
suffer a loss of political relevance.143 In both case studies, it was these harms that refugees 
aimed to remedy by participating in transitional justice processes. The primary objective 
of refugee involvement in transitional justice, then, was not to resolve physical 
displacement, but to restore political relevance, and the ability to claim rights. In other 
words, refugees used transitional justice processes in an attempt to restore their state-
citizen relationship, even before they were ready to physically return. 
 
The understanding of displacement as political, and not simply physical, underlines that 
its resolution is best understood in terms of political inclusion, and realisable rights.144 
This separates the repair of the state-citizen relationship from physical return, and 
suggests that, in fact, the process entails ‘return not to a place, but to a political 
community.’145 The way to judge the reparative value of transitional justice activities, 
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then, is not whether they contribute to refugee return; but how they contribute to the 
quality of the relationship between refugees and their state. This might entail the formal 
recognition of refugee rights – reflecting a liberal construction of citizenship – or 
establishing channels of communication between refugees and officials from their home 
country, reflecting a civic republican construction of citizenship.  
 
In pursuing the restoration of their state-citizen relationship, refugees often relied on 
unconventional mechanisms, such as out-of-country voting, or development assistance; 
and unexpected methodologies, such as social interactions and relationships. This was 
necessary since the conventional approach to transitional justice struggled to respond to 
the political conception of displacement. Human rights law proved ill equipped to 
recognise, or remedy, the harms associated with a loss of political identity, and the legal, 
institutionalised expression of transitional justice was usually too inflexible to incorporate 
alternate conceptions of harm and repair. These processes and methods also offered 
practical ways by which refugees could realise their rights, and regain their political 
relevance, while still displaced.  
 
9.5 Conclusion   
 
In 2015, the number of refugees living in protracted displacement due to conflict and 
human rights abuse continues to rise, and is proving increasingly difficult to resolve. 
Transitional justice offers one way to respond to the harms associated with long-term 
displacement: it can assist refugees to achieve recognition and accountability for the harm 
they have suffered, allow them to join in a national process of memorialising the past, 
and assist them with their eventual return home. On this basis, for refugees whose 
preferred justice outcomes align with those of transitional justice, the use of transitional 
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justice as a response to protracted displacement appears to be a positive step. Those who 
wish to return to their original home within the time frame supported by their state, for 
example, are likely to find significant value in property restitution processes.  
 
However, transitional justice struggles to incorporate the justice preferences of all 
refugees. In both case studies, transitional justice mechanisms often failed to respond to 
the lived experience of injustice, as well as to its repair. Many refugees found that their 
own perspectives concerning the harm, reparation and resolution of displacement were 
incompatible with those of transitional justice. Part of the problem was the tendency of 
transitional justice to rely on a discourse of human rights to identify which past 
experiences it would address, and which remedies it would apply. Refugees who could 
not fit their experiences into language of human rights, or did not wish to engage with an 
institutionalised, legalistic forum, often found that they had no way to communicate their 
experiences, or to achieve the remedies they sought.  
 
At the root of this problem was a lack of genuine engagement with refugees, on both the 
substance and format of transitional justice processes. Scholars and practitioners tend to 
use the language of human rights to speak on behalf of refugees, and fail to take into 
account conceptions of the harm and repair of displacement that fall outside the human 
rights framework. Scholars also tend to define the purpose of transitional justice in 
normative terms, which suggests that transitional justice mechanisms are neutral and 
objective and obscures the fact that refugees often hold very different interests to those 
of their state.  
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In both Liberia and Afghanistan, refugees often spoke of justice outcomes that differed 
markedly from those of scholars and practitioners, and they often pursued these objectives 
in forums not conventionally recognised by transitional justice. These perspectives 
demonstrated that a victim-centred approach to transitional justice expands the very idea 
of what constitutes transitional justice. Victim-centred transitional justice does not simply 
mean asking refugees if they would prefer a truth commission or criminal trials. Rather, 
it entails understanding the implications of using a legal human rights framework to 
define harm and repair, and acknowledging the voices and experiences that a human 
rights framework excludes. It means analysing mechanisms in terms of actors’ interests, 
rather than normative principles, in order to provide an account of the politics of 
transitional justice processes, as well as to acknowledge that actors hold unequal 
capacities to pursue their own interests. It also means questioning why certain solutions 
are considered most appropriate for refugees, and whether refugees themselves share 
those same priorities.  
 
If paying attention to local experiences shows us how foundational assumptions and 
practices of transitional justice break down, it can also point to new possibilities.146 In the 
two case studies, listening to refugee voices produced an alternate understanding of the 
mechanisms and methodologies of transitional justice. This broader view of transitional 
justice suggested practices and forums capable of addressing harms, and achieving justice 
outcomes that conventional process of transitional justice could not. Refugee perspectives 
suggested that the full effects of political displacement, rather than only that of physical 
displacement, should inform practices of transitional justice. This entails addressing two 
main deprivations: the loss of a forum through which to claim rights, and the loss of 
political relevance. While a conventional approach to transitional justice would attempt 
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to repair these harms by establishing laws or institutions that formally recognise refugees 
as citizens, refugees suggested that the rebuilding of the state-citizenship relationship 
takes place through a much wider range of non-legal processes. This includes politicising 
the space of asylum, building personal relationships, and the provision of development 
assistance. 
 
Defining refugees as those who suffer primarily from physical displacement suggests that 
justice will be found in physical return. Victim-centred justice, then, must start by looking 
at what constitutes harm, and who defines the parameters of what is recognised, and what 
is excluded. Equally, the methods for repair of harm must be shaken free of the 
institutionalised expression set up by the law and states, and placed back in the hands of 
those who have been harmed. Together with the opportunity to define the harm that 
requires repair, and how that repair should be approached, refugees might be better 
positioned to achieve justice outcomes more closely aligned with their own perspectives, 
and preferences.  
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